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  Abstract 
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) play important roles in socio-economic development 
and poverty alleviation particularly in developing countries. It has however been argued 
that the focus of MFIs is changing from the traditional purely social to commercial 
(mission drift) and has been criticised for neglecting the welfare of citizens and 
grassroots accountability in favour of commercialisation and accountability to 
donors/shareholders. This mission drift has resulted in changes in the structure and 
practices of MFIs. The study has been designed to examine how the accounting and 
accountability practices of a MFI can change in response to changes in its mission.  The 
study presents case evidence from a large MFI operating in Cameroon with data 
collected through semi-structured interviews, informal discussions and documents. The 
study traces the evolution of the organisation and its accounting and accountability 
practices.  A theoretical framework of an interpretive nature is used which draws on 
institutional entrepreneurship theory in order to highlight the importance of actors in the 
change process. The findings suggest a mission drift and transformations over the years 
from a social to a commercial organisation with the change impacting significantly on 
its structure and accounting and accountability practices.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 Introduction and Problem Statement 
It is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the fact that there is a growing desire to provide 
financial services to the poor, particularly in developing countries (Hopper et al., 2009; Imai et 
al., 2010). Today’s expression ‘micro financing g’ can be dated back to the 1970s, when 
Mohammad Yunus developed the concept. MFIs amongst other financial institutions have been 
suggested to be the best channel for reaching the poor with financial services and as a means of 
socio-economic development (Otero, 1999; Hudon, 2008). Until recently, MFIs were charged 
essentially with the provision of microcredit to microenterprises, but the demand of the poor has 
increased over time forcing MFIs to broaden their supply from microcredit to microfinance 
(Rhyne, 2001; Valadez and Buskirk, 2012).  
 
It has been argued that the main objective of MFIs is poverty alleviation (Quinones and 
Remenyi, 2014). Hammill et al. (2008) emphasise that the poverty alleviation objective is not 
only obtained via the provision of financial services to the poor but also by ensuring the services 
are put into productive activities for better asset building, consumption stabilisation, risk hedging 
and positive socio-economic development. With the initial objective of MFIs being loan 
expansion to the poor, the primary metric for measurement was outreach (Meyer and Nagarajan, 
2006), to include its breadth and depth (Cull et al., 2007; Mersland and Strom, 2010).  
 
Bateman and Chang (2012) argued that microfinance activities in the early 80s heavily depended 
on the inflow of subsidised capital. The capital was either provided by the government of the 
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country where the MFI was residing or an international development body. In a bid to solve this 
problem of sustainability in the long run, the idea of commercialisation was developed by MFIs: 
that is, making profits and using the income to reinvest in giving out microloans to the poor and 
remaining sustainable without having to rely on either the government or any international body 
(Woller, 2002). Since then, MFIs have been criticised for both including such a commercially 
focused financial objective and for drifting away from their social mission (Mersland and Strom, 
2010).  
 
Alongside MFIs being financially viable and meeting the financial needs of the poor, they also 
contribute to women’s empowerment, asset building , risk mitigation and management of 
vulnerable groups and increase employment (Balkenhol, 2006) and engage in other forms of 
socio-economic development (Oluyombo, 2010). MFIs, which were previously referred to as a 
‘double tasked’ can now be referred to as multiple tasked in meeting development needs and 
achieving long-term goals (Zeller, 2001). Commercial approaches are now being adapted by 
MFIs to meeting such socio-economic needs of their illiterate and poverty-driven customers 
(Christen, 2001; Woller, 2002).  
 
The microfinance industry has received many commendations over the last decade as the best 
means of intervention dedicated to serving the poor in a bid to alleviate poverty while remaining 
financially viable (Tulchin, 2003; Mersland and Strom, 2010). Thus, MFIs’ engagement in 
development and poverty alleviation work has favoured the marginalised population at local, 
national, and global levels around the world (Bala and Mir, 2006). Microfinance successes have 
also been documented, even though researchers including Tulchin (2003) still argue that they are 
not an absolute developmental solution. The challenges faced by MFIs support Karnani’s (2007) 
argument that these organisations cannot claim to work alone as panaceas for the complex and 
different dimensional issues imbedded in poverty and social exclusion. Karnani’s argument 
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implies that for MFIs to succeed in alleviating poverty, as they claim to be doing alongside 
meeting other objectives, other external interventions cannot be ignored. Hermes et al. (2011) 
also mention the trade-offs that exist in achieving microfinance objectives. 
 
The microfinance industry has witnessed a rapid growth rate in the last decade, particularly in 
developing countries where aid and development is still very essential in order to meet the needs 
of a wider client base (Bateman, 2010; Ahmed, 2009). In spite of the importance and rapid 
growth rate witnessed in the microfinance industry, the literature on its governance and 
accountability issues remains sparse, with recent attention tilted towards NGOs (Ebrahim, 2003; 
Gray et al., 2006). Such control mechanisms are also vital because managers could have 
conflicting objectives/preferences to those of fund providers (Hartarska, 2005, Meyer and 
Nagarajan, 2006). MFIs are increasingly being put under pressure to exercise ‘good governance’ 
in their organisations (Lewis and Madon, 2004; Dixon et al., 2006), based on the argument that 
good governance is critical for the success of these organisations (Hartarska, 2005).  
 
The governance idea necessitates MFIs to become more transparent and accountable. The 
implication of this idea is that accountability is better in order to achieve their set objectives, 
which could encompass poverty alleviation, financial viability, and commercialisation and/or 
development. Thus, there is a need for a closer examination of the meaning of accountability, 
together with its types and the mechanisms through which it can be delivered (Hartarska, 2005).  
 
What then does and should accountability mean in an organisational context (Gray et al., 2006; 
Gray, 2014) given the fact that MFIs aim at satisfying the needs of the poor and are also 
becoming commercially focused? Besides looking at shareholder primacy, a stakeholder 
perspective of accountability has also been discussed and adopted in the field of study (Gray, 
2001; Ebrahim, 2003; Bovens, 2007; Cooper and Owen 2007). The implication here is that for a 
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MFIs to remain transparent and accountable to the poor, its accountability practice should 
include that which runs from the centre to the periphery in order to assure appropriate grassroots 
services (Dixon et al., 2006). Traditionally, researchers have tended to look at accountability 
only between MFIs and donors or shareholders (shareholder primacy) and at times internally 
within the organisation. External accountability between MFIs and customers has often been 
excluded (stakeholder perspective). Embracing the accountability relationship between MFIs and 
their customers will broaden our understanding of MFI-customer relationships and the 
accountability process, where, for example, customers are required to account for how the loans 
obtained from MFIs have been utilised for better management and accountability enhancement. 
Top-down approaches of accountability have thus been questioned (principle and practice) as 
they fail to embrace customers (Ebrahim, 2003; Hilhorst, 2003). The argument raised here is that 
top-down accountability fails to comprehend what actually constitutes accountability in a 
practical society (Hilhorst, 2003). It may not even reach the periphery or grassroots where the 
aid and development is needed most.  
 
Bala and Mir (2006:3) argue that “governments are accountable to their voters in principle, 
private companies are accountable to their shareholders”, however accountability issues remain 
complex. Hilhorst (2003) argues that in practice, institutions like MFIs are either not accountable 
at all or accountable only to their funding agencies or donors (shareholder primacy). Questions 
surrounding the nature of microfinance accounting and accountability practices have raised 
several eyebrows (Dixon et al., 2006).  There is therefore a need to study these governance 
issues in order to make sure that the financial services provided by MFIs are channelled to the 
intended people (Hartarska, 2005) – mission accomplished not drifted and to ensure transparency 
(Ebrahim, 2003; Chen, 2011).  
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A review of the MFI literature has thus identified complex and unexplored issues on 
microfinance missions, actors, accounting and accountability in different organisations 
(Hartarska, 2005; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006; Dixon et al., 2006). While it has been 
recognised that a number of MFIs lack effective accounting and accountability practices, 
particularly at the grassroots level (Dixon et al., 2006) due to the changing nature of 
microfinance’s objectives, little has been done to explore such practices. CGAP (2009) points 
out that good accounting principles can lead to high quality financial analysis, giving room for 
sound managerial decisions that can help in achieving microfinance missions and objectives. 
Thus, accounting systems need to be more accurate and transparent for more informed financial 
and operational decisions to be made (CGAP, 2009). MFIs, like other institutions, must give, or 
feel the need to give, an account of any activities undertaken (Ebrahim, 2003) where accounting 
information plays a vital role (CGAP, 2009). 
 
The study contributes to knowledge by providing policy makers with understanding of some of 
the accounting and accountability issues facing MFIs and as a result policy makers will be better 
informed in designing policies to address some of these issues. Further the results are shared 
with the management of the case organisation and based on the recommendations made 
management will be able to understand how they can better implement and manage change in 
the accounting and accountability systems of the organisation. Theoretically, researchers will be 
able to use the findings of the study to better understand the process of change as well as the role 
of actors as institutional entrepreneurs in initiating change.  
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1.1 Aim and Objectives of the Study 
In order to fill the gap in the literature, the study therefore aims to investigate the accounting and 
accountability practices of MFIs, how these practices have changed over time and the role of 
actors in the change process. The puzzling and interesting question in the study is whether MFIs 
still alleviate poverty as preached, and what impact this has on their accounting and 
accountability practices. The study explores the missions and objectives of the case MFI, 
reviews microfinance accountability practices and furthers seeks to find out if there are any 
changes in such practices and what causes them to change. 
 
Based on the argument that microfinance mission drift might lead to changes in organisational 
structure and practices, the study adopts an approach that begins with the case MFI’s mission(s) 
and objective(s), followed by the structure, with an attempt to find out if changes in mission and 
structure (if any) could impact on the organisation’s accounting and accountability practices. In 
this attempt, the study also embraces an accountability view (stakeholder accountability) which 
includes a view from below, or ‘grassroots’ accountability (Dixon et al. 2006), to which little 
attention has been given. The following specific objectives have been addressed: 
- To investigate the accounting and accountability practices in MFIs 
- To explore the changes in MFIs’ accounting and accountability practices  
- To analyse the role and relative power of the key actors in the change process 
- To examine whether there has been any mission drift in the case MFI and how this 
change in mission has influenced its accounting and accountability practices. 
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1.2 Main and Sub-Research Questions 
The main research question in the study is: What is the nature of accounting and accountability 
practices in the case MFI and how has this changed over time? 
The following specific research questions will therefore be addressed in order to help to answer 
the above stated main research question: 
1. How does the accounting and accountability system of the studied MFI function? 
2. Why and how have MFIs accounting and accountability practices changed over the 
years?  
3. Who are the institutional actors and what are their roles and relative power in this 
change? 
4. What are the challenges encountered in a typical African MFI environment? 
 
 
1.3 Background of Study 
The practicality of the study is based mainly on the changes surrounding the case study MFI’s 
accounting and accountability related issues in a developing country, in this case Cameroon. The 
case study MFI is viewed from the poverty alleviation-financial viability perspective, where the 
MFIs are regulated by the government, shareholders provide funds for the MFIs and MFIs 
provide customers with loans and engage them in social and developmental projects, all leading 
to different forms of accountability involving various stakeholders, including those at the 
grassroots. Institutional and accountability change is further studied and a modified theoretical 
framework further suggested and applied following existing review and practice. A brief 
understanding of the financial sector of Cameroon will serve as a base from which the study can 
better be understood. 
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1.3.1 The Financial Sector of Cameroon 
The economic growth of Cameroon has been stable for the past decade (Mbaku, 1993; Sunderlin 
et al., 2000). The services sector of the diversified economy of Cameroon amounted to close to 
46% of her GDP in 2011, registering a growth rate of about 3.5% on average between 2002 and 
2007. Nevertheless, the global economic and financial crisis has negatively affected the 
economic performance of the country, resulting in low investments and a fall in demand and 
prices for her exports, particularly oil, timber and rubber (Wamba, 2001), hence the wider group 
of poverty-stricken citizens embraced by MFIs.  
 
The financial sector of Cameroon accounts for almost half of the regional financial assets, 
making the country the largest financial system in CEMAC (Economic and Monetary 
Community of Central Africa). CEMAC coordinates its economic and monetary policy, ensuring 
consistency between national budget policies. COBAC (Commission Bancaire de l’Afrique 
Centrale) harmonises and controls banking activities. The CEMAC region has around 29 banks, 
with 10 in Cameroon (Kouassi et al., 2007). The financial sector comprises excess liquidity, 
loans and deposits. The insolvency problem remains evident in non-financial institutions (IMF, 
2009). There are fifteen operational banks in Cameroon which have experienced serious 
financial downturn, particularly in recent times, caused mainly by neglecting regulatory rules, 
with about six of them being foreign-owned (IMF, 2009). A continuous increase in the number 
of loans disbursed has been registered over the years in Cameroon.  
 
The microfinance sector in Cameroon has experienced a rapid growth rate, even though the 
penetration level remains relatively low. It is argued that there is a loose regulatory and 
supervisory framework governing MFIs in Cameroon, which impacts on her developmental 
prospects. Regional law has governed most of the country’s financial system since her 
integration into the CEMAC region. Cameroon’s accounting and accountability requirements are 
  
9 
 
not yet fully in line with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), even though the 
authorities concerned have expressed their intention to introduce financial instruments that will 
focus on Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs), with a plan to institute a judiciary court 
aimed at addressing commercial issues and contract enforcement.  
 
Given the colonial past of Cameroon, the banking sector is seen to be characterised by different 
cultures and languages (bicultural and bilingual). Cameroon’s formal banking system is less than 
50 years old and rooted in the colonial era. However, the first commercial bank existed in 
Cameroon long before her independence in 1960 (Amin, 2002). Banking was more primitive in 
thrift and loan societies regulated by custom and tradition. Such primitive societies still played a 
vital role in shaping Cameroon’s banking sector, with a remarkable evolution in the sector 
evident in recent times (CameroonTribune, 2010).  
 
The urge for socio-economic development started shortly after the country’s independence in 
1960. The government started to intervene in practically all sectors of the economy, including 
the financial sector (Amin, 2002). During the 1960s to 1980s, the financial sector was therefore 
created under the shield of monetary and regulatory policies geared towards assisting the state to 
pursue its developmental strategies. The financial sector was therefore seen as an instrument that 
could be used to organise various industrialisation policies (Amin, 2002; Kouassi et al., 2007; 
Noula and Yah, 2012). Banks became owed by the government, with credit only made available 
to crucial financial sectors (Johannes et al., 2011). 
 
In the late 1980s, crises such as bankruptcy and illiquidity did not spare Cameroon’s financial 
sector. The cause of the crisis included employee incompetence, poor managerial skills, 
competition from other financial institutions and state intervention (Wamba, 2001). As a result, 
companies were not able to meet certain banking and financial obligations. The financial sector 
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was again restructured and financial houses were liquidised and some recapitalised thanks to 
structural adjustment programmes.  
 
The DSX (a public limited company) was formed in 2001 headed by BODs with a capital of 
about 1.8 billion francs CFA, with about 63.7% of the shares held by private commercial banks, 
about 23% by public interests, and about 13.3% by private insurance companies (Johannes et al., 
2011; IMF, 2009; Noula and Yah, 2012).  
The reforms marked the end of the repressed financial practices and the beginning of 
a classical market based practices. With all the above reforms, the economy regained 
the path of economic growth and the banking sector regained its liquidity and 
soundness. (Johannes et al., 2011: 368) 
 
The capital of Cameroon’s is Yaoundé and the last state-owned bank was sold by the Cameroon 
government in January 2000 (Akon, 2012; IMF, 2009; Kouassi et al., 2007). This was the major 
step and the last in the restructuring of Cameroonian financial/banking practices. Within the last 
ten years or so, Cameroon has gained more hope, looking at the number of actors entering the 
banking sector, bringing commercial functional banks to a total of 13 today, as further discussed 
below. Besides commercial banks, the financial sector in Cameroon also consists of 
microfinance institutions and leasing and insurance companies, amongst many others (Kouassi et 
al., 2007).  
 
The regulation and supervisory functions of the banking sector, especially in most developing 
countries, is carried out by the central/reserve banks. Cameroon, however, is seen as an 
exception. Cameroon, together with a few other central African states such as Chad, Central 
African Republic, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon, belongs to a common central bank –BEAC 
(Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale). COBAC is in charge of the administration, regulatory, 
supervision, controlling and sanctioning duties of formal finance that have a licence to operate 
from the central bank (Kouassi et al., 2007; Akon, 2012). Within the country, banking regulation 
is undertaken by the local Ministry of Finance (MINFIN) and outside the country by COBAC. 
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The Cameroonian banking regulations and legislation have been instituted in order to ensure 
banking stability, growth and development. 
 
The banking sector of Cameroon is ruled by various enactments, including laws, presidential 
decrees and ministerial orders, which result from contradictions and implementation problems 
and are often amended to suit the banking conditions (Akon, 2012). Within the financial sector 
of Cameroon is the microfinance industry and it will be worthwhile giving an overview of how it 
operates in order to better understand its mission and objectives and answer the research 
questions well. 
 
1.3.2 Brief Overview of MFIs and Accounting in Africa 
The history of MFIs in developing countries started in the mid-1800s with evidence of the 
benefits from small credits to entrepreneurs and farmers in a bid to reduce poverty, even though 
significant impact only came in after the end of the Second World War with the British Marshall 
plan (Lapenu and Zeller, 2001; Lafourcade et al., 2005). 
The new wave of microfinance initiatives later led to innovations in the sector and Cameroon, 
like other developing countries, gladly welcomed and benefited from the introduction of the 
innovative concept.  
In the 1970s, MFIs demonstrated that even the poor to whom microfinance services are rendered 
can be relied upon to repay their loans. About 16 million people were estimated to be served by 
about 7000 MFIs around the world, with approximately 500 million families benefiting from the 
small loans they provide (Daley- Harris, 2009; Reed, 2011). In line with distribution and growth, 
Lapenu and Zeller’s (2001) findings show that in a database of 85 developing countries, 1500 
institutions are supported by international organisations by extending their charitable hands to 
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approximately 54 million members, 44 million savers and 23 million borrowers with a minimum 
of 46 000 branches employing about 175000 employee. 
Until recently, developing countries’ external accountability (regulation) has ignored the 
existence of MFIs (Meagher, 2002). Developing countries’ regulatory rules are tailored towards 
answering the question ‘who’ is regulated, by whom and what kind of regulation is applied 
(Meagher, 2002)? In line with ‘who regulates’, there is the development of hybrid and self-
regulation as the case in Bangladesh and the Philippines (Meagher, 2002). Overall, the existing 
study on Africa’s MFIs (Lapenu and Zeller, 2001; Lafourcade et al., 2005; Menyah et al., 2012) 
show that there are set internal standards or principles of best practice regulation and supervision 
unlike before as suggested by Meagher (2002). Meagher (2002) pointed out that unlike 
commercial banking, there is insufficient experience on MFI regulation and supervision to 
enable certainty on governance (accountability) principles. External reporting by MFIs to clients 
is erratic or non- existent (Meagher, 2002). The argument raised here is the need for a new 
regulatory framework (that can accommodate and account for specific institutional environment) 
to be developed in developing countries particularly in countries with emerging MFIs like 
Cameroon. The study has contributed towards this proposition (see chapter eight- 8.2 for thesis’ 
contribution in line with policy making). 
A poor regulatory framework or lack of regulation has been argued further in the study to lead to 
poor accounting and accountability (Menyah et al., 2012). Thus a need to look into MFIs’ 
accounting and accountability practices further which the study embraces with a case study on 
Cameroon. Hopper et al. (2009) explains the reason behind Africa’s growth in accounting 
research one of which is globalisation. Menyah et al. (2012) in emphasising on the need for 
accounting in Africa mentions governance, control, quality of information, ethics as well as 
evaluations (audits). The study elaborates on such accounting issues looking at Microfinance 
with regards to its Accounting and Accountability practices. 
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1.3.2.1 Background of Cameroon’s Microfinance Industry  
Looking at the conventional form of microfinance, the roots of official microfinance activities in 
Cameroon can be traced as far back as 1963, with the creation of the first cooperative savings 
and loans institution, also known as a Credit Union, by Roman Catholic clergy (Fotabong, 
2012). Fotabong (2012) adds that it was only after the early 1990s when President Paul Biya 
passed a law in December 1990 in line with the freedom of association, and another law in 
August 1992 relating to MFIs, in order to get elites and various interest groups involved in his 
New Deal Policy, that the development of MFIs and their activities started booming. 
In addition, the growth and development of microfinance activities in Cameroon came as a result 
of the banking crisis in the late 1980s where there were heavy closures of some commercial and 
developmental banks in rural areas and some cities. Cooperative credit unions were created at 
the time to act as mini banks. 2005 was officially proclaimed the International year of 
Microcredit by The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Today, a wide range of 
organisations are regarded as MFIs: mini banks/ semi- formal finance offering microcredits and 
other financial services to the poor. Such organisations include credit unions, commercial banks, 
NGOs and cooperatives.  
Even though it is argued that MFIs are concerned about the success of the poor, there is still 
evidence of mission drift, as suggested in Section 2.5. Thus, the term ‘transformation’, or 
commercialisation, of MFIs has been commonly used in the literature to mean a change in legal 
status from an unregulated non-profits or NGO into a regulated, for-profit institution. Regulated, 
transformed organisations are different from non-profit organisations in that they are held 
accountable to performance and capital adequacy standards and are supervised by COBAC, 
regulated by MINFIN and registered with BEAC. 
According to Heidhues and Djeudja (2005), in 1997 Cameroon counted about 389 MFIs, with 
this number increasing over time. In line with the growing consolidation and restructuring 
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witnessed by 2006, MFIs had increased to 490, even though this was down from the 656 MFIs 
previously identified in 2000. In 2006, there were about 1052 outlets as opposed to the 700 in 
2000. The total number of members reached about 849,030 showing an increase compared to the 
less than 300,000 registered members in 2000. The growing interest, closer supervision, control 
and monitoring resulted in a strengthening equity structure, rising from the FCFA 3 billion in 
2000, to FCFA 19.9 billion in 2006 and by 2012, given feedback from the market and industry 
sources, total equity is close to FCFA 23.5 billion (Fotabong, 2012). By 2002, more than 388 
MFIs had been closed due to the malpractices of the MFIs with the sudden disappearance of 
huge amounts of customers’ savings. But MFIs in Cameroon had recorded an impressive growth 
rate by 2010 (Fotabong, 2012).  
Major shareholders of COFINEST have recently been accused and arrested for mal-functions 
and mismanagement of customers’ funds, which led to the closure of the microfinance 
organisation (Fotabong, 2012). Depositors and non-depositors felt scared to invest in 
microfinance following the winding down of MFIs in Cameroon and responded by withdrawing 
savings from other MFIs. However, the government tried to regain customers’ confidence by 
making sure that creditors were given back their funds and assurance from other actors within 
the microfinance industry (Fotabong, 2012), hence, the reason for the tighter control in 
Cameroon’s MFIs today, mainly from regulatory and supervisory bodies. The collapse of a 
major players in the microfinance sector such as CONFINEST could be the reason for the 
slowdown in the exponential growth of MFIs in Cameroon from 2010 to 2011, by reducing the 
confidence of customers (Fotabong, 2012).  
 
Conclusively, the existence of such successful and sustainable MFIs has gone a long way to 
overcoming the challenges faced by traditional banks in servicing the poor, leading to better 
growth rates and socio-economic development. The next section provides the structure of the 
rest of the study. 
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1.4 Structure of the Study 
The remainder of the thesis has been divided into eight chapters. Following the introduction, 
Chapters 2 and 3 review the pertinent literature. Chapter 4 focuses on the theoretical framework 
to be applied to the study. Chapter 5 details the research methodology and Chapter 6 is the case 
results. Chapter 6 presents the discussion. Lastly, Chapter 8 provides conclusions, limitations, 
contributions and recommendations for future study. 
 
FIGURE 1.1: Thesis Structure 
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CHAPTER TWO 
OVERVIEW OF MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS (MFIs) 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
Microfinance has been noted for gaining the limelight at the global level as a viable institution 
for fighting against poverty (Zeller, 2001; Cohen, 2003) and its existence is nothing new. 
Valadez and Buskirk (2012) point out that even though the concept is not new; it has recently 
gained global attention as a commercially viable institution that can offer real opportunities to 
micro entrepreneurs. Microfinance evolved from a small supply-led, credit focused paradigm to 
one that aims at financial sustainability and poverty alleviation through the provision of access to 
financial products such as savings, social insurance, loan, transfers and pension services and has 
long gained attention as a viable institution for fighting poverty (Cohen, 2003; Valadez and 
Buskirk, 2012). However, the delivery of microfinance services in developing countries has 
continuously been viewed as assisting the poor.  
 
The modern renaissance in microfinance started in the late 1970s with the establishment of the 
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, thanks to the pioneering efforts of Muhammad Yunus (Hermes 
and Lensink, 2007; Bateman, 2010). His continuous efforts, success and experiments led to 
wider recognition, especially in developing countries (Khalily, 2004; Sengupta and Aubuchon, 
2008). In as much as it is not easy to say exactly how many MFIs exist in the world today, the 
Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) estimates that it ranges from 1,000 to 2,500, serving 
67.6 million customers with more that 50% from very poverty-stricken areas (Sengupta and 
Aubuchon, 2008). The implication is that most of the 41.6 million of the extreme poor are being 
served by MFIs, penetrating both rural and urban markets, and above all it is well known that the 
concept of microfinance is important and nothing new (Valadez and Buskirk, 2012). Why then is 
attention still given to MFIs?  
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Even though many scholars have discussed issues around the concept of microfinance, there are 
still limitations, particularly with reference to the study and practice of microfinance accounting 
and accountability. The accounting and accountability practices of every organisation remain at 
their heart and if they are not properly taken care of, the whole organisation might collapse 
(Dixon et al., 2006). Building on the study’s aim, the chapter begins with an in-depth 
understanding of ‘microfinance’.  
 
The chapter is divided into eight sections. There is the introductory section, an overview of the 
meaning of ‘microfinance’ to include the services offered, the discussion on the types of MFI, an 
exploration of the missions and objectives of MFIs, ‘mission drift or accomplished’ argument, 
registration procedures of MFI’s in Cameroon and  the chapter summary. 
 
2.1 The Meaning of Microfinance: Disaggregating the Concept 
 
It is argued that the concept is largely understood but not clearly defined in the minds of its users 
(Vijender et al., 2012). It is therefore important to start the study with a clear-cut definition of 
‘microfinance’. The term microfinance has changed over the years due to changes in societal 
needs. In the early 1980s and 1990s, particularly in developing countries, the term was largely 
referred to as ‘microcredit’, where small amounts of loans were made available to the poor 
through NGOs, for example (Meyer and Nagarajan, 2006). Fernado (2007) adds that modern 
microfinance in the early years could mean;  
… a credit methodology that employs effective collateral substitutes to deliver and 
recover short-term, working capital loans to micro entrepreneurs or potential micro 
entrepreneurs. (p.2)  
 
Today, the concept embraces much more than just the provision of microcredit, with 
microfinance customers located not only in rural areas as initially thought of, but everywhere, 
including urban areas, offering variety of services such as insurance, savings, remittance 
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transfer, pensions and loans, thus the term ‘microfinance’ has arisen (Valadez and Buskirk, 
2012). Parikh (2006) points out that MFIs provide financial services mainly to poor and 
uneducated customers living in remote areas and excluded from main banking. Such ‘up scaling’ 
financial institutions are now regulated in order to remain financially viable (Copestake, 2007). 
Rhyne (2001) thus, defines microfinance as: 
… the provision of financial services like deposits, loans, payment of services, 
money and insurance to low- income, poor and excluded people enabling them to 
raise income and standards. (p.57)  
 
The implication here is that MFIs are concerned with giving out short-term loans to the poor and 
empowering them to account properly and independently for such loans through monitoring its 
customers (Dixon et al., 2006; Copestake, 2007). The emphasis is that MFIs, besides the 
provision of microcredit, also assist the poor with financial services. Hammill et al. (2008) add 
that microfinance is not just about providing the above services to the poor but also making sure 
that the poor participate in productive activities that will in return boost standards of living. 
Copestake (2007) suggests that the definition of microfinance should capture mainly its users 
rather than the form of finance.  
 
In line with clients’ needs and satisfaction perspective, a client has been referred to in the 
literature as an individual or group who does not only purchase goods or services from suppliers 
but one whose operations can be improved upon or one whose needs can be met, better than 
anyone else. The emphasis here is on having the ability to serve or satisfy customers’ needs. 
CGAP (2004a) further stresses the fact that MFIs are “a powerful tool to fight poverty”, which 
can in return assist even the extreme poor to “raise income, build assets, and hedge themselves 
from external shocks” (p. 1). The emphasis here is tailored towards microfinance’s social 
mission of outreach to customers (Copestake, 2007; Hermes et al, 2011). Copestake (2007) 
argues that defining microfinance organisations in line with the services they provide will not 
give the best picture of microfinance.  
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Furthermore, Vijender et al. (2012) suggest that the definition of microfinance should not be by 
form but by the intent of the lender. They give as an example a case from India where it is 
argued that if a commercial bank in India gives out loans for an economic activity, there are high 
chances that it will not be treated as microfinance, whereas if an alternative sector like an NGO 
gives out similar loans, it will been recognised as microfinance. This means that a loan 
distributed by a market intermediary to a small borrower is not in any way regarded as 
microfinance. Banks are usually not seen as being involved in microfinance, as they do not 
predominantly cater for the needs of the poor (Vijender et al., 2012). However, it has been 
argued that commercial banks nowadays have sectors that are predominantly for developmental 
purposes and to cater for the needs of the poor, which are now seen as microfinance (Vijender et 
al., 2012), and that these microfinance organisations themselves are today more commercially 
focused (see Section 2.5 below). Usually, such MFIs grow out of their social roots into an 
“alternative commercial sector” (Vijender et al., 2012).  
 
2.2 Microfinance Services (MFS) 
 
Parikh (2006) and Vijender et al. (2012) note that the provision of MFS is done by different 
organisations including NGOs, private and financial institutions. Today, microcredit remains the 
common MFS operating on the ground, given that without any collateral, it is difficult for the 
poor to obtain loans, especially from traditional mainstream banks. Unlike microcredit which is 
based on collateral, Grameen credit is based on ‘trust’ (Sengupta and Aubuchon 2008).  
 
As suggested in the definition of microfinance (Rhyne, 2001) the main products and services of 
MFIs include the provision of microcredits, subsidising collateral through group lending 
guarantees or compulsory savings, disbursing more larger and repeated loans to customers 
depending on their repayment capabilities/ performance, monitoring loans disbursed to 
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customers and safeguarding customers’ savings. However, not all models of microfinance offer 
all such products, especially with the profit-orientated mind-sets of some of today’s MFIs 
(Jacobs, 2012). 
 
The MFIs that provide social services mainly focus on education, training and healthcare 
(Cohen, 2003; Sengupta and Aubuchon 2008). Dixon et al. (2006) point out clearly that an MFIs 
can only be considered a poverty alleviation strategy when it is capable of channelling both its 
financial and non-financial objectives to the grassroots. As the microfinance industry has 
become more efficient and versed with the microfinance market, MFIs are now developing 
innovative strategies. Sengupta and Aubuchon (2008: 13) for example talk about ‘safeSave’- the 
ability to encourage the poor to save small amounts of money via deposits, thereby reducing 
high rates of unnecessary and excess spending.  
 
In the search for alternatives to formal finance, attention is increasingly diverted to semi-formal 
finance such as MFIs (Bateman, 2010). MFIs are out to occupy the gap left by formal finance 
programmes, especially in line with meeting the needs of the poor (Hammill et al., 2008; 
Bateman, 2010). This explains why microfinance is often associated with assisting the poor with 
various microfinance services (Ryhne, 2001). Different conditions and services surround MFIs, 
leading to the existence of different types. Even though knowing the types of MFIs is not enough 
to give an in-depth understanding of what microfinance is all about (Vijender et al., 2012), it at 
least gives a foundation on which a study can build. 
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2.3 Types of MFI 
 
It is argued that the broad range of microfinance services provided today, especially those 
targeting the poor, cannot be guaranteed to reach the target groups if the right channelling means 
are not identified (Dixon et al., 2006). The confirmation of MFIs in delivering proper MFS via 
the different types leads to the urge to understand what makes the MFIs different (Zeller, 2006). 
Besides depth and breadth of outreach, institutional diversity also helps to enhance competition 
and impact customer welfare (Zeller, 2006). 
 
Vijender et al. (2012) point out that, in order to better understand the types of MFIs, their 
missions and objectives must also be clearly understood (see Section 2.4). For example, MFIs 
like the Banco Sol of Bolivia have the aim of returning profit, while the Grameen Bank promotes 
social equity by operating below market rates (Zeller, 2006; Hudon, 2008). Different types of 
MFIs discussed in the microfinance literature can be differentiated (see Table 2.2) according to 
their intended missions and objectives (Hudon, 2008), organisational size (Lapenu and Zeller, 
2001) services provided, ownership of equity/ funding sources, regulatory status (Van Greuning 
et al., 1999) and decision-making (Lapenu and Zeller, 2001; Hudon, 2008). However, it would 
be naïve to believe that any such type of organisational structure would actually be able to deal 
with all organisational realities (especially social), given how complex and diverse such realities 
could be (Hudon, 2008).  
 
Lafourcade et al. (2005) point out that MFIs are made up of a wide range of diverse and 
geographically dispersed institutions, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, with high volumes of 
low-income groups (see Table 2.1): see, for example, rural banks, savings and postal financial 
institutions, solidarity groups like the Grameen Bank and specialised banks like state-owned 
micro banks and village banks (Meyer and Nagarajan, 2006; Zeller, 2006; Hudon, 2008), 
implying that not all MFIs are NGOs (Sengupta and Aubuchon, 2008). 
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TABLE 2.1: Types of MFI  
REGULATED Banks, regulated non-bank financial intermediaries, regulated 
NGOs 
COOPERATIVES Financial cooperatives and credit unions 
UNREGULATED NGOs, non-bank financial intermediaries, MFI projects, and others 
Source: Lafourcade et al. (2005: 2) 
 
TABLE 2.2: Classification of MFIs 
CATEGORY A TYPE 1 Simple non-profit NGO 
TYPE 2 Non-profit NGO associated with 
limited deposit-taking 
TYPE 3 Incorporated MFI (transformed NGO) 
CATEGORY B TYPE 4 Credit Union, Savings and Credit Cooperative 
Society 
CATEGORY C TYPE 5 Specialised Bank, Deposit-taking Institution or 
Finance Company 
TYPE6 Mutual Ownership Bank (licensed) 
TYPE 7 Equity Bank (licensed) 
Source: Adapted from Van Greuning et al. (1999: 7) 
 
By Category A, Van Greuning et al. (1999) mean MFIs that rely on others for funds usually 
external donors; Category B refers to those MFIs that rely on their customers’ money as their 
source of finance; and Category C includes MFIs which leverage the public’s money in order to 
fund microfinance loans. MFIs are clearly not charity organisations, but organisation building 
and innovation still depend heavily on public resources. The socio-economic cost-benefit ratio is 
influenced by many factors, at the macro, micro, institutional or community levels (Zeller, 2006; 
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Zeller and Johannsen, 2006). Cooperatives and banks in Types 4 and 5 respectively according to 
Van Greuning et al. (1999) are explored below and in Table 2.3.  
 
2.3.1 Credit Unions/ Cooperative Societies 
 
The pioneering work of credit cooperatives has been attributed to Friedrich Wilhelm together 
with Hermann Schulze since the 1940s and 1950s in Germany (Zeller, 2006). They were not 
motivated by any profit maximising action but that which required them to assist the rural 
population to restrain from relying on money lenders and to enhance the welfare of poor 
customers. This type of institutional innovation started progressing in Germany, with expanded 
services with little or no dependency on the government funds. These cooperatives then spread 
to other countries, including Ukraine and Poland (Zeller, 2006). 
Credit unions or cooperative societies are usually owned and controlled by their members, with 
democratic rules where there are no external forces influencing them from the government, as in 
developing countries (Zeller, 2006). They are member-based financial institutions. The profits 
generated are usually reinvested in the credit union or shared amongst the members. The 
implication here is that the focus of MFIs has been tilted towards commercialisation (Mersland 
and Strom, 2010). Credit unions focus on savings from which loans are disbursed at an interest 
rate and profits made in return. The registration of credit unions usually falls under the same 
laws as cooperatives or in a special banking law group for each country (Zeller, 2006). 
Cooperatives demonstrate the notion that they are out to help each other, particularly weaker 
members, shown in the voting system with its one person, one vote rule (Zeller, 2006). They 
remain a viable rural MFI even though they lack external supervision.  
Comparatively credit unions have an advantage of being capable of reaching a larger number of 
depositors and in turn use these savings to provide loans to individual members: the breadth and 
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depth of their outreach is assured via loan size and the median of savings deposits and 
distribution in many other countries (Evans, 2001). Zeller (2006) adds that even though the 
majority of credit union members are not poor, the poor can still be reached because of the 
breadth of outreach. The main key innovation in credit unions is the idea of offering potential 
members the opportunity to get involved in a group loan. 
Governments have, however, often misused such cooperative movements for political purposes 
which is evident in their failures, particularly in developing countries (Zeller, 2006). The 
performance of cooperatives particularly in rural areas is a mixture of the good, the bad and the 
ugly (Huppi and Feder, 1990). There is a need to revise their supervisory and regulatory 
framework, blending this with technical support in order to enhance their performance (Zeller, 
2006). The ownership and governance structure in credit unions usually favours savers compared 
to owners and borrowers, which gives room for policies that sacrifice profitability and efficiency 
(Krahnen and Schmidt, 1994).  
 
 2.3.2 Village Banks 
 
These are semi-formal financial institutions promoted by international NGOs with the owners 
being their members. The interest rates (decided on by members) are usually higher than those of 
commercial banks. Greater decision autonomy is given to the members of village banks densely 
populated with women. They serve a greater number of poorer customers compared to credit 
unions. Their main objective is poverty reduction, with greater emphasis on depth and breadth of 
outreach. Other services are unusually provided to members by the international NGOs, such as 
education and business training, which enhance their impact (Zeller, 2006). Unlike credit unions, 
village banks have a simple structure which favours the uneducated members, in line with their 
management strategy. However, village bank start-up costs are usually higher, with external 
sources of finance. The credit guarantee is best and comes mainly through social pressure. 
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Unlike other types of MFIs, village banks function as member-governed, autonomous 
institutions that are flexible in making rules, deciding on interest rates from loans and savings 
and adapting to local socio-economic conditions. They are usually expected to keep sufficient 
levels of equity in order to remain self- reliant. The objective of financial sustainability remains 
theoretical, with greater success recorded for reaching greater number of poor customers. Zeller 
(2006) views this as being attributable to the disadvantaged locations chosen and the wrong 
target groups initially selected. Their small size puts them at risk due to the constrained nature of 
the savings and loans shaped by the local government. From a financial systems perspective, 
Zeller (2006) adds that their long-term success in achieving sustainability and outreach depend 
heavily on their ability and willingness to become part of a bank or establish connections with 
formal financial systems or credit unions. Chao-Beroff (1999) points out how a village bank 
became successful after connecting with a bank in Mali. 
 
2.3.3 Micro Banks 
 
These are MFIs that have individual relationships with their customers, with the equity owned by 
investors like donors. Such MFIs usually follow a top-down approach, especially in decision-
making. Unlike credit unions and village banks, micro banks like the BRI in Indonesia are either 
legally (state, NGO or private companies) or individually owned, not owned by their members 
(Van Greuning et al., 1999). 
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 TABLE 2.3: Types of MFIs and Major Characteristics 
 
Type of Institution Size of the local 
Organisation 
Ownership of 
Equity  
Rules/Decisio
n making 
Eligibility/ 
Screening 
1.Credit Union 
Supported by 
WOCC. 
Ralffeissen. 
Desjardins 
 
New group on 
average 100-200 
members 
Member(Equity 
shares) 
Democratic 
(One person, 
one vote) 
Purchase of shares 
sometimes type of 
occupation or 
social group 
2.Village bank e.g., 
supported by 
FINCA or CIDR 
New group on 
average 30-50 
members 
Members  Bottom-
up/Democratic 
(members) 
links with 
banks 
supported by 
NGO/State 
Village members: 
payment for 
membership 
3.Micro banks e.g. 
BancoSol, BRI 
Village banks, IPC-
Supported banks 
Individual 
relationship with 
the client 
Investors: 
donors 
providing 
equity, private 
firms or 
individual 
foundations or 
state e.g., BRI 
Top-down Information on the 
client 
4. Solidarity Group 
Retail Model, either 
by NGOs (ASA 
SHARE) or banks. 
Lately also by 
banks (Grameen 
Banks) or other 
MFI Types used 
New group 
centre (5-6 
groups of 5-10 
members each) 
Members  Top-down Accepted as a 
member of a group 
by peers or (worse) 
by supporting 
institutions  
5.Linkage Retail 
Model e.g. 
promoted by 
GTZ/IFAD and 
NABARD in India 
Pre-existing 
informal group 
or groups with 
variable sizes 
who can obtain 
loans and save 
as a group with 
a public or 
private bank 
Members  Mix of bottom-
up and top 
down 
approaches 
(Supporting 
agency/ 
members) 
Members of a pre-
existing SHIG 
peers, bank or 
NGO approval 
 
Source: Adapted from Lapenu and Zeller (2001: 204) 
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2.4 Mission(s) and Objective(s) of MFIs 
 
In line with Vijender et al.’s (2012) suggestion on the impact definition of microfinance 
(according to lender intent not form), an exploration of MFIs’ mission and objectives has been 
made. The initial and mostly commonly known objective of MFIs is to expand loans to the poor, 
with the primary metric for measuring progress being ‘outreach’. Outreach is the measure of the 
sum of customers receiving loans, with an emphasis on women, as cited in the microcredit 
summit goals (Meyer and Nagarajan, 2006; Hermes et al., 2011) or “measured by the number of 
credit customers served and customers' poverty levels improved” upon especially with group 
lending mechanisms (Mersland and Strom, 2007:2).  
 
Nevertheless, the single objective has been argued to be inadequate, especially in recent times 
(Mersland and Strom, 2010). MFIs have often been unable to cover their operating costs and 
loan losses outside their interest income and are highly subsidised (Meyer and Nagarajan, 2006). 
Furthermore, MFIs’ operating efficiency has not been maximised and valued, given that the 
primary goal of MFIs is to maximise the number of poor customers served (Meyer and 
Nagarajan, 2006; Sengupta and Aubuchon, 2008). However, it has further been argued that 
failing to achieve sustainability together with outreach will limit MFIs’ chances of growing 
while serving greater number of customers (Mersland and Strom, 2010).  
 
The objectives of a microfinance institution depend on its mission (Vijender et al., 2012) or type 
(Lapenu and Zeller, 2001). Zeller (2006), for example argues that MFIs with a social mission are 
usually associated with poverty alleviation objectives and are usually member-based MFIs like 
credit unions, cooperative societies and village banks. On the other hand, commercially focused 
MFIs are usually geared towards maximising profits and usually welcome the general public 
(non-members) besides their members (Mersland and Strom, 2010). More insights on 
microfinance objectives and missions are explored in the following paragraphs. 
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2.4.1 Poverty Alleviation 
 
Poverty eradication has continuously been a serious issue in most developing countries, despite 
the efforts made by governments and other agencies to combat poverty (Sengupta and 
Aubuchon, 2008; Quinones and Remenyi, 2014). Otero (1999) stresses the fact that microfinance 
poverty alleviation should be client focused. Perspectives on the target group for microfinance, 
like the concept of microfinance itself, have changed drastically recently with the inclusion of 
low-income men, women, youth, and children, vulnerable non-poor groups left out by formal 
finance and the marginal and extreme poor. The encouraging results of the Grameen Bank, 
BRAC, and ASA in Bangladesh, together with other advocacy work, has led to the inclusion of 
the extreme poor in the target group in recent years (Fernando, 2007). 
 
The World Bank report in 2001 shows estimates of more than 1.2 billion people classified as the 
extreme poor in 1998 and 1.1 billion people in 2001 depending on less than 50 pence a day for 
their upkeep. Throughout the literature we find the use of the word ‘poor’. It is interesting to 
pause here and ask the question who is the ‘poor’? Several attempts have been made to define 
the word poor. Sengupta and Aubuchon (2008) for example look at the meaning of ‘marginal 
poor’ and ‘extreme poor’ in line with the proposal from CGAP where the poor are firstly defined 
to mean those below the poverty line or simply those excluded from formal financial services. 
 
MFIs can improve the living standards of the poor if they remain promising with their financial 
and social objectives (Islam, 2007; Imai et al., 2010; Jacobs, 2012). Lafourcade et al. (2005) and 
Dixon et al. (2006), in support of the above claim, add that in analysing the importance of MFIs, 
particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, microfinance can be seen to be mainly linked to helping the 
poor to account for their livelihood and manage and maintain their small businesses. Moreover, 
the government and major international organisations like the World Bank and United Nations 
have happily used MFIs to achieve their goal of reaching the poor. Even though other policy-
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makers have argued against MFIs, recent findings show that most microfinance has a significant 
impact on poverty reduction (Imai et al., 2010). 
 
As MFIs continue to grow, the questions asked often include who should MFIs really target 
(Morduch, 2000; Sengupta and Aubuchon, 2008; Bateman, 2010)? Morduch (2000) looks at two 
case studies of microfinance customers from different poverty groups, the first being a 
subsidised microfinance and the second a financially sustainable MFI that charges higher interest 
rates. The first is seen as working with the extreme poor and the second the marginal poor. 
Morduch further argues that MFIs should pay attention to the extreme poor first, even though 
this does not happen in reality (Sengupta and Aubuchon, 2008). Another conclusion Morduch 
arrives at is the fact that the more financial sustainable MFIs want to be, the more they turn to 
focus on the marginal poor customers with the primary aim of returning a profit. Poverty 
alleviation becomes secondary for these MFIs. This is evident in Banco Sol MFI in Bolivia and 
not surprisingly may explain why the interest rates charged by Banco Sol are higher compared to 
those at the Grameen Bank. However, Islam (2008) adds that the Grameen Bank only targets the 
non-poor and the moderate poor (those poor customers closer to the poverty line) and neglects 
the extreme poor (those far below the poverty line). The implication is that MFIs have still not 
been able to meet the needs of the extreme poor (Islam, 2008). 
 
Wright (2000) points out that outside Bangladesh, other microfinance programmes have not 
actually reached the extreme poor, as is the case in Bolivia, as suggested by Mosley (2001). The 
reason that partially explains the unfulfilled promise by MFIs could be its strong emphasis on 
delivering credit to the poor without first sorting out what the needs of the poorest customers are 
(Jacobs et al., 2012). Imai et al. (2010) adds that it is not all about identifying which client group 
to serve and that, whether servicing the marginal or extreme poor, their needs must be initially 
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identified. Identifying which customers can benefit from the services the MFI can provide is also 
very important after identifying their needs (Meyer, 2002; Imai et al., 2010). 
 
In order to capture different views on poverty alleviation, Imai et al. (2010) used the IBR 
Indicators in his study in India using a national-level household survey. He found that poverty 
still remains a serious problem in India, despite her recent national economic growth. His 
findings further show that the increased economic growth rate is actually accounted for by a few 
sectors (industry and services) in urban areas. The poverty head count ratio is very high in rural 
dwellings compared to urban areas (Sen and Himanshu, 2004; Deaton and Kozel, 2005). Poverty 
in rural areas remains a serious issue compared to that in the cities. MFIs, particularly in 
developing countries, have decided to expand the access of credit particularly among the rural 
poor in order to make sure they are serving the right target customers and promoting outreach 
(Mosley and Arun, 2003; Imai et al., 2010). The is because it has been pointed out that even with 
the different vast network of MFIs and banking and cooperative finance institutions, the 
performance of such institutions still fails to effectively outreach, reflect and meet the needs of 
the poor (Imai, 2010). 
 
Another question of interest in the microfinance literature is to what extent do MFIs actually 
benefit the extreme (very) poor? (Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe, 2011; Jacobs et al., 2012). 
MFIs have been criticised for giving continuous attention to their donors’ needs, restricting them 
from focusing on their customers’ needs (Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe, 2011;Jacobs et al., 
2012). Dixon et al. (2006) further elaborates on the claim with their study of a Zambian MFI that 
found it difficult to accommodate its customers’ needs together with those of its donors, thus 
favouring a ‘top-down’ approach and putting the ‘bottom-up’ of approach in a critical position 
which can result in a negative impact on core organisational values.  
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Poverty alleviation through the distribution of loans alongside other microfinance services is 
often suggested. The dearth of social trust between MFIs and poor customers has resulted in 
negative loan experiences like defaults. Findings from a cross-country study conducted by 
Hulme and Mosley (1996) show that the income levels of the marginal/ upper poor, those above 
the poverty line, increase when they take loans while 50 per cent of the extreme poor who 
participate in taking loans experience a small and temporary increase in income.  
 
Second, Jacobs and Kemp (2002) point out that it is very clear that the extreme poor lack the 
required business knowledge and social capital to operate a successful business to reduce their 
poverty and realise their developmental potential. Thus, such poor customers will be very 
vulnerable to environmental, socio-economic and political change amongst other factors. Islam 
(2008) elaborates on the lack of required business knowledge to include “the lack of education, 
proper technological design, marketing facilities, awareness and information and little or no 
managerial skills” (p. 137). Arun and Hulme (2008), in support of the argument on the lack of 
resistance to socio-economic shocks of the poorest, cites examples like sickness, unfavourable 
market conditions, theft and violence which are often beyond their control, leading to low 
repayment rates of loans.  
 
However, it has been noted in practice that MFIs operating long-term financial schemes end up 
providing short-term financial services to the poor, which can only help smooth consumption but 
not alleviate poverty as promised (Morduch, 1998; Islam, 2008). An increase in microloans is 
only directly proportional to the starting income level of the extreme poor (Islam, 2008). Islam 
(2008) contributes to the debate on micro credit in alleviating poverty by studying the Grameen 
case, where the efforts to reduce poverty had a partial success. Islam argues that recent writings 
have often confused readers by equating microenterprise development to poverty alleviation. 
Even though the two often coincide, there is a need for empirical evidence, thus, adopting a 
  
32 
 
microcredit approach as a panacea for poverty reduction, without some sort of critical 
evaluation, is very dangerous and nothing but a ‘poverty trap’. 
 
Furthermore, Islam (2008) adds that no single income sources will effectively “provide an 
escalator for sustained growth of income” (p. 146). The approach of various MFIs is therefore 
subject to open debate. The Grameen approach combines microcredit at a reasonable rate, socio-
economic development and educational projects (Jacobs et al., 2012). Wilhelm (2009) agrees 
with Yunus’ argument that if a MFI is charging more than 15 per cent on loans, it is indirectly 
restricting the genuine charitable intentions behind the loans such as reducing poverty among the 
extreme poor. He therefore implies that the MFI is no longer seen as a microcredit provider, but 
as a ‘loan shark’ (Jacobs et al., 2012).  
 
Microcredit programmes can thus be seen as double disaster for the rural extreme poor, which is 
the reason why practitioners lay increasing emphasis on microfinance as a whole and not just 
microcredit (Islam, 2008). There is a higher probability for the poor to be able to save with 
microfinance than microcredit programmes and they will enjoy other benefits of microfinance 
over time: a wide group of financial services as opposed to just loans from microcredit 
programmes. The microfinance services will in effect give room for higher chances for lower 
costs on loans. Khandker (1998) argued that 10-15 per cent of the poorest usually require initial 
help with getting food, shelter, health and so on before they can be able to respond to policy and 
environmental changes which will eventually reach the marginal or less poor people. The 
implication here is that “the extreme poor are more likely to use public work programmes than 
credit-based interventions” (Khandker, 1998: 142). In effect, a significant number of the extreme 
poor will limit themselves from joining microcredit programmes. Microbanks comparative to 
other MFIs offer relatively higher loan amounts, which implies that the depth (benefits 
customers of MFIs get / services offered) of poverty alleviation is weaker; that is, the breadth of 
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outreach to the poor (number of poor served) relies to a greater extent on its scale, in contrast to 
the case with other MFIs (Zeller, 2006). 
 
When MFIs cannot offer the promised microfinance services to the poor, the poor turn to seek 
refuge in informal financial sectors (Wright, 2000). However, it is clear that the poor turn to face 
a more risky environment when they put their savings into informal financial institutions (Wright 
2000). In as much as poverty alleviation has been the long-term objective of social MFIs, 
microfinance’s financial sustainability cannot be ignored.   
2.4.2 Financial Sustainability 
 
MFIs have so far been referred to as being ‘doubled tasked’ in meeting development ends and 
achieving such long-term goals - an effective ‘double-edged sword’ (Tulchin, 2003; Dunford, 
2003). The discussion on ‘financial sustainability’ here is in line with microfinance customers’ 
and MFIs self-sustainability; that is, MFIs’ self-sustainability in a way that will enhance long-
term customers’ financial sustainability through increased levels of income, hence reducing 
customers’ poverty levels. However, the statement remains widely debatable. 
 
Financial sustainability remains the backbone of every microfinance sustainability activity. 
Similar views on financial sustainability are shared by various researchers (Dunford, 2003; 
Tucker and Miles, 2004). They all refer to sustainability as the capacity and ability to remain 
financially viable without any external assistance, be that local or international. Dunford (2003) 
clearly points out that financial sustainability means being able to continuously operate or 
function towards the achievement of set objectives without depending on donor support. 
Financial self-viability implies being able to cover almost all expenses in the absence of 
subsidies or grants. This means the ability to generate enough profit/ income from self-
operations to cover all costs incurred (CGAP, 2004), which implies a reduction in transaction 
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costs, higher quality supply of products and services to meet customers’ demands and more 
methods of outreach to the unbanked poor. The high rate of dependency by MFIs on financial 
sustainability in order to survive gives a reason why institutional sustainability is often used 
interchangeably with financial sustainability. 
 
Financial self-sustainability can be measured at both the firm’s operational level and at the self-
sustainable level. Meyer (2010) defines operational sustainability as the ability to cover all 
operational costs from operating income regardless of whether the microfinance is subsidised or 
not. Financial self-sustainability, on the other hand, refers to the ability to cover not only 
operating costs but all other costs from self-generated income, regardless of whether the 
microfinance is subsidised or not (Balkenhol, 2007). Thus, financial self-sustainability urges all 
MFIs to be able to cover at the very least the opportunity cost of all of their factors of production 
from which their own income is generated without outside assistance (Chaves and Gon Zalez-
Vega, 1996). The claim raised so far implies that any microfinance with poor financial 
performance is not financially sustainable. Operational sustainability is often referred to as the 
welfarists’ view, while financial self- sustainability is in line with the institutionists’ view. 
 
Constant pressure has been levied on MFIs to expand in order to reach a reasonable number of 
the poor and impact them positively with their services (Tucker and Miles, 2004; Ahmed, 2009). 
Such expansion of services in order to meet the needs of the poor calls for more capital in 
operations, besides other factors. Operating sustainability can be obtained by increasing profits 
through higher interest rates and or fees.  
 
Ahmed (2009) suggests that the target group needs to be widened; new products and new 
financial technologies need to be given attention. In order for the target MFI customers to be 
reached, Ahmed (2009) suggests the need for MFIs to expand horizontally. Most importantly, as 
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older borrowers move to higher income brackets, there is the need to devise new products that 
will satisfy their changing needs. However, such products can also assist the MFIs to grow 
vertically, by meeting borrowers, particularly outside the target group (Ahmed, 2009). Ahmed 
(2009) suggests that including more men can lead to horizontal expansion. The is evident from 
the case in Bangladesh, where researchers have found out that men are likely to borrow larger 
amounts than women, even though their repayment records are not very positive compared to 
those of women. However, the inclusion of more men may lead to quicker sustainability of MFIs 
at the expense of repayment performance. Furthermore, a larger package of different products 
needs to be provided for the changing needs of borrowers as microfinance programmes grow.  
 
In order to further promote customers’ financial sustainability, Ahmed (2009) points out that a 
client is only considered sustainable when they are able to meet the basic needs of their family 
without the aid of financial institutions for consumption purposes. Ahmed (2009) add that 
customer sustainability, like institution sustainability, can be viewed from two different but 
interdependent and related angles. These two criteria are social development and economic 
development. Which criterion should be prioritised remains a debatable issue. Ahmed (2009) 
argue that economic development is a prerequisite for social development and vice versa. 
However, other researchers argue that because these two criteria interact, they should be treated 
simultaneously. Sustainability of borrowers is, however, a challenge to MFIs, which have a need 
to come up with the right insurance and social protection schemes while still reaching the poor 
with other financial services (Ahmed, 2009). 
 
Continuous concerns about the issue of MFIs’ financial sustainability, particularly in terms of 
customers, to which little attention has been paid, have resulted in raised eyebrows questioning 
the actual contribution of MFIs to areas besides poverty alleviation (Elahi and Danopoulos, 
2004; Jacobs et al., 2012). Meyer and Nagarajan (2000) point out that the mission of 
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microfinance in reducing poverty may overlook financial development, particularly in rural areas 
where the extreme poor are hence, the distortion of financial markets. Tsai (2004) further argues 
that NGOs are better able to reach the poor with financial services than donor-managed MFIs. 
MFIs financial sustainability has still remained questionable, as has the reason why the market 
for MFIs still remains vast (Tsai, 2004). Like financial services, MFIs also provide social 
services (Cohen, 2003; Sengupta and Aubuchon, 2008), as further discussed.  
2.4.3 Socio-economic Development  
 
Emeni (2008) argues that the importance of MFIs in the socio-economic development of an 
economy cannot be downplayed. MFIs have impacted on developmental issues at individual, 
household, community, organisational, national and international levels including enhanced 
confidence in decision-making at the individual level, positive sharing attitudes of family 
members and self-respect in the family at the household level, increased cooperation, solidarity 
and interaction amongst men and women at the community level, improved methods of 
managing institutional activities, new and improved opportunities for skill enhancement, 
education and income-generating activities at the organisational level.  
 
Recent studies have paid more attention to discovering the impact of MFIs on customer welfare 
(Khandker, 1998; Zohir, 2004). The provision of microloans helps to reduce poverty through 
increased levels of income from profits as a result of investments, employment, consumption, 
asset accumulation and increased savings (Khalily, 2004). Research has argued that the failure of 
developmental institutions and the distortions of rural financial markets (Meyer and Nagarajan, 
2000; Khalily, 2004) have actually given room for more emphasis to be given to the 
sustainability of MFIs. Arguably, sustainability will help to develop such markets and also retain 
credit facilities for poor households (Imai et al., 2010; Khalily et al., 2000; Khalily, 2004). 
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However, development sociologists argue that the contribution of MFIs is seen as a means to 
reduce the role of the government in financial markets (Khalily, 2004). 
 
With regard to promoting children’s education, for example, Littlefield et al. (2003) point out 
that most people turn to use new income from micro enterprises towards their children’s 
education, thus reducing the rate of school dropouts of microfinance customer households. The 
argument also supports Todd’s (1996) ethnographic study of a Grameen village with high 
records of schooling for Grameen children compared to non-members’ children. 81% of boys in 
the Grameen household and almost all girls were highly educated compared to 54% of boys and 
60% of girls in non-Grameen households. Furthermore, 80% of microfinance customers 
recorded high levels of diversified income sources compared to 50% of non-members, similar to 
Saad’s (2010) study.  
 
Sapkota (2008) points out that the economic development of a country like Nepal is possible 
only through improving its agricultural sector, where agricultural credit through which resources 
are mobilised is seen as the main agricultural input. Shrestha (2009) adds that the insufficiency 
of capital accumulation remains a hindrance in LDCs. This is where MFIs step in to provide 
some sort of rural credit, as the case in Nepal, to help finance agricultural activities and enhance 
socio-economic development, besides other impacts like poverty alleviation. This is evident in 
Nepal, where there is a shift from subsistence farming to commercial farming (Sapkota, 2008).  
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2.4.4 Women’s Empowerment 
 
The number of women and women’s groups in MFIs programmes is increasing at a rapid rate 
compared to overall groups and membership. The major reason is that female members are more 
reliable credit customers and better co-operators than males (Eckart et al., 2004) and this has 
been suggested as the reason why most MFIs tend to give out loans primarily to women (Jacobs, 
2012). Greater concerns are still being raised as to why women get more loans when the men are 
the head of the family. Feminists and gender specialists argue that MFIs empowering women 
and giving them more access to microcredit will increase their role in family decision-making 
(Khalily, 2004). This implies that female MFI customers are seen to be taking care of family 
well-being, besides their participation in economic decisions. There is empirical evidence of 
women’s empowerment as a result of their involvement in microfinance (Mayoux, 2006). 
Khandker (2005) attests to the claim that MFIs have a sustained impact on participants, 
especially in reducing poverty levels, particularly true with female customers and at the rural 
level. 
 
According to the above discussion on microfinance objectives, an empirical question is 
warranted. In line with microfinance objectives, the question do MFIs really function as a tool 
for oppression or empowerment? is empirical and cannot be ignored in an attempt to reconcile 
microfinance promise(s). The focus of microfinance in recent times remains debatable, as 
socially focused MFIs have been noted for drifting away from their social roots to accommodate 
commercial ones (Woller, 2002), as further discussed below. 
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2.5 The Microfinance ‘Mission Drift’ Debate 
 
To better understand the microfinance mission debate, the word ‘commercialisation’ needs to be 
defined. Christen (2001) defines commercialisation as having some important features like 
profitability, competition and regulation. The definition implies that there is a transformation of 
non-profit MFIs into profit-orientated and regulated ones, which to some appears to be the 
ultimate destiny of MFIs. This therefore follows Ledgerwood’s (2002) meaning of 
commercialisation: the inclusion of MFIs into the formal financial sector on a sustainable basis. 
In most cases the practice includes the creation of regulated entities which can ensure the safety 
of client savings and guarantee access to commercial capital. MFIs are starting to be more 
concerned about becoming commercialised so as to avoid depending solely on external sources 
of finance like donors. Woller (2002) argues that Christen’s (2001) definition of 
commercialisation is too narrow, and redefines commercialisation as the use of commercial 
approaches to microfinance, for example the introduction of cost-saving technologies. Woller 
(2002) adds that commercialisation here remains a puzzling word that refers to a “new state of 
affairs” (p. 12) which may or may not include transformation.  
 
The challenge of meeting the outreach and sustainability objectives of MFIs continues to persist 
with their growth (Merslaand and Strom, 2010; Bateman, 2010; Hermes et al., 2011). The 
argument often raised in the mission(s) accomplished debate is for MFIs to see their commercial 
role as an addition to their social role and not to completely wipe out their social focus (Asian 
Development Bank, 2002: Balkenhol, 2006; Misra, 2006) in the search for commercial outcomes 
(mission drift). 
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2.5.1 Mission(s) Accomplished 
 
Based on the basis that most MFIs are out to obtain a balance between their financial 
sustainability and socio-economic impact missions, studies focus more on the approach used in 
the delivery of microfinance services (Orbuch, 2011). Frequent questions include: can MFIs 
really achieve financial sustainability and at the same time reach the extreme poor in practice? 
and what are the trade-offs, if any, in pursuing financial sustainability and poverty alleviation 
goals simultaneously? (Orbuch, 2011). Hulme and Mosley (1996) attempted to answer such 
questions and their findings led to other research. Hulme and Mosley studied 13 poverty 
alleviation-focused MFIs in seven countries with the aim of understanding the effects of 
institutional design, management and policy environments on poverty reduction and financial 
sustainability. They noticed that MFIs with high financial sustainability had lower rates of 
arrears and subsidy dependence indices compared to those with lower sustainability. Moreover, 
institutions like Banco Sol adopting microfinance recognised that best practice features of high 
rates of interest, high repayment rates, provision made for material incentives and the availability 
of voluntary savings facilities amongst others will result in higher financial sustainability. For 
those MFIs that are really interested in making sure all necessary jobs are done to deepen 
outreach to the extreme poor, Hulme and Mosley propose two other recommendations. 
 
First, using financial product(s) like appropriate savings facilities and small loans tailored to the 
requirements of the poor, such as consumption. This will result in increased successful adoption 
of financial services. Second, a higher interest rate could be charged on small loan amounts. The 
idea here is to automatically alter the incentive system which works against relatively high costs 
on small loans. The results show high ambiguity in the relationship between financial 
sustainability and poverty reduction. Thus, the argument that MFIs should seek profits, 
according to Cull et al. (2009), has an appealing ‘win-win’ resonance, confirming the trade-off 
between social and commercial objectives. Tucker and Miles (2004) point out that the “the 
  
41 
 
poverty alleviation/self-sufficiency paradox underscores the trade-off between effective service 
leading to poverty reduction and financial self-sufficiency” (p. 42). In line with poverty 
alleviation and profitability, MFIs might be tempted to seek larger amounts of loans that will 
make their customers better off and also give room for them to gain greater economies of scale, 
hence minimised costs and higher loan repayment probability. Woller (2002) adds that 
commercialisation brings benefits such as increased outreach to the poor, development and 
enforcement of accounting, improved performance standards and increased financial viability. 
Thus, adopting commercial approaches can attract more commercial funds, leading to long-term 
financial sustainability, and in effect increased loans to the poor (Hermes et al., 2011).  
 
Tucker and Miles (2004) argue that reaching the poor with microfinance services may be an 
expensive proposition that may hinder many MFIs from reaching self-sufficiency. In order for 
MFIs to achieve their mission of reaching the poor with financial service, Woller (2002) argues 
the need for MFIs to become financially self-sustainable (long term) and not rely so much on 
donors and governments. The MFIs must be ready to cover all of their costs and return a profit 
from the financial services they provide to their customers as Copestake et al. (2001) suggest. 
Ahmed (2009) points out that it is fair to acknowledge the fact that donors’ funding and interest 
for MFIs might reduce with time.  
 
On the other hand, if MFIs also rely so heavily on offering services to the extreme poor, a 
sustainable amount of income might not be generated, given that the extreme poor take small 
loans. Suggestions in the literature argue that if MFIs are to achieve their social objective to 
outreach to poor customers, they must offer their services to the marginal and not the extreme 
poor client groups. In that way, enough income to sustain them can be generated. Furthermore, 
various products and services should be made to meet the demands of various client groups, so 
as to both achieve the objective of remaining financially healthy and still focus on reaching out 
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to extremely poor customers (Luong, 2010). Luong (2010) suggests that there is a vital need for 
MFIs to treat the poor as its potential customers and even increase the level of product 
availability and affordability.  
 
Cooperation with formal financial institutions is encouraged (Ahmed, 2009). Here, we can see 
the case of Latin America, where MFIs such as Prodeem and Banco Solidario have become 
financially sustainable through collaborating with commercial banks and other business 
institutions in selling products such as savings, pensions and insurance, thus generating a more 
stable income capable of covering their costs and in effect make more profit, which implies a 
higher chance of serving a wider range of poor customers. In this sense, MFIs are more business 
orientated than charity focus, hence, diverting their interests focus from the extreme poor to the 
marginal poor. The implication here is that MFIs will therefore focus on urban regions where 
more of the marginal poor are found, and ignore rural poverty-stricken areas with their extreme 
poor (Zeller and Meyer, 2002).  
 
Microfinance, which started as a grassroots ‘movement’ largely informed and motivated by a 
development paradigm is gradually changing into a more globalised sector, increasingly 
informed by a commercial/finance/accounting paradigm (Brau and Woller, 2004). As a result of 
increased competition, rapid and sure movement of commercial providers into the market, 
growing innovation and customers with more experience and formal backgrounds demanding 
quality financial services, the microfinance sector is now moving towards a new era (Jackson 
and Islam, 2005). The commercial viability of MFIs remains crucial, due to such continuous 
growth in the industry serving a wider client group with financial and social services in a bid to 
alleviate poverty (Sengupta and Aubuchon, 2008). The significant change in the microfinance 
industry over the years has resulted in microfinance ‘mission drift’ (Mersland and Strom, 2010). 
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2.5.2 Microfinance ‘Mission drift’ 
 
Increased market competition assuring efficiency, for example, has forced MFIs to drift from 
their social roots with developmental concerns to a more commercialised industry with 
profitability aims (Woller, 2002). Lately, profitability pressures have been evident in MFIs, 
leading to mission drift (Woller, 2002; Mersland and Strom, 2010; Hermes et al., 2011). This 
claim is supported by Dr. Yunus, who expresses his concern about businesses, including 
commercial banks, which turn to concentrating on profits, the bottom line, and move away from 
focusing on the poor, their initial target and objective (Jacobs et al., 2012). 
 
Mission drift as discussed in the study refers to a situation where MFIs are forced to divert from 
their social roots and poverty alleviation focus to a more commercialised one with greater 
emphasis on the twin concerns of profits and market share (Woller, 2002). In as much as 
commercialisation might increase MFIs’ long term sustainability, it might also limit the poor’s 
capital access (Tucker and Miles, 2004; Ahmed, 2009). The implication is that a larger loan size 
will improve profitability but is likely to reduce the breath of outreach. Gibbons and Meehan 
(1999) acknowledge that it is not easy to achieve both objectives; however most financially 
sustainable MFIs are able to increase borrowing in the private capital markets besides their 
ability to disburse loans. The absence of sustainability implies that MFIs are not a going concern, 
thus the goal of poverty alleviation remains theoretical (Otero, 1999). 
 
Hermes et al. (2011) further argue that providing the poor with financial services seems to be 
very costly for MFIs, and the objective may conflict with that of financial sustainability. Thus, in 
a bid to resolve the issue, most MFIs have approached foreign donors seeking financial 
assistance so they can remain financially sustainable and in turn provide the poor with financial 
services. Until recently, the means of financial sustainability have been argued to be unsecured 
and not guaranteed as such (in most cases only lasting for a shorter period). Microfinance 
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efficiency and financial sustainability goals have made MFIs shift towards engaging themselves 
in long-term financial sustainability activities like commercialisation in order to meet the 
continuous changes (competition, technology, government policies and regulation), as suggested 
by Rhyne and Otero (2006). 
 
The question of interest is to what extent are MFIs shifting towards a commercialisation-focused 
objective? Commercialisation in MFIs can boost their existing commercial funds, which can be 
used to assist the poor through increased amounts of loans and for a longer period of time 
(Woller, 2002; Hermes et al., 2011). Rhyne and Otero (2006) claim that the Bolivian MFIs have 
become more efficient since the late 1990s and experienced a fall in interest rates from 30% in 
1998 to 21% in 2005, implying that microfinance financial sustainability, outreach and 
commercialisation objectives can be argued to remain compatible. 
 
However, Hermes et al. (2011), together with other researchers like Mersland and Strom (2010) 
have argued that MFIs’ objectives can still conflict. For example, in line with financial 
sustainability and efficiency, the cost of lending to customers cannot be overlooked. Hermes et 
al. (2011) point out that the cost incurred by MFIs to lend money to illiterate, rural and extreme 
poor customers is very high. The implication here is that in order to minimise costs and remain 
competitive, MFIs will end up not meeting the needs of such extreme poor customers. The trade-
off claim argues that MFIs cannot simultaneously be financially viable and reduce poverty. The 
transaction costs, for example, incurred by MFIs in disbursing small loans which are usually 
taken by the extreme poor customers associated with lower interest rates are usually higher than 
those of larger loans. Thus, MFIs will prefer to give out larger loans in order to remain 
financially viable and competitive (Hermes et al., 2011). 
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Woller (2002) adds that mission drift can only occur if MFIs abandon the poor and illiterate 
client group, when there will be minimal or no outreach. Depth of outreach in MFIs is concerned 
with the provision of financial services to the poorest client groups, with average loan size being 
a determinant for outreach (Cull et al., 2007; Mersland and Strom, 2010). The extent of lending 
cannot be undermined in viewing outreach, as pointed out by Bhatt and Tang (2001). Ignoring 
the importance of savings in livelihood strategies, particularly of poor households, is wrong 
when outreach is concerned (Woller, 2002). The inclusion of ‘savings’ in the definition of 
outreach shows clearly that small-scale savings mobilisation can be promising in reaching poor 
with financial services (Woller, 2002). 
 
However, there remains an extensive body of literature on microfinance, in line with the fact that 
its successes in alleviating poverty and improving socio-economic development are well 
documented (Islam, 2008; Bateman, 2010; Jacobs, 2012). Evidence is seen in Bangladesh 
through the Grameen customers who have reported better crisis management (Khalily, 2004). 
Khandker (1998) argues that Grameen-type microfinance has effects on both individual and 
household education, consumption, savings, income levels, wealth, living standards and 
women’s empowerment.  
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2.6 Registration Procedures of MFIs in Cameroon 
No matter which category an MFI falls into, at inception, they need to obtain accreditation and a 
licence from the MINFIN before becoming operational, following Prime Ministerial Decree of 
1998, No. 94 98/300/PM. The COBAC text also states that every MFI must form part of the 
national association of MFIs (Fotabong, 2012) which in Cameroon is called ANEMCAM.  
 
This degree was enacted and further enforced by CEMAC Regulation which relates to the 
conditions and regulations regarding the effective operation and governance of MFI activities in 
CEMAC, and became operational on 15 April 2005. The main purpose behind these laws 
governing MFIs’ activities is to ensure that depositors’ savings are well secured, besides making 
sure that basic economic activities are financed.  
 
In order to complete the microfinance registration process, there must be a manager, general 
assembly or list of members and a given amount of minimum capital, depending on the type of 
MFI, before the application form can be submitted. This is followed by the creation of a file for 
the MFI which goes through the Monetary Authority to COBAC. The file created should consist 
of:  
a stamped application specifying the requested category, a registration certificate, the 
minutes of the general meeting for the creation of the institution, the articles of 
association of the institution, a list of founding members or shareholders, the 
members of the board of directors or of the organ considered as such and where 
necessary, documents testifying that payments have been made in connection with 
the liberation of subscribed shares, supported by bank statements or any other 
documents serving as such a three year forecast of the activity, expansion and 
organisation, a detail of technical and financial means to be used and any element 
likely to enlighten the competent authorities (Fotabong, 2012:12). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
47 
 
2.7 Chapter Summary 
 
The chapter has successfully explored the background knowledge on microfinance highlighting 
and making review to pertinent issues vital for the study. Following the conclusive argument that 
the concept of ‘microfinance’ is largely understood but not clearly defined in the minds of its 
users (Vijender et al., 2012), the first section therefore focuses on an in-depth exploration of the 
definition of ‘microfinance’ and Ryhne (2001)’s definition is adopted in the study since it 
broadens the types of services offered by MFIs today. 
 
The second section is on the types of MFIs where a clearer and in-depth discussion is provided 
for better understanding of the microfinance concept. In line with the research aim, the study 
explores the main and frequently cited missions and objectives of MFIs. In this section a clear 
definition of the ‘poor’ is given and further emphasis laid on the difference between 
microfinance breadth and depth of outreach. The chapter has also explored pertinent issues 
surrounding microfinance debate in line with its missions. In this section the mission 
accomplished and drift arguments have been explained according to existing literature.  
 
Attention needs to be given to the fact that, microfinance commercialisation practices (Woller, 
2002) in MFIs might affect its accounting and accountability practices (Burns and Scapens, 
2000). Microfinance increased competition have led to tremendous pressure calling on MFIs to 
exercise ‘good governance’- the need for MFIs to become more transparent and accountable 
(Kaldor, 2003) especially at the grassroots level which is often missing (Dixon et al 2006).   
  
48 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
MICROFINANCE ACCOUNTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY PRACTICES 
3.0 Introduction 
Lately, institutional reforms have given room for more emphasis to be placed on institutional 
transparency and governance (Kaldor, 2003) especially in MFIs, where such concepts remain 
contestable (Hulme, 2006; Aitken, 2010; Pouchous, 2012). The emphasis here is to ensure that 
microfinance accounting and accountability practices are reviewed. Institutional pressures, as 
argued by Hyvönen et al. (2012), can force such practices to change in order to adapt to the 
environment. Such a review process can assure more transparency and better governance 
(Pouchous, 2012).  
‘Accountability’ even though a complex, ambiguous, contradictory, contestable and tricky 
concept (Mulgan, 2000; Ebrahim, 2003; Demirag, 2004; Bovens, 2007), is often seen as a good 
way to access organisational adherence and transparency to its objectives and performance and 
build organisational confidence. It is an inevitable concept, especially today as different 
authorities continuously demand ‘good governance’ particularly from aid and developmental 
organisations such as MFIs.  
Accountability issues have thus continued to receive attention from researchers, particularly 
those with a developmental and cultural focus (Ebrahim, 2003; Bovens, 2007; Jayasinghe and 
Wickramasinghe, 2011; Ahmed et al., 2012), but with little covered in terms of the growing 
microfinance environment. Official sources continue to demand that institutions (including 
MFIs) become more transparent its accountability functions (Dixon et al., 2006), hence a call for 
more research in this arena (Ebrahim, 2003; Dixon et al., 2006; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2007).  
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The importance of MFIs continues to grow, but knowledge on how they have impacted on 
society remains partial and contested (Hulme, 2000). The fact that the importance of MFIs lies in 
their capacity to be able to meet the needs of the grassroots with the services they provide must 
not go unaccounted for (Dixon et al., 2006). In spite of the importance and rapid growth rate of 
MFIs involved in socio-economic development, accounting research is just beginning to notice 
and develop a significant interest in their operations (Goddard and Assad, 2006). Worse still, 
only a few studies have explored governance issues, particularly in relation to accountability. 
Accounting issues remain at the heart of every organisation as they impact on organisational and 
individual life (Perry and Nolke, 2006) and therefore should not be ignored. 
 
In relation to MFIs, Hartarska (2005) argues that there is a need to study these governance issues 
in order to make sure the financial services from MFIs are channelled to the intended people. In 
addition, these organisations are increasingly put under pressure to show their impact on society 
(Simanowitz, 2001; Zeller and Meyer, 2002) and to exercise ‘good governance’ (Kaldor, 2003; 
Lewis and Madon, 2004; Dixon et al., 2006) in order to achieve set organisational missions and 
objectives (Hartarska, 2005). Therefore, the focus on governance necessitates MFIs to become 
more transparent, accountable and accounted for (Dixon et al., 2006). The implication here is 
more accountability is better in order to achieve the set objectives of MFIs. Thus, a closer 
examination of the role of accountability mechanisms is necessary (Hartarska, 2005; Ebrahim, 
2003).  
 
However, it is argued that the broad and highly contested concept of accountability (Bovens, 
2007; Kemp et al., 2012) cannot exist as a standalone but as a related and inseparable term from 
‘accounting’ per se (Burns, 2000; Gray, 2001). In line with microfinance objectives, certain 
accounting functions need to be carried out in order to assess how successful the organisation 
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has been, and it is argued here that those performing such accounting functions are ‘held 
responsible’ for any mistakes or reports produced. Roberts and Scapens (1985) even show how 
accounting information can lead to certain forms of accountability, as further discussed below. 
Gray (2014) adds that accountability also has implications for accounting, in line with informed 
decision-making and control of stakeholders.  
 
Accountability remains a powerful tool use to maximise the economic and social performance of 
a firm. In as much as financial and management accounting techniques have provided 
information to various stakeholders about the performance of an organisation, such accounting 
techniques have also provided mechanisms through which managers have been able to discharge 
accountability duties to non-managerial stakeholders (Unerman et al., 2007). Furthermore, 
Unerman et al. (2007) argue that, in as much as accounting is an important tool in accountability 
and other functions within an organisation, broader techniques of sustainable accounting and 
accountability have the potential to be powerful tools in planning, control and accountability for 
more social, developmental and environmental impact.  
As with any developmental intervention, there is an increasing demand by donors, governments 
and interested parties for impact assessment and accountability studies to determine the 
successes and failures of MFI programmes (Afrane, 2002). The purpose of this chapter is to 
review microfinance accountability issues pertinent to their success, to include meanings, 
perspectives, types, mechanisms, importance and impacts. ‘Grassroots accountability’, as 
suggested by Dixon et al. (2006), cannot be ignored when reviewing the socio-economic impact 
of microfinance, particularly MFIs with a social mission.  
 
The chapter is divided into seven sections. First is an introduction followed by a review of 
accountability from a broader perspective, where ‘accounting’ is argued to remain inseparable 
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from accountability. Accounting discussed as part of accountability has been further recognised 
as a socially constructed phenomenon with social impacts on developmental institutions like 
MFIs. Third is a review on accountability issues pertinent to the success of MFIs, such as the 
meanings, perspectives, types and mechanisms of accountability, adopting a socially 
constructive stakeholder perspective (Belal, 2002). Fourth is a review of microfinance impact in 
line with its objectives: social and financial impacts are further discussed as a form of 
accountability where internal and external monitoring systems remain pertinent in determining 
the impact level of microfinance. The chapter further establishes a connection between 
microfinance objectives, accounting and accountability before closing with a summary.  
3.1 Accountability in a Broader Context  
The term ‘accountability’ does not seem to bring out a clear or precise definition (Sinclair, 1995; 
Cooper and Owen, 2007). The process of accountability can broadly be seen to mean an 
accounting (system) where accountability is seen to occur at each stage. Thus, it is apparently 
impossible to talk about the accountability concept without relating it to accounting issues, 
especially when looking at social issues (Unerman et al., 2007). Starting the discussion by 
bringing in accounting-related issues will help to give a clearer picture of the accountability 
concept and process. In order to account for the level of achievement of microfinance objectives, 
the accounting function cannot be ignored. Hence, accountability, in line with Burns (2000), is 
seen to include the traditional view of accounting and social aspects to include CSR issues. What 
does CSR actually mean, to whom and why (Moir, 2001)?  Moir (2001) defines CSR to mean 
focusing on employee relations, human rights, organisation’s ethic, community as well as the 
environment.  
 
Traditionally, accounting has been used for planning, controlling and decision-making amongst 
other processes. However, the word ‘accounting’ in itself is ambiguous – for example, the 
  
52 
 
variation in the application of accounting standards in guiding accounting and auditing 
procedures (Ledgerwood, 1999), which embraces wider and different fields. 
 
Beyond the narrow and functional perspective, it can be argued that accounting has the power to 
shape and change behaviour, and is interdisciplinary and socially constructed (Dillard, 1991; 
Goddard and Assad, 2006; Hopper et al., 2009). It can be argued that all institutions are 
interconnected in any given society. The implication is that “organisational structures and 
strategies are shaped by institutional environments” (Beckert, 1999: 777). Hence, organisations 
cannot exist in isolation to their societal world and should be understood from this angle, 
meaning that there are bound to be changes affecting the organisation both from within and 
without, including changes inherent within its (social) accounting systems. Perry and Nolke 
(2006) define accounting as: 
… a system for measuring economic activity and therefore, in an economic world 
characterized by division and specialisation of labour, it is an important and 
necessary social practice. (p. 560) 
 
Thus, both the functional and social practice of accounting is on its own seen as accountability in 
a broader context. Gray (2005) adds that accounting systems vary in different parts of the world 
and in different organisations within a given country. He further adds that culture (rules, routines 
and beliefs shaping behaviour in order to pursue set objectives and missions) ,for example, has 
been one of the major influences on the differences in accounting systems, especially at the 
international level.  
 
Furthermore, the wider perspective on accounting argues that accounting is more of a social 
(Gray, 1997; 2002) and political process than just a rational-technical system. Thus, one way of 
understanding accounting systems from their social roots within their organisational context is to 
see them as types of organisational language systems (Laughlin, 1987). The practicality of 
accounting, where the study’s interest lies, is much more complex than shown in the rational 
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textbook approach. Forces operate to shape the way in which accounting is used; given the fact 
that accounting theory is embedded in or allocated within a social and complex political reality, 
accounting will not necessarily improve the decisions of an organisation if these social and 
political influences are not considered (Gray, 2002). Dillard (1991) adds that accounting remains 
subjective, where the social world is understood from the context of social actors shaping it. 
Accounting as a language system is defined by Laughlin (1987) to mean:  
… human artefacts which control certain aspects of the organisational life whose 
terms and sentences (the technical part of the design) find meaning in the historical, 
organisational and social context in which they can be uttered. (p. 481)  
 
3.2 Microfinance Accountability  
The adoption and implementation of the correct corporate governance system is becoming a 
particular issue, particularly in less developed and emerging economies, however it is suggested 
that such systems are designed to suit the needs of individual countries (Tsamenyi and Uddin, 
2008), and that the decisions reached should suit the interests or needs of various stakeholders 
(Cooper and Owen, 2007). Regulation of microfinance services has long been demanded (Van 
Greuning at al., 1999; Hardy et al., 2003). It is believed that corporate governance or 
institutional reforms enhance accountability (Cooper and Owen, 2007; Tsamenyi and Uddin, 
2008). Moir (2001) adds that a business can only contribute fully to society if it is socially 
responsible, besides other attributes. 
 
Gray (2001) points out that accountability usually “places the society at the heart of the analysis 
and questions the legitimacy of an organisation’s actions or perhaps its right to exist” (p.11). 
However, the aims of society and that of the organisation cannot be ignored under the 
accountability umbrella. Bovens (2007) states clearly that “accountability is a contestable 
concept par excellence” (p.105). Sinclair (1995) and Gray (2014) add that nobody really doubts 
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the need for accountability, but how it is defined, provided and accounted for is far from 
resolved.  
 
The accountability concept has thus far embraced several meanings for different people that 
extend beyond its simple meaning to give an account of an action in which one is involved 
(Mulgan, 2000). Accountability, as argued by Bovens (2007), like an umbrella covers many 
other highly debatable concepts, to include accounting. However, certain intriguing issues have 
arisen in the literature about the meaning, nature, mechanisms and importance of accountability 
and other unresolved issues. In order to better understand the accountability concept, other issues 
surrounding it have further been explored. The exploration starts by identifying the various ways 
in which it is defined, seen and experienced rather than overlooking its chameleon quality.  
 
The questions often asked in this regard include: what is accountability? To whom and from who 
is accountability due? What are the different forms of accountability? How can the presence of 
accountability be determined? What type of information is needed for accountability purposes? 
and Why is accountability important? These questions have been explored from an 
organisational perspective and in line with accounting systems below. Another discourse missing 
from the accountability literature is how organisations deal with competing accountability 
demands (Ebrahim, 2003) in order to achieve their objectives and missions. 
3.2.1 Accountability: Perspective and Meaning 
In order to understand the complex and tricky concept of accountability, the different definitions 
offered in the literature must be explored. Accountability, even though it is an ever-expanding 
concept (Bovens, 2007), still appears to be misused and misunderstood (Gray, 2001). In 
academic reviews, accountability is often seen as “a set of standards for evaluation of the 
behaviour of public actors” (Bovens, 2007: 106). Accountability in this sense is seen as a social 
virtue, whether personal or organisational. Thus, in its broad sense it can be termed an 
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‘evaluative’ not ‘analytical’ term in which the state of affairs or an agent’s performance is 
positively measured (virtue).  
 
Going beyond the broad concept of accountability, the study embraces and adopts the view that 
accountability may vary from function to function, person to person (stakeholder to stakeholder), 
field to field, time to time, place to place and above all depending on the purpose, mission and 
objectives of the organisation. Gray et al. (2006) further point out that accountability is viewed 
by accounting professionals to have a straightforward and simple meaning. In summary, 
accountability can be seen as “identifying what one is responsible for and then providing 
information about that responsibility to those who have rights to that information” (Gray, 2001: 
11). Other accounting researchers have also referred to accountability as a way of giving and 
expecting/demanding reasons for conduct in its broadest sense (Robinson, 2003). Stakeholder 
accountability is seen to mean a discourse (dialogue or discussion)1 which takes into 
consideration the open, unbiased ideal speech situation, debate, needs and views of all 
stakeholders leading to an acceptance by all stakeholders, unlike shareholder primacy (a 
neoclassical economic theory with a free market view) which only focuses on the interests of 
shareholders in making decisions, reflected through reports, for example (Cooper and Owen, 
2007). In addition, corporate accountability, as suggested by Cooper and Owen (2007) “must 
result in instances where decisions made are not done so purely on the basis of shareholders 
primacy” (p.653).  
 
This section continues by defining accountability to mean “the duty to provide an account (by no 
means necessarily a financial account) or reckoning of those actions for which one is held 
responsible” (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2004:6). Unerman and O’Dwyer’s definition fails to 
                                                          
1 In discussions, decisions are seen as outcomes converging on a conclusion while in dialogue, 
there is an exploration of complex diverging issues and participants do not seek agreement but to 
have an in-depth and richer understanding of complex issues, as suggested by Cooper and Owen 
(2007) 
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address “the issue of effective utilisation of information by recipients and associated power 
differentials between the accountor and the accountee” (Cooper and Owen, 2007: 653). Giving 
an account is one way which further “requires the accountee to have the power to hold to the 
account the person who gives the account” hence, the “accountors can also be held to account” 
to make the accountability relationship a two way process (Cooper and Owen, 2007:653). 
Messner (2009) adds that giving an account means providing “reasons for one’s behaviour, to 
explain and justify what one did or did not do” (p. 920). Boland and Schultze (1996) view 
accountability as “giving explanations through a credible story of what happened and a 
calculation and balancing of competing obligations, including moral ones” (p. 62). Such 
accountability has certain attributes, such as being external, as an account is being sent to 
someone other than the person providing the account; it also brings in social interaction and the 
exchange of information. However, it can thus be argued at this juncture that the idea that 
accountability is a straightforward concept has been challenged with the notion of ‘society’, 
especially when the concerned institutions are exclusively MFIs, which in practice do not agree 
with this definition (Gray et al., 2006). It is therefore important at this point to understand what 
accountability means in line with looking at its parameters, functions and essence within the 
societal terrain (that is, the purpose of the organisation) as further discussed below. 
 
Accountability has been used in a narrow way in countries such as Britain, Australia and 
continental European countries. This has occurred simply because these countries have liberal 
market economies that specify that limited companies should only be accountable to their 
shareholders (shareholder primacy). Accountability here is seen as a social mechanism, in which 
the actor or agent in that institutional setting is held responsible (external) to give an account by 
another actor (Ebrahim, 2003; Mulgan, 2003). However, accountability from this angle has been 
criticised for being too descriptive and not including the behaviour of other stakeholders, 
concerned only about the operations of the said institution (Bovens, 2007). Cooper and Owen 
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(2007) add that a more pluralistic type of accountability needs to be established for stakeholder 
accountability to take place. This is where there is a clear recognition of the presence of other 
legitimate stakeholders than simply recognising equity shareholders alone (Cooper and Owen, 
2007). The argument here is that other groups, particularly employees, make firm-specific 
investments and also incur risks as shareholders do. Thus, denying them a place in the 
company’s governance structure makes it difficult to justify on moral grounds (Gamble and 
Kelly, 2001; Cooper and Owen, 2007).  
 
The main focus on accountability here is not whether these actors operate in an accountable 
manner but knowing if they can be held responsible ex post facto by other agents (Ebrahim, 
2003; Bovens, 2007). Accountability is thus narrowed down here to mean the relationship 
between the principal and the agent in line with the mission and objectives of the MFI (more 
specifically, actors’ perception of such purpose). A wider stakeholder perspective has been 
adopted in the study than for cases applied in countries like Germany and Japan. 
 
Accountability has been defined as a standalone and as a system, also focusing on its various 
types. Bovens (2007) adds that accountability comes from accounting. Bovens (2007), in line 
with the above, claims that accountability can be referred to as; 
A relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to 
explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass 
judgement, and the actor may face consequences. (p.107) 
 
 Ebrahim (2003) in the same view defines accountability as “the means by which individuals and 
organisations report to a recognized authority (or authorities) and are held responsible for its 
actions” (p. 814). Many different elements can be found in this definition. The term ‘actor’ in 
this case could be an individual, official or institution that gives the principal information on 
their conduct (Ebrahim, 2003; Bovens, 2007). 
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Furthermore, it has also been argued that there is need to provide an explanation besides 
providing information which is directed to specific forum in order to complete the meaning of 
accountability (Ebrahim, 2003). That is, the actor must also feel obliged (taking responsibility, 
internal) to give an account and not at liberty to do so or not. Thus accountability is externally 
seen as ‘held responsible’ and internally viewed as ‘felt responsible’. In addition, there must be 
some room for debates and judgement by the forum, together with formal or informal sanctions 
or rewards. Another important feature of accountability is the need to distribute equal 
information to all interested parties in line with the organisational mission and objectives 
(Tower, 1993). 
 
According to accountability discourse, CSR (Moir, 2001; Chen, 2011; Kemp et al., 2012) and 
transparency are sometimes used as synonyms for accountability. However, transparency 
(openness) does not necessarily involve monitoring by a particular agent. The definition of 
accountability here is retrospective, as actors are obliged to give an account (for example a CSR 
report) or actors take on the responsibility to give an account to the right party after the act/fact 
for which they are held responsible. Responsiveness only contributes to the proactive inputs of a 
policy process but does not have the elements of justification, judgement and consequences, so 
as such does not constitute accountability per se (Bovens, 2007). Transparency is only a virtue of 
accountability (Chen, 2011). The conclusion drawn from the above accountability discourse, 
according to Moir (2001), is that accountability should be a continuous commitment in which 
parties behave in an ethical manner in contributing to socio-economic development. 
 
3.2.2 Types of Accountability (for Whom?) 
Microfinance stakeholder accountability in particular, appears to be very complex, since its 
operations involve the attainment of social and financial objectives due to the competing 
demands of different stakeholders (Ebrahim, 2003; Ahmed, 2004). MFIs, especially those with 
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dual objectives, can arguably be accountable to various stakeholders including funders, donors, 
regulators and customers, and such accountability, if well carried out, can improve 
organisational transparency and performance (Ebrahim, 2003).  
 
In order to better understand the various types of accountability, Ritchie and Richardson (2000) 
are used as a starting point. Ritchie and Richardson (2000) identify four different types of 
accountability. They focus on understanding how these accountability types differ and the ways 
in which they are formed. They talk about vertical (rule-based) and horizontal (relational-based) 
accountability types. Types 1 and 2 as shown in Figure 3.1 below refer to the more traditionally 
focused accountability types in the literature where accounting information remains vital (Jacobs 
and Walker, 2004). The accountability type here is more formal and hierarchical directed 
towards fund providers (Hilhorst, 2003). It is here that accountability for explicit performance 
methods and procedures is usually imposed on organisations by external stakeholders (Kearns, 
1994; Dixon, et al., 2006). Lewis and Madon (2004) summarise Types 1 and 2 by pointing out 
that accountability mainly involves rule-bound responses. Accountability in this case, as 
mentioned in Section 3.5.1 refers to those ‘held responsible’ (Ebrahim, 2003). 
 
Types 3 and 4 horizontally embrace the idea that all institutions are occupied by social agents 
where the relationship with one another cannot be ignored (Hilhorst, 2003; O’Dwyer and 
Unerman, 2007). Others have viewed Type 3 as a daily, spoken, unrecorded and taken-for-
granted type of accountability which does not have any formal roles (Hilhorst, 2003; Ritchie and 
Richardson, 2000; Sinclair, 1995). Type 4, on the other hand, comes from different social 
networks which add to the accountability process. 
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FIGURE 3.1: Types of Accountability 
Strong  
Accountability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Weak accountability                 Strong accountability 
 
Source: Ritchie and Richardson (2000: 454) 
 
Ritchie and Richardson’s (2000) accountability framework, however, fails to incorporate the 
dual relationship between the various actors (agency and power) in designing the system of 
accountability. Dixon et al. (2006) have attempted to address this issue of agency and power by 
providing a comparative accountability framework (Figure 3.2). Dixon et al.’s (2006) 
accountability framework embraces the relationship between the various actors to an extent and 
the grassroots, the community and groups, as shown in Types 3 and 4 respectively. Dixon et al. 
(2006) see Type 1 as accountability from the MFIs to its donors (upwards) with pressure from 
these donors (held responsible), Type 2 looks at the internal management acting as donors or 
own agents imposing tighter forms of control and accountability strategies, thus accountability to 
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management. Both Types 1 and 2 are rule-based, Type 1 on external and Type 2 on internal 
rules, seen as the bottom-up (upwards) formal accountability approach.  
 
Types 3 and 4 rather embrace the top-down (downwards) informal forms of accountability. Type 
3 looks at the community through personalised, informal relationships while Type 4 focuses on 
the client group with more informal relationships, taking into consideration cultural values and 
beliefs, public sentiments and trust amongst other social factors in the accountability process 
(Ebrahim, 2003). Type 4 is a typical reflection of the Bangladesh typology of MFIs, where the 
primary intention is on poverty alleviation focusing on customers or grassroots, and is in line 
with what Roberts (1996) calls ‘socialised accountability’. However, this Type 4 conflicts with 
the Type 2 hierarchical or formal accountability. In summary, Types 3 and 4 give a clearer 
explanation as to why Types 1 and 2 increasingly become problematic to MFIs. Hardy and 
Marguire (2008) add that ‘power’ is embedded in Types 1 and 2 but the ideas for development 
step up from Types 3 and 4 
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FIGURE 3.2: Typical Microfinance Accountability Environment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Dixon et al. (2006: 418) 
 
 
Hopwood (1984) and Jacobs (2000) point out that accountability has the ability to bring about 
‘changes’2. This argument has been supported by Jacobs (2000). However, the fundamental 
questions of how, why, when and in what way these rules and resources are drawn upon need to 
be answered for this visibility process as they vary with time, organisation, situation and person 
(Roberts and Scapens, 1985; Jacobs, 2000). Just who is made visible to whom? Are the patterns 
of visibility symmetrical or otherwise? Can only the centre observe the local? Or can the local 
                                                          
2 See Chapter 4 for the meaning of change and its application in the study. 
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also observe the centre? The nature of this accountability visibility, origins and consequences is 
also very important in understanding accounting practices (Roberts and Scapens, 1985). 
Hopwood (1990) emphasises the role of accounting technologies in creating visibilities within 
organisations. Jacobs (2000) adds that bookkeeping can bring about the creation of indirect 
means of visibility. 
 
3.2.3 Practical Accountability in MFIs – Review of Empirical Evidence  
Often in practice, accountability approaches tend to concentrate solely on upwards 
accountability to funders, ignoring downwards accountability to stakeholders receiving 
microfinance services such as customers and community groups (Ebrahim, 2003; Dixon et al., 
2006; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006; Edwards and Hulme, 1996b). However, few attempts have 
been made in practice to study downward accountability to recipients (Ahmed et al., 2012) and 
mechanisms (Ebrahim, 2003) particularly in organisations with a social mission (social 
accountability). Even when bottom-up accountability is studied, the accountability relationship 
between MFIs and its customers is often missing (Dixon et al., 2006). 
 
In Dixon, et al.’s (2006) accountability framework, an emerging tension surfaces between 
vertical (formal or hierarchical) and horizontal (informal) accountability mechanisms. The 
findings reveal that such tensions can lead to dysfunctional consequences which are not good for 
the organisation. Dixon, et al. (2006) point out how upward formal accountability mechanisms 
have been imposed on microfinance NGOs and how the NGOs began to suffer following rapid 
growth. From the individual perspective, loan officers have been targeted as they operate in the 
field, mediating the relationship between the NGO and its customers. The focus on loan officers 
can also be partially explained by the fact that the initial formal and procedural accountability 
mechanisms needed them to provide daily accountability reports to managers and donors. 
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Furthermore, Dixon et al. (2006) explain that there seems to be an informal, horizontal or 
downward accountability type between the loan officers and microfinance NGO customers. This 
mutual accountability between loan officers and managers or donors and between loan officers 
and microfinance customers has been argued to remain essential for the success of MFIs 
(Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006). Moreover, informal accountability works not just between the 
loan officer and customers but between the lending group members registered in the MFI 
(Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006). Trust has been argued to be the key binding factor in informal 
accountability relationships, which seemed not to be the case in the Zambian microfinance NGO 
studied by Dixon et al. (2006). Loan officers can sometimes find it hard to maintain upward 
accountability to their manager or funders while at the same time maintaining a trust-based 
informal accountability relationship with their customers, as in Dixon et al.’s (2006) study. The 
implication here is inappropriateness in the accountability mechanism or imposition of rigid 
hierarchical and procedural accountability mechanisms can lead to inefficiency and even 
threaten the success of the organisation, leading to potential social damage. Even though there 
has been strong emphasis requiring organisations such as MFIs to be accountable, Unerman and 
O’Dwyer (2006) and Ebrahim (2003) argue that identifying and developing a suitable 
accountability mechanism is very important for the survival and socio-economic life of these 
organisations. 
 
Goddard and Assad (2006) share a similar view from a study on three Tanzanian NGOs. They 
argue that even though formal accountability and accounting mechanisms served as an important 
factor in establishing legitimacy to the donors, it had no impact on the internal decision-making 
process, thereby threatening the activist mission of some NGOs. Ahmed et al. (2012) examine 
accountability in a large NGO in Bangladesh. They conclude that both functional and social 
accountability are pertinent for organisational success. Accountability in practice is much more 
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problematic than it appears, especially in sub-Saharan African, where the concept has not been 
fully absorbed (Dixon et al., 2006). 
 
3.2.4 Accountability Mechanisms 
Different mechanisms have been pointed out in the accountability literature (Ebrahim, 2003; 
Tsamenyi and Uddin, 2008; Jordan, 2009). Ebrahim (2003), for example, focuses on five broad 
categories: reports and disclosure statements, performance measurement and impacts, 
participation, self-regulation, and social audits. The discussion of accountability mechanisms is 
led by the different organisational management elements (missions or vision statement and 
organisational governing boards for example) set to assure internal accountability.  
Before elaborating on accountability mechanisms, it is important to differentiate between ‘tool’ 
and ‘process’-based accountability mechanisms (Jordan, 2009). Tools are used to mean the 
discrete instruments or strategies used to arrive at accountability, usually for a short timeframe. 
Process accountability emphasises the course of an action, most often for a longer time. 
Following the above classes of accountability, Ebrahim (2003) regroups reports and disclosure 
statements under tools, as they are often used on a monthly, quarterly or yearly basis. Also, 
performance evaluations are usually done at particular periods (usually by the end of the 
project), which means they can also fall under tool accountability. Participation and self-
regulation, on the other hand, fall under process accountability mechanisms. The fact that these 
take more time, with complicated broad requirements, besides their intangibility, render them 
process mechanisms. 
3.2.4.1 Disclosure statements and reports 
Gray (2001) points out that the law on disclosure, particularly on issues surrounding 
organisational governance, has steadily increased over the years. In line with government 
regulations (Chen, 2011), Gray (2001) points out that organisations are always increasing the 
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level of voluntary disclosures made about consumers, product safety and interactions with the 
community. Disclosure (financial) statements and reports remain widely adopted accountability 
tools as they can expose vital basic organisational information. Such information is usually in 
demand by different users, to include the government for regulatory purposes in many countries, 
particularly in less developed and emerging economies (Ebrahim, 2003; Tsamenyi and Uddin, 
2008). Such information also helps regulators to ensure that regulated organisations are 
operating in conformity to set standards and regulations at the external level.  
Legal or formal mandated reports are also usually required by funders or donors from 
institutions which invest funds in order to assess the achievements of funded projects. However, 
such accountability tools do not encourage internal responsibility in order to promote the 
missions, performance or ethics of the organisation. In line with decision-making and 
performance measurement, reports and financial statements can also be of substantial aid in 
providing basic information. Gray (2001) concludes that the collation of social reports with other 
organisational reports will boost the organisation’s image, making it seen as more than simply an 
economic entity, especially if that is the purpose of the organisation. 
3.2.4.2 Participation 
Participation seems quite distinct from evaluation, disclosure statements and reports, due to its 
process nature (Ebrahim, 2003). It is seen as part of the organisational on-going routines. 
Building on Adnan (1992), Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe (2006) and Jayasinghe and 
Wickramasinghe (2011), four different types of participations are discussed. First, participation 
is seen as a situation where planned organisational projects are exposed to the public through 
public meetings, surveys or formal dialogue about the projects. Here participation involves 
consulting the community (leaders and or members) while the power over decision-making still 
rests with the project planners (Ebrahim, 2003). Second, participation could mean greater levels 
of community involvement in the project through labour or funds for implementing and 
  
67 
 
maintaining it. Third, the community can negotiate and talk about details of the project with the 
MFIs, hence exercising more control over such developmental projects. Last is a situation where 
individuals in the community use their own initiatives independent of microfinance projects, for 
example organised social movements to fight against civil disobedience in the community. The 
first two types, where little decision is vested on the community, usually come from government 
authorities, donors and MFIs where there is an assumption that increasing community access to 
resources and service will help in alleviating poverty. The last two forms of participation can 
actually mean integrating the views of the community in the organisation’s governance structure. 
3.2.4.3 Self-regulation and Social Audits 
Self-regulation simply focuses on a case where an organisation develops its codes of conduct, 
ethics or behaviour to measure performance and usually theses codes give a picture of the 
organisation in terms of it missions and objectives amongst other features: it is seen as a process 
than simply a mechanism (Ebrahim, 2003). 
Social auditing looks at the process whereby bodies independent of an organisation are involved 
in assessing organisational reports, usually without full knowledge of the organisation 
concerned, in order to improve organisational performance and ethical behaviour (Gonella et al., 
1998; Gray, 2001; Belal, 2002; Owen et al., 2010). The argument raised in performing social 
audits (particularly external social audits) is: 
If organisations fail to act appropriately and fail to discharge its account to society, 
the social audit may well appear and do the job for them. (Gray, 2001: 10) 
Social audits as an accountability mechanism assure organisational trust, reputation and growth 
(Swift, 2001). Social auditing also helps in developing organisational goals and serves as a 
valuable tool for strategic planning when the information gathered about various stakeholders’ 
views (Belal, 2002) and performance is fed back into the decision-making process (Ebrahim, 
2003). However, the drawbacks of social auditing cannot be ignored. Among other matters, 
social auditing is costly in terms of time and money. Ebrahim (2003) concludes that, 
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Social audits can improve upward and downward accountability only if its users seek 
systematically to incorporate stakeholders into dialogue, indicator development and 
performance assessment. (p. 824)  
Gray (2001) adds that social audits remain founded on issues around power/information 
asymmetries, different interests and conflicts, and that the lack of theoretical rigour and clarity of 
purpose (objectives) has triggered the mix of stakeholder dialogue, sustainability reporting and 
community reporting. 
3.2.4.4 Performance Evaluation versus Impact 
Performance evaluation can be external and internal. Internal performance evaluations are done 
with a focus on the organisational mission, objectives or goals and are usually conducted by 
internal management employee, while external evaluations are geared at judging the 
organisation’s achievements that will stimulate and determine future funding, and are usually 
conducted by donors (Jordan, 2009). Donors usually focus on organisational output or activities 
such as training workshops or impacts such as increase in customers’ income, health, and 
academic/professional experience. Nevertheless, both internal and external audits encounter a 
series of relevance and measurement problems. Conflicting ideas on how go about these issues 
have often been raised, however, it has been argued that aid and developmental organisations 
like MFIs and NGOs need not focus on conducting time-consuming and costly evaluations, but 
focus on helping the poor (Ebrahim, 2003).  
Evaluations have the potential for bringing about organisational change at a broader level, 
particularly in the areas of capacity building and learning (Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe, 
2011). Thus, it can be argued that donors or regulators can enhance microfinance accountability 
by building microfinance organisations’ capacity to carry out self-evaluations and encourage 
them to understand its drawbacks as a means of learning, besides assessing its performance. 
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- Microfinance Impact Assessment 
An impact assessment, according to Afrane (2002) is a management process geared at measuring 
the success of projects (usually social) in terms of the intended client group. The main reason for 
doing this is to determine if invested resources can yield expected results l and contribute 
towards achieving the organisation’s missions, which can arguably be seen as giving an account. 
Thus, in the review of accountability mechanisms especially in a socially orientated MFI where 
grassroots accountability is pertinent, impact assessment issues cannot be overlooked. The 
traditional approach to impact assessment has been criticised for being extractive (with neutral 
outsiders’ views incorporated), monolithic in form and above all failing to embrace different 
responses to the changing needs of customers and project impact. Away from the functional 
approach, impact assessments, especially when driven by donor intervention, have been 
suggested to assure the sustainability and growth of MFIs, more importantly, when the process 
involves the participation of the targeted client group (Afrane, 2002) – again, grassroots 
accountability is here proposed. The sustainability of MFIs is vital for further impact (Littlefield 
et al., 2003) which induces different forms of accountability. Before proceeding to review the 
impacts of MFIs on society it is worth looking at how the MFIs themselves are surviving 
(financial sustainability). Hence, the financial sustainability of MFIs has been reviewed, 
particularly in regard to microfinance performance.  
- Understanding the Financial Impact of Microfinance 
MFIs continuously view financial sustainability as a major element or backbone of their business 
strategy for financial, social and developmental impacts to be assured. In line with performance 
measurement, it has been argued that profit-orientated microfinance relies on its financial 
indicators to determine its performance (Hermes et al, 2011, Copestake, 2007). Kereta (2007) 
adds that financial sustainability remains a vital performance indicator for MFIs.  
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Measuring financial sustainability, according to Meyer (2002), requires MFIs to keep good 
accounting records in accordance with recognised and applicable accounting practices (standards 
and principles) in order to assure “transparency in income, expenses, loans and potential losses 
disclosed” (p. 4). MFIs’ operational sustainability can be measured via returns on asset, returns 
on equity and the industry’s profit (Kereta, 2007). The dependency ratio over a given period also 
indicates how sustainable, profitable and socially focused an MFI is (Kereta, 2007). Loan 
repayment rate (measured by default rate) is one of the indicators for financial sustainability in 
MFIs (Khandker et al., 1995). 
 
Ledgerwood (1999) points out that at the heart of an accounting system lies the general ledger, 
within which lie the ‘charts of accounts’, which are there to show a number of fundamental 
decisions that can be taken by the organisation. Financial statements could be seen as a reflection 
of the financial performance of a firm. Thus, adjustments made on such financial statements 
must not be ignored when evaluating microfinance financial sustainability (Ledgerwood, 1999; 
Helms, 1998). Adjustments such as accounting for losses, depreciation of fixed assets, accrued 
interest and interest expense, subsidies and inflation and restating financial statements in 
constant currency terms must be paid attention in order to remain prudent (Ledgerwood, 1999). 
  
Any sound financial management entails a periodic analysis of financial performance 
(Ledgerwood, 1999). Financial performance indicators help to obtain and retrieve financial data 
that can be used to provide information to interested parties such as investors on the financial 
performance of MFIs. Hence, using these indicators to measure performance can help donors, 
practitioners and consultants to understand the viability, outreach (impact) and level of 
efficiency of an MFI. The financial performance indicators mostly used by financial institutions 
such as MFIs include portfolio quality, productivity and efficiency, financial viability, 
profitability, leverage and capital adequacy (Helms, 1998).  
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In order to ensure proper financial management of MFIs, there is a need to focus on their 
performance (Ledgerwood, 1999). Brau and Woller (2004) add that measuring the financial 
performance of MFIs is a relatively straightforward concept where financial ratios are calculated 
and used as a guide to measure its performance. Ledgerwood (1999) adds that financial 
performance ratios are only appropriately calculated when the financial statements have been 
adjusted to reflect the true situation of the MFI. Measuring, reporting and managing the impacts 
that MFIs have on society has become another interesting and vital function in MFIs: an impact 
assessment that cannot be dodged in a review of microfinance accountability.  
 
- Beyond Microfinance Financial Impacts: Socio-economic Impacts 
Social performance measurement is becoming another crucial management tool in organisations 
like MFIs (Ebrahim, 2003), with scale, outreach, depth and growth of social projects being key 
social performance (impact) indicators, for example. Social impact (return) is often argued to be 
a difficult concept to measure (Simanowitz, 2001; Brau and Woller, 2004). Besides measuring 
the impact that MFIs have on themselves (sustainability: continual existence via donors, 
shareholders or customers), there is a need to go beyond the institution to embrace its impact on 
its customers. Littlefield et al. (2003) add that donor agencies working via microfinance 
programmes are now focused on the attainment of developmental goals and are mobilising 
resources to reduce high levels of poverty and disease, empower women, increase education and 
lower child mortality rates. However, measuring such social and developmental impacts involves 
high costs that most MFIs often are not able to attempt, except when there seems to be special 
interest in doing so (assessing social returns from social investments or projects, as suggested by 
Brau and Woller (2004)). An impact assessment is not only out to prove to donors how its 
interventions have been helpful but to further provide information that will help MFIs improve 
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on the services they provide and have more impact (Simanowitz, 2001). The following 
discussion focuses on the impact that MFIs have on society via projects, loans, etc.  
 
In order to estimate the depth of outreach through loans, Copestake et al. (2001) suggest 
focusing on the borrowers, their businesses and their households. Pitt and Khandker (1998) 
reported that loans given to poor customers (especially women) impacted positively on the well-
being of poor households. In support of the above statement, Copestake et al. (2001) state that 
lenders with more than one loan experienced more profit from their business and increased 
household income. It follows that the impact of microfinance goes beyond just business loans to 
include impacts on health, education and management of household emergencies. Littlefield et 
al. (2003) point out that the rate of school dropouts in microfinance client households is lower 
compared to non-microfinance client households. Thus microfinance is seen as a unique form of 
developmental intervention delivering social benefits on an on-going, permanent and larger-scale 
basis, especially in rural areas (developing countries) where formal finance is only dreamt of 
(Littlefield et al., 2003). 
 
- Case Study Examples 
Littlefield et al. (2003) point out that the participation of customers in a Zimbabwean MFI led to 
a positive impact on the consumption of high protein food by extremely poor client households, 
especially in the late 1990s when there was a downward trend in food expenditure in Zimbabwe 
(or when the cost of living was high and people were managing cash in order to adapt to the 
increasing cost of living). 
 
Littlefield et al. (2003) also report that the USAID-AIMS project in Uganda showed that 
microfinance client households turn to use the finances entrusted to them by such organisations 
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(either as loans or other means) to invest more in educating their children and those of non-
household members than do non-microfinance customer households.  
 
A comprehensive longitudinal study of BRAC customers, as highlighted by Littlefield et al. 
(2003) shows that insignificant client groups suffered malnutrition, but the longer the period of 
time spent by members in microfinance, the lower their rates of malnutrition. 
  
- Measuring Social Impact: Methodologies 
Ledgerwood (1999) suggests the use of loan tracking systems and portfolio systems (credit and 
savings monitoring systems) to assess social impact, even though it may complicate the 
generation of information to be reported. In attempting to obtain socio-economic and impact 
data, Ledgerwood (1999) points out that client impact systems should be used in order to easily 
track vital information such as the number of customers moving out of poverty and the 
development involved (for instance through increased education, employment and so on) as a 
result of customers’ participation in microfinance schemes. However, this client impact tracking 
brings more challenges for MFIs to continue to search for appropriate accounting software 
packages, as it is far less standardised compared the credit and savings monitoring systems. 
 
Bateman (2010) argues that the microfinance industry has largely failed to pay attention to its 
customers’ microenterprise, particularly in terms of profit measurement, cost minimisation, 
accountability (mainly to donors/ shareholders) and performance (especially non-financial or 
social) measurement (monitoring) and management. More focus has always been on the MFI 
and its shareholders (Dixon et al, 2006). Fleisher (2003) adds that managing the grassroots is a 
complicated business which cannot be ignored by aid and developmental organisations, 
especially those with a poverty reduction mission. Bateman (2010) points out that “the poor 
register because of its strong desire for traditional small business loans with lowest cost not 
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microfinance institution per se” (p. 37). Hammill (2008) further lays emphasis on the need for 
MFIs to make sure such customers’ businesses result in poverty reduction through stabilising 
consumption and cost minimisation, amongst other strategies.  
 
Furthermore, in assessing the impact of MFIs on poor customers in a bid to measure the depth of 
outreach, Simanowitz (2001) argues that client loyalty should be used, as client satisfaction 
simply means a positive impact and further assessment remains irrelevant- hence there is little 
cost incurred. Microfinance participation has also been argued to increase societal awareness and 
impact positively on small, labour-intensive and growing enterprises. 
 
Afrane (2002) presents various indicators (quantitative and qualitative) that could be used to 
evaluate or analyse the level of change that credit interventions impact on customers as a 
resulting of being a member of the MFI.  
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TABLE 3.1: Microfinance Impact Assessment Indicators 
 Indicators  
 
Quantitative Qualitative 
1 Economic 
 
- Number of employees 
- Increase in revenue or 
turnover 
- Equipment and tools 
- Market opportunities 
- Income and expenditure 
- Quality of business 
premises 
- Household/personal assets 
- Business diversification 
- Business skills and 
techniques 
- Business opportunities 
2 Access to social 
services 
- Water 
- Toilet 
- Health facility 
- Children out of school 
- Number of rooms occupied 
- Housing conditions 
- Health conditions 
- Food and nutrition 
- Meeting educational needs 
3 Social  - Family bond and relations 
- Quality time with the 
family 
- Family acceptance and 
respect 
- Social involvement 
- Public respect and 
acceptance 
- Attendance of social 
meetings 
- Financial independence of 
women 
4 Psychological  - Personal dignity and self-
esteem 
- Self-worth 
- Confidence for the future, 
self-actualisation 
5 Spiritual  - Church attendance 
- Donation to church 
- Participation in church 
activities 
- Prayer and devotional life 
 
Source: Afrane (2002: 45) 
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Moving towards a sustainable reporting system, Kolk (2008) points out that sustainability 
reporting broadly includes ethical, environmental and or social dimensions also known as CSR 
reporting. In this case, reports are seen to include not only governance issues but also 
sustainability, codes of conduct/ethics, complaints procedures and the involvement of auditors in 
assessing such sustainability reporting. Owen (2007) adds that if organisations do not provide 
external verification or assurance of their reports, they are bound to encounter credibility 
problems with many users. The auditing of financial accounting reports is therefore very crucial. 
Owen (2007) adds that better assurance of sustainability reporting is vital in an organisation in 
order to provide greater accountability. Willis (2003) points out that sustainability reporting 
holds high potential to significantly improve the quality and usefulness of the information 
reported by organisations in line with their socio-economic and developmental impacts and 
performance. The aim of most organisations will be to develop a voluntary reporting system in 
order to reach a sustainable reporting practice in terms of rigour, comparability, auditability and 
general acceptance – going beyond financial reporting standards.  
 
Chec (2011) adds that other strategies used for determining accountability include reputation 
improvement, competitive advantage and stakeholder pressures, depending on the purpose of the 
organisation. 
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TABLE 3.2: Characteristics of MFIs’Accountability Mechanisms 
Accountability 
mechanism (tool or 
process) 
Accountability 
types - to whom? 
(upwards or 
downwards or to 
self) 
Drivers (internal or 
external) 
Organisational 
response (functional 
or strategic) 
Disclosure/ Reports 
(tool) 
- Upwards to funders 
and oversight 
agencies 
- Downwards (to a 
lesser degree) to 
customers or 
members who read 
the reports 
- Legal requirements 
- Tax status 
- Funding 
requirement(external 
threat of loss of 
funding or tax status) 
- Primarily functional 
with a focus on short-
term results 
Performance 
assessment and 
evaluation (tool) 
- Upwards to funders 
- Significant potential 
for downwards from 
NGOs to 
communities and 
from funders to 
NGOs 
- Funding 
requirements 
(external) 
- Potential to become 
a learning tool 
(internal) 
- Primarily functional at 
present, with 
possibilities for longer-
term strategic 
assessments 
Participation 
(process) 
- Downwards from 
NGOs to customers 
and communities 
- Internally to NGOs 
themselves 
- Significant potential 
for downwards from 
funders to NGOs 
- Organisational 
values (internal) 
- Funding 
requirements 
(external) 
- Primarily functional if 
participation is limited 
to consultation and 
implementation 
- Strategic if it involves 
the bargaining power of 
customers vis a vis 
NGOs and NGOs vis a 
vis funders 
Self-regulation 
(process) 
- To NGOs 
themselves, as a 
sector 
- Potentially to 
customers and donors 
- Erosion of public 
confidence due to 
scandals and 
exaggeration of 
accomplishments 
(external loss of 
funds; internal loss of 
reputation) 
- Strategic in that it 
concerns long-term 
change involving codes 
of conduct 
Social auditing (tool 
and process) 
- To NGOs 
themselves (by 
linking values to 
strategy and 
performance) 
- Downwards and 
upwards to 
stakeholders 
- Erosion of public 
confidence (external) 
- Valuation of social, 
environmental and 
ethical performance 
on par with economic 
performance 
(internal) 
- Functional to the 
extent that it affects the 
behaviour of a single 
organisation 
- Strategic to the extent 
that it affects NGO- 
stakeholder interaction, 
promotes longer-term 
planning, becomes 
adopted sector-wide 
Source: Ebrahim (2003: 825) 
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3.3 Linking Accounting Systems and Accountability  
The practice of accounting falls instantaneously under accountability, especially where 
accountability is seen to include the relationship between actor and forum, as argued by Bovens 
(2007), and to mean the thoughts of various stakeholders. The implication here is that 
accountability necessitates a form of accounting. Gray (2001) further seeks to understand the 
relationship between social accounting and accountability with more insights gained from 
understanding the tension between accountability and control. Gray (2001) looks at social audits, 
showing how organisations are subject to compulsory democratic upwards accountability (held 
responsible). One of the major challenges found in practising accounting or designing an 
accountability relationship is to determine who is responsible for a particular action and who 
should therefore be responsible/held accountable in line with the organisation’s missions and 
objectives (Roberts and Scapens, 1985).  
Roberts and Scapens (1985) focus on how the intended and actual impacts derived from the use 
of accounting information could bring particular accountability patterns within various 
organisations. Issues on trust, culture and legitimacy, for example, are vital for the design and 
use of accounting systems (Hopwood, 1983; Roberts and Scapens, 1985). This means 
establishing a connection between technical and interpersonal/social accounting, as suggested 
by Roberts and Scapens (1985). It can be concluded here that accounting systems can influence 
organisational objectives and accountability. 
  
The practice of accounting, according to Roberts and Scapens (1985), is much more than just 
production and reproduction. This implies that social, political/domination (power) and 
legitimacy/moral issues, amongst others, cannot be ignored when talking about accounting 
practices or accountability.  
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Giddens’ (1979) conceptualisation of power relations is used by Roberts and Scapens (1985) to 
explore accounting and accountability practices in the broad and narrow sense. Furthermore, 
Bachrach and Baratz’s (1962) analysis of power suggest that accountability may also operate as 
a system of domination when a particular accountability framework is imposed on employee, 
especially by donors. However, Roberts and Scapens (1985) argue that the real power in 
accounting occurs when a decision can be made as to what shall or shall not be seen as important 
within the organisation. Burns (2000) further refers to power as the power over resources and 
decision-making, as discussed in Chapter 4 and applied in the study. 
 
Long-term accountability implications cannot be under-emphasised, as this remains a very 
important aspect in the understanding of accounting in every organisation, especially those 
incorporating social welfare. Control plays a very important role in the accountability process 
(Gray et al., 1996). Burns and Scapens (2000) argue that changes in accountability could follow 
changes in an organisation’s accounting systems.  
 
In its broad spectrum, an accounting system is an evaluation (control and performance 
management) system. These types of systems are put in place to satisfy demands from two main 
structural accountability types: short-term functional accountability and strategic accountability 
(Ebrahim, 2003; Ahmed, 2004). Strategic accountability requirements include reporting on the 
organisation’s social impact (Ebrahim, 2003). However, there could be instances of 
mismanagement, particularly in developing countries where there are high levels of political 
instability, social disorder, religious strife and economic malaise (Ahmed 2004).  
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3.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has reviewed accountability in a broader context, where is it seen as inseparable 
from accounting (accounting discussed as a part of accountability), the meaning of 
accountability, accountability types, mechanisms, and impacts from aid and developmental 
institutions, particularly MFIs.  
 
The chapter’s discussion stems from the view that accounting and accountability have moved 
beyond the narrow traditional perspective to embrace the ‘alternative’ view of incorporating 
social, cultural, political and economic aspects in microfinance impact assessment (Afrane, 
2002): in particular, the relationship between actors and grassroots accountability (Dixon et al., 
2006) cannot be ignored. It has been argued in the chapter that accountability requirements are 
often shaped by the mission and objectives of the organisation. It can again be reiterated that 
accountability has both an external (held responsible) and an internal (felt responsibility) 
dimension. 
 
Furthermore, the review has pointed out that for a MFI to cater for the needs of its customers, it 
must first of all be financially sustainable. Following the argument above, it has been suggested 
that the financial performance of such MFI needs to be reviewed. Going beyond the financial 
sustainability of MFIs, the chapter has looked at the socio- economic impacts that MFIs are 
bringing to society. Microfinance impact assessments have further been reviewed, in line with 
health, education, gender and other socio- economic impact domains, in line with its poverty 
alleviation objective. 
 
In line with the accountability review, the key conclusion to noted is the fact that grassroots 
accountability, as suggested by Dixon et al. (2006), is pertinent for MFIs aiming at reaching the 
poor with their financial services, which remains missing in practice. The next chapter gives a 
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detailed exploration of the issues around accounting change/stability or resistance, based on 
theories borrowing from institutional entrepreneurship theory. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
4.0 Introduction 
Accounting and accountability practices do change, however, little is known about the pressures, 
process and the results surrounding such organisational changes. Building on Jayasinge’s (2006), 
Jayasinge et al. (2008) and Jayasinghe and Thomas (2009) suggestion for the need for alternative 
research frameworks, with the implication of adopting different social theories to understand 
such entrepreneurial and accounting issues, an alternative framework has been adopted in the 
study. This chapter draws on institutional entrepreneurship theory to conceptualise the changes 
surrounding accounting and accountability practices. Prior studies have drawn on different 
strands of institutional theory to explain accounting change (Hyvönen, 2012; Burns and Scapens, 
2000; Tsamenyi et al., 2006).  
 
Contributions towards ‘old’ (OIE) and ‘new’ (NIS) institutional theory are used to better 
understand how certain changes come about. The chapter further incorporates institutional 
entrepreneurship theory, a social action theory, to explain actors’ interests and position as agents 
of change. The change vision and results discussed here come as a result of collaborative social 
actions as opposed to isolated individuals (Dorado, 2013). Following from Seo and Creed’s 
(2002) subjective conception that actors’ interests and power are institutionally shaped, various 
issues surrounding institutional change are further explored in the chapter. 
 
OIE is concerned about actors’ behaviour in line with their organisation’s internal rules and 
routines (Burns and Scapens, 2000; Scapens, 2006); however, OIE has been criticised for 
ignoring the macro level (external) factors (Scapens, 2006) in analysing accounting change. In 
an attempt to fill in the gap, Scapens (2006) suggests that macro/ external-level pressures should 
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also be considered in studying accounting change: the birth of NIS (Tsamenyi et al., 2006; 
Scapens, 2006; Leca et al., 2008). NIS offers an explanation for the similarities found within 
organisations in the same field (Scapens, 2006). Nevertheless, both theories have still received 
further criticism, particularly for the fact that they ignore agency issues. However, another new 
phase of institutional theory is institutional entrepreneurship theory (IET), which has stepped in 
to address some of the criticisms of institutional theory to include the role of actors in 
institutional change.  
 
The discussion on institutional entrepreneurship theory in this chapter starts by using the 
contributions of OIE with further insights from NIS. The study adopts a ‘processual’ approach to 
understanding the role of actors in institutional change given different prevailing environmental 
pressures (Hardy and Maguire, 2008). It should be noted that the interest here is not primarily to 
look at the relationship between institutions and agents, as suggested in Giddens’ (1979) 
structuration theory, but to include the role of these agents (including individuals) in studying the 
change process from an institutional entrepreneurship point of view, where the starting point of 
the focus is on the environmental and organisational pressures. The thesis framework therefore 
integrates the contributions of new and old institutionalism with the roles of actors and their 
relative power,3 in exploring the process of accounting and accountability change.  
 
Organisational divergent changes (Battilana et al., 2009) have thus been examined from inter- 
and intra-organisational perspectives. It is argued in the chapter that actors can affect the patterns 
of already established rules, norms and relationships in and outside an organisation (Battilana et 
al., 2009; Sharma et al., 2010; Hyvönen et al., 2012). The chapter also looks at the 
conceptualisation of ‘change’. The chapter is thus divided into five main sections: following the 
introduction is a discussion on the concept of ‘institutional theory’, incorporating OIE and NIS, 
                                                          
3 Power to influence decision-making and over resources, as argued by Burns (2000), for example. 
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which then moves on to a more practical theory, institutional entrepreneurship theory, used in 
the rest of the chapter. Third, the process of institutional entrepreneurship is further discussed. 
The exploration of such a process is structured and discussed around certain themes in order to 
be able to answer the research questions ‘why’ and ‘how’ (see page 7). The themes discussed in 
the chapter and the rest of the study includes; institutional pressures, actors, change drivers, 
enabling conditions, institutional contradictions and implementation. Before reviewing issues 
around the themes, the chapter clearly defines ‘change’ as used in the study with its roots in the 
literature. Fourth, following the contributions from existing literature on the process model of 
institutional entrepreneurship, this section develops the thesis’ theoretical framework (a 
modification) and explains it, with the chapter summary coming last. 
 
4.1 The Concept of Institutional Theory  
Accounting studies on institutional theory have so far shown how accounting change occurs, 
especially when more than just the organisational norms take place, which can either override or 
incorporate existing organisational practices with neglected practices (Burns and Scapens, 2000; 
Hyvönen et al., 2012). Institutional theory so far has still proven to be very useful, however its 
use has been criticised in accounting research, especially its wide-ranging application.  
 
Institutional theory; the theory known for understanding organisational stability, also seeks to 
explain how different organisational groups can reserve their jobs and legitimacy by obeying the 
internal rules and regulations (Burns and Scapens, 2000; Bruton et al., 2010; Scott, 2008). 
Institutional theory has also been known to be one of the most prominent theories frequently 
used in the past to explore a wide range of topics from different fields (Dacin et al., 2002, Leca 
et al., 2008). These fields range from institutional economics and political sciences to 
organisational analysis (Bruton et al., 2010). That is, institutional theory often poses questions on 
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how societal choices are build, mediated and made visible by the institutional environment 
(Hoffman, 1999). 
 
Institutional theory is a highly utilised theoretical lens in accounting research (Burns, 2000; 
Burns and Scapens, 2000; Grandlund, 2001), through which issues like culture, legal 
environment, tradition, history of the institution, economic incentives and resources that impact 
on organisational success are examined (Bruton et al., 2010). Institutional theory also gives 
greater attention to aspects of social structure (Scott, 2005). It looks at the processes in which 
various structures become established, serving as authoritative guidelines for social behaviour in 
terms of the scheme, rules, norms, and routines of the organisation. It looks at how such 
elements come about, their adoption and how they are adapted with time. Battilana et al. (2009) 
add that early institutional theory mainly focused on the effects of institutions on actors. 
 
Institutional theory has increasingly been seen as a theoretical lens for exploring different 
concepts, particularly in the field of accounting; see, for example, the area of management 
accounting change explored by scholars such as Burns and Scapen (2000), and Granlund (2001). 
It plays a major role in explaining the forces or reasons behind the adoption of organisational 
practices such as accounting practices (Burns, 2000; Burns and Scapen, 2000; Granlund, 2001). 
Burns and Scapens (2000) point out that an organisation’s accounting practices play a major part 
in shaping its rules and routines. They use a framework that explores the complex relationship 
between actors and institutions and then demonstrate how an organisation’s rules and routine can 
shape the process of accounting changes. Thus, there is a need for organisational research to 
extend its boundaries beyond the constraints under which actors act or institutional effects on 
actors to include actors’ effects on institutions, which the rest of the chapter goes on to look at 
(Battilana et al., 2009). 
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4.1.1 Towards an Action Theory- Institutional Entrepreneurship Theory 
Despite the importance of institutional theory in organisational analysis, its use in research has 
gradually been questioned. In the early 1980s, more focus was placed on mimetic organisational 
processes through which the same kind of behaviour becomes incorporated (Leca et al., 2008). 
However, such emphasis has gradually shifted over the years to give more focus on external 
pressures (Tsamenyi et al., 2006; Leca et al., 2008), engagement of individuals’ agency (see for 
example Dacin et al., 2002; Garud et al., 2007; Sharma et al., 2010) and organisational power 
relations (Mosse, 2004). Power, according to Hinings et al. (2004), is the ability to determine 
outcomes.  
  
Old institutional theory has thus been criticised for its lack of focus on change and dynamism, as 
it heavily concentrates on explaining the stability, persistence and homogeneity of a particular 
situation (Dacin et al., 2002; Lounsbury, 2008; Sharma et al., 2010). New institutional 
(Institutional entrepreneurship) theory has arisen, offering a powerful explanation for the actions 
of both an organisation and individuals (Dacin et al., 2002). New institutional theory embraces 
both the external coercive pressures (Tsamenyi et al., 2006; Leca et al., 2008) and the internal 
organisational pressures resulting to either change, resistance and or decoupling (Oliver, 1991).  
 
Recent institutional studies have been able to examine how actors at such external or internal 
institutional levels (Hyvönen et al., 2012) bring about institutional change (Dacin et al., 2002). It 
has been argued that institutions are dynamic, belong to specific situations, are challenged and 
are highly contested (Dacin et al., 2002; Garud et al., 2007). The shift from old institutional 
theory led to the birth of institutional entrepreneurship, initially proposed by DiMaggio (1988) - 
a theory that recognises the role of actors in institutional change process. Even though few early 
institutional studies such as Selznick (1957) did recognise human agency in institutional change, 
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this was largely de-emphasised in later studies (Leca et al., 2008). According to later research, 
the idea of institutional change result was initiated by exogenous shocks (Leca et al., 2008). 
 
 Pressures exerted from coercive, normative and mimetic processes (institutional isomorphism) 
were singled out as the drivers of institutional change, not agency as such. Given the gap in 
research recent studies, this study acknowledges the presence and role of agency in institutional 
research (Dillard et al., 2004).  
 
Despite the shift identified above, Garud et al. (2007) argue that some recent institutional 
literature still focuses on issues around the stability, persistence and isomorphic change of 
institutional fields. Scott (2001) however points out that despite the attention on stability and 
isomorphic change, more emphasis is about developing new institutional and convergent change 
processes: deinstitutionalisation.  
 
Deinstitutionalisation is “the processes by which institutions weaken and disappear” (Scott, 
2001: 182). The weakening and disappearance here refers to the introduction of new sets of rules 
and practices (Dacin et al., 2002). Oliver (1991) points out that pressure on institutionalised 
practices may also be another reason why actors initiate change.  
 
The change discussed in the study could either be to create, maintain somehow or transform the 
existing institution (Garud et al., 2007; Hardy and Maguire, 2008). The notion of institutional 
entrepreneurship aims to build an action theory with a foundation rooted in the tenets of 
institutional theory (Fligstein, 1997, Leca et al., 2008). Institutional entrepreneurship theory thus 
broadens the field of organisational studies (Battilana et al., 2009). Before exploring the process 
of institutional entrepreneurship, it must be acknowledged that the notion of institutional 
entrepreneurship is in itself problematic (Leca et al., 2008): the paradox of embedded theory. 
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4.1.2 Paradox of Embedded Theory 
It is in line with the “classical debate on structure versus agency” (Leca et al., 2008: 4) that Seo 
and Creed (2002) criticise Barley and Tolbert (1997) for not considering institutional paradox. 
Hardy and Maguire (2008) identify some of the critical theoretical puzzles that need addressing, 
including the fact that it is not clear how actors who are embedded in an institutional field can 
bring about change or new practices in such an institutional field and eventually get others to 
adopt it. This is the puzzle of how new institutions emerge and become changed eventually by 
individuals or firms (Seo and Creed, 2002; Bruton et al., 2010). Traditionally, the changes that 
take place within an institution are usually those behind the idea of maintaining congruence with 
existing environmental pressures, but recently, the idea has changed.  
The institutional entrepreneurship literature argues that individuals or groups of individuals are 
now able to break through the constraints of existing institutional order and establish their own 
institutional change, and still gain support from people (Seo and Creed, 2002; Hardy and 
Maguire, 2008). The implication here is that actors can in a way disconnect themselves from 
their social background and even react in a way that will bring about change in it (Holm 1995; 
Seo and Creed, 2002). This brings in great tension: how can actors innovate or bring in positive 
changes if their culture or beliefs and actions are brought about by the institutional environment 
in which they live and would like to change? This issue, especially resolving it, remains a 
challenge in institutional entrepreneurship. Even though Leca et al. (2008) point out that studies 
on institutional entrepreneurship have so far not been able to resolve the embedded agency 
paradox, Bruton et al. (2010) argue that the concept of institutional entrepreneurship has arisen 
to answer these theoretical puzzles. Sharma et al. (2010) add that the paradox of embedded 
agency is to an extent resolved by institutional entrepreneurs, who are seen as change initiators.  
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In order to address such issues, two broad questions need to be explored: how are entrepreneurs 
(interested actors) able to modify existing or create new fields and/or norms, rules and 
principles in an organisation: how may change be created or integrated? Secondly, how are 
these changes institutionalised in practice? The specific questions further addressed include: 
where does the pressure for change originate? Who are the entrepreneurs and their roles in the 
change process? What condition(s) can favour the change? What were the 
strategies/mechanisms used to effect and institutionalise the change(s)? Seo and Creed (2002) 
and Hardy and Maguire (2008), amongst others, have sought to address these questions in 
discussing institutional entrepreneurship as a process in detail.  
 
The question as to where new practices or organisational forms come from has been largely 
ignored in the literature until relatively recently (Garud et al. (2007; Lounsbury and Crumley, 
2007). Lounsbury and Crumley (2007) argue that institutional entrepreneurship theory has not 
offered much help in addressing the question, as it focuses more on the role of (powerful) actors 
in bringing in new practices. Even then, the actors that have been focused on in the literature are 
mostly those at the organisational and individual level. Actors at the organisational field level 
have been given little attention (Hyvönen et al., 2012). The argument of Lounsbury and Crumley 
(2007) on new organisational practices re-emphasises the vital need for cooperation between 
actors in order to interactively create a change. Institutional entrepreneurship theory is further 
explored in the chapter as a process, as previously stated.  
 
Before understanding the processes involved in institutional change under the discourse on 
institutional entrepreneurship process, the meaning of an ‘institution’ must be clarified. In 
organisational analysis, an institution is the  
rules, norms and beliefs that describe the reality for the organisation, explaining what 
is and is not, what can be acted upon and what cannot. (Hoffman, 1999: 351)  
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Whilst there remains no universal meaning of an institution, Burns and Scapens’ (2000) 
definition of institution has been adopted in the study as commonly used in OIE – a way of 
thought or behaviours that originate from habits or customs of people: a subjective view. 
4.2 The Process of Institutional Entrepreneurship 
DiMaggio (1988) argues that institutional entrepreneurship cannot be well examined without 
focusing on pertinent issues surrounding it. For a better understanding of what institutional 
entrepreneurship involves, it is explored in the study as a process, as recommended for 
accounting research (Burns, 2000). This approach brings out the characteristics of accounting 
and accountability to mean a process rather than an outcome (Burns, 2000). In particular, the 
processual approach to accounting has important implications for both practitioners and 
researchers of accounting, especially through understanding the various processes of accounting 
change whereby actors can easily influence the change direction or predict future problems 
within their organisation (Burns, 2000). Therefore, the study explores accounting and 
accountability change practices as a process rather than a snapshot of various outcome analyses. 
This implies going beyond ‘rational’ or traditional accounting, focusing more on the process of 
such change (Burns, 2000), of which the outcome must not necessarily be the change but can be 
stability as a result of decoupling and or resistance (Oliver, 1991; Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006). 
Even though the approach mainly takes into consideration intra-organisational level factors, 
inter-organisational pressures cannot be ignored. The later part of the chapter takes into 
consideration both level pressures shaping the process of accounting change. 
 
Unlike structuration theory (Giddens, 1979; 1983), which focuses on the relationship between 
the actor and the institution, institutional entrepreneurship theory goes a step ahead to look at the 
role of actors (Smets et al., 2012) in changing an institution. Institutional entrepreneurship 
therefore is 
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activities of actors who have an interest in particular institutional arrangement and 
who put their resources together in order to create new institutions or change existing 
ones. (Hardy and Maguire, 2008: 198)  
 
Battilana et al. (2009) further define institutional entrepreneurship in a more comprehensive way 
to mean agents who initiate and actively follow up the implementation process of the change that 
distinguishes them from existing institutions, no matter whether the change was meant to change 
the institutional environment or was successfully instituted/ implemented. The central idea 
behind institutional entrepreneurship theory is that of the reintroduction of the relationship 
between interests, agency, power and institutions (Maguire et al., 2004; Garud et al., 2007). 
Hence, more emphasis in the existing literature on institutional entrepreneurship is given to 
actors and their role played in the institutional change processes (Sharma, 2011). 
 
The use of discursive strategy has been argued in the literature to be very crucial in the process 
of institutional entrepreneurship (Fligstein, 1997; Dorado, 2005; Maguire et al., 2004; Leca et 
al., 2008; Seo and Creed, 2002). It has further been argued that the process of institutional 
entrepreneurship is all about discourse, with heavy use of texts which in turn affect the social 
constructive processes that underlie institutions (Leca et al., 2008; Phillips et al., 2004). The 
discursive strategy follows the research philosophy underpinning the study, as further discussed 
in Chapter 5. Before looking at the process of institutional entrepreneurship, it is worth pausing 
and clearly defining ‘change’. 
 
- The Meaning of ‘Change’ 
 
Theorisation of accounting or accountability change with insights from institutional 
entrepreneurship literature remains scarce (Burns and Scapens, 2000; Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 
2005). Most studies have been on broader-level institutional change (Seo and Creed, 2002; 
Dacin et al., 2002) and attempts to narrow such change have only ended at the organisational 
change level (Quattrone and Hopper, 2001). Accounting and accountability change is still a new 
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field that needs to be exploited, as it has been argued that accounting and accountability 
practices do change. The starting point for understanding such changes is to answer the question 
what therefore is change?  
 
Quattrone and Hopper (2001) refer to change as the movement from one noticeable specific 
stage to another, and Sulaiman and Mitchell (2005) further suggest different types of change to 
include an addition, replacement, modification of output or operations and reduction. The 
definition and classification of change here provides useful insights for the study of the 
accounting and accountability change process.  
 
Arguably, the complex process of accounting change being inter-related to other forces shaping 
its organisational practices implies that accounting and accountability change cannot be 
explained in isolation from its immediate internal and external environment (Scapens, 2006; 
Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005) and independent from actors (Smets et al., 2012). Burns and 
Scapens (2000) argue that management accounting change is seen as a continuous process rather 
than a discrete movement from one position to another. Their emphasis is on the relationship 
established between actors and their actions, rules and routines and the underlying taken-for-
granted organisational assumptions. However, Burns and Scapens (2000) only focus on 
management accounting change and at the level of individual organisations (intra-organisational 
processes of change). Scapens (2006) adds that Burns and Scapens’ (2000) framework did not 
recognise external institutions which contribute in shaping organisational accounting practices, 
which the study embraces (See Figure 4.4 for a summary).  
 
The process of institutional entrepreneurship discussed here covers all of its different phases, 
from the emergence of institutional entrepreneurs to the implementation of institutional change. 
The discussion covers identifying what pressures are being exerted, who institutional 
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entrepreneurs are, the field of analysis, institutional contradictions, enabling conditions in which 
institutional entrepreneurship can occur, the implementation stage, where actors with a divergent 
and non-isomorphic change in mind visualise it and mobilise allies to support their change 
project, and lastly the challenges institutional entrepreneurs encounter. The application of the 
institutional change process is further discussed. 
 
4.2.1 Institutional Pressures 
Organisations do exist in an environment of institutions that exert pressure on them to an extent 
(Dillard et al. 2004; Garud et al., 2007). Recent literature has however added that there is a need 
to recognise the fact that institutions exist in three different pressure areas: the field, the 
organisation and the individuals (Hyvönen et al., 2012). Oliver (1991) suggests functional, 
political and social pressures to be the gateway to institutional change. Functional pressure, she 
argues, is associated with institutional operational or utility. Such pressures may also be related 
to environmental changes, for example competition (Thornton, 2002). Political pressure, 
according to Oliver (1991), results primarily from shifts in the interest and underlying power of 
stakeholders that have supported and legitimated such existing institutional arrangements.  
 
Two approaches to accountability change have often been proposed in the literature. 
Organisational and accounting studies for example Dillard et al. (2004)  argue that change within 
an organisation is usually shaped by the pressures received from outside (exogenous) (Hyvönen 
et al., 2012 and Quattrone and Hopper, 2001) or within the organisation itself (endogenous) 
(Burns and Scapens, 2000; Tsamenyi et al., 2006; Leca et al., 2008). Exogenous shocks include 
shifts in social values, regulatory policies or technological regimes, which force actors to reflect 
upon existing institutional logics or think about other possibilities (Smets et al., 2012). 
Endogenous shocks, on the other hand could be argued to include the triggering role of field-
level contradictions (Seo and Creed, 2002) as explained further in Section 4.2.5. The elaboration 
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of rules and requirements which individual organisations are obliged to obey is a major 
characteristic of institutional environments (Scott, 2001).  
 
Di Maggio and Powell (1983), Scott (2008a) and Garud et al. (2007) have talked about three 
main institutional forces that drive change. While Scott (2008a) talks about regulative, 
normative, cognitive pillars, Di Maggio and Powell (1983) use the terms coercive, to mean 
regulative, mimetic and normative pressures.  
 
Regulative (coercive) pressure is concerned with organisational behaviour that is based on 
sanctions and conformity. Institutions guide behaviour by means of rules, norms, monitoring and 
enforcement. Such regulative institutional forces arise primarily from government legislation and 
industrial agreements/ standards or rules (Bruton et al., 2010). The second type of institutional 
pillar is of a normative nature and is based on obligatory or social, professional and 
organisational reactions. The institution guides and directs behaviour towards what is expected 
in social and commercial environments. Bruton et al. (2010) add that such normative practices 
are mainly composed of values (what is considered right) and norms (how things are to be done 
in the organisation in line with the values). Hence, the normative or institutional pillar is that 
which guides actions through the organisational norms, making sure these norms are accepted 
and respected morally and ethically. The cognitive pillar talks about individual behaviour based 
on subjectivity and constructed rules and meanings that restrict the right beliefs and actions. It 
operates more at an individual level, in line with culture and language (Bruton et al., 2010; 
Scott, 2007). Action is guided by the various ways in which people see and interpret the world. 
Other research has also mentioned a mimetic pillar, which simply means copying what others are 
doing (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).  
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Even though Smets et al. (2012) only clearly mention three approaches to institutional change, 
they however acknowledge the fact that change “may also originate from individuals” (p. 7), 
particularly those at the front line, although there is no model yet to show how such change 
moves to the field. 
 
4.2.2 Actors 
Early institutional studies did not focus on actors’ agency (Selznick, 1957). Later studies have 
looked at actors and their roles in creating divergent change with more focus on exogenous 
forces, ignoring endogenous explanations for the change (Dillard et al. 2004; Battilana et al., 
2009). Recent literature in institutional entrepreneurship urges that the ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
institutionalisms be bridged by reconsidering the introduction of agency, power and interests and 
roles when analysing institutional fields (Hirsch and Lounsbury, 1997, Dillard et al. 2004; 
Hinings et al., 2004; Hardy and Maguire, 2008). This means that institutional entrepreneurship is 
a concept that “reintroduces agency, interests and power into institutional analyses of 
organisations” (Garud et al., 2007: 2). Institutional entrepreneurship is thus argued to be a 
political process which reflects the power and interests of actors (Garud et al., 2002; Seo and 
Creed, 2002; Dillard et al. 2004;  Hinings et al., 2004), and its conceptualisation has been noted 
to be a major step towards the modification of institutional theory through the introduction of 
agency (Dorado, 2005; 2013).  
 
Smets et al. (2012) add that institutional change is inherent in praxis, where not just the people 
involved in the activity are considered, but more importantly, the act of ‘performing’ the activity. 
The person performing such an activity in a bid to bring about change is the initiator 
(institutional entrepreneur) and must fulfil certain conditions. They must initiate divergent 
change: change that breaks or brings in possibilities of transforming the existing institution or 
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create new ones. Secondly, these change agents must take active part in the implementation of 
the change(s).  
 
Battilana et al. (2009) defines institutional entrepreneurs as 
change agents who, whether or not they initially intended to change their 
institutional environment, initiate, and actively participate in the implementation of, 
changes that diverge from existing institutions. (p. 70) 
 
That is, institutional entrepreneurs are actors (seen as rational actors) that deviate from their 
scripted ways of behaviour (Dorado, 2005) and move towards building new strategies in order to 
shape institution(s) (Lecca and Nccache, 2006). Schumpter (1991) describes an entrepreneur 
simply as an innovator who makes sure that certain rules and routines are instituted to respond 
creatively to any changes. Fligstein (1997) further defines institutional entrepreneurs as 
actors who have social skills, that is, the ability to motivate cooperation of other 
actors by providing them with common meanings and identities. (p. 397)  
 
Institutional entrepreneurs are individuals or different organised groups of actors who can bring 
about influential change in an institutional field (Hardy and Maguire, 2008).  
 
Sarma (2011) supports the meaning of institutional entrepreneurs, specifying that institutional 
entrepreneurs can be an organisation or an individual or group of organisations or individuals. 
They are initiators of institutional change and can impact on some key aspects during the 
implementation of such changes (Sharma et al., 2010; Hyvönen et al., 2012). Battilana et al. 
(2009) states that institutional entrepreneurs are change agents, but not all change agents are 
institutional entrepreneurs. Hyvönen et al. (2012) and Sharma et al. (2010) add that an 
institutional entrepreneur could be the organisation’s manager, or even a consultant who 
performs their duties at either the organisational field level, organisational level or individual 
level.  
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Furthermore, Hardy and Maguire (2008) argue at the very basic level that actors include 
individuals, organisations especially those in professions, networks, associations or social 
groups. Scholars have examined the various types of actors that can bring about institutional 
change and eventually act as institutional entrepreneurs: that is, individuals (Fligstein, 2001b; 
Maguire et al., 2004; Dew, 2006), organisations (Garud et al., 2002; Dejean et al., 2004), 
especially those in professions (Greenwood et al., 2002; 2005; 2006, Lounsbury, 2002); 
networks (Dorado, 2005); associations (Demil and Bensedrine, 2005); and social movements 
(Lounsbury et al., 2003). 
 
Rao et al. (2000) and Leca et al. (2008) point out that institutional entrepreneurs are only able to 
mobilise available resources when they have framed the problem, seen if they are interested in 
resolving the problem or grievance, identified the cause of the problem, assigned its blames and 
been able to provide a solution and implement their solution. The discursive frame is argued by 
Leca et al. (2008) to include two main dimensions. Firstly, there is a need to specify the failings 
of existing institutional practices, which involves tracing the cause and assigning the blame for 
it. Secondly they must justify why the present project to be carried out will yield better results 
than the already existing one. 
 
Fligstein (1997) argues that the problem embedded in the role of actors under institutional theory 
can actually be addressed by considering institutional entrepreneurship theory. Thus, in 
exploring institutional entrepreneurship theory, knowing where change pressure originates and 
who an institutional entrepreneur is, does not give a better and clearer picture. Institutional 
entrepreneurs together with the other actors and their roles in the change process remain vital.  
 
Dorado (2013) argues that change does not rest in the hands of an isolated individual but as a 
group-bounded effort of social action, given that organisations like MFIs are inhabited by 
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individuals who motivate, inspire and enable the vision of each other for the common good of 
the organisation. In order to move towards the success of institutional entrepreneurship there is 
need to examine the manner in which interested parties incorporate the intended change project 
into organisational activities and get field actors to be interested; that is, building their projects to 
suit the field conditions. Fligstein (1997) shows how the president of the European Union with 
minimal support received from the European countries, brought in change in terms of 
institutional reform and monetary union. However, cases of resistance and or decoupling (Oliver, 
1992) have been recorded, as further discussed later in the chapter.  
 
In line with the different types of forces and agents or actors involved in bringing in accounting 
change, such a change process can be said to be a complex process (Battilana et al., 2009). 
Acknowledging the fact that institutional/ accounting change is a complicated or complex 
process, it will be very important to explore the concept, explaining not only how these 
institutions can influence the actions of actors but also how these agents can impact on these 
institutions and if possible change them (Battilana et al., 2009; Leca et al., 2008).  
 
The role of institutional entrepreneurs, as argued by Sharma et al. (2010) can be to initiate 
organisational change or even to influence the implementation of such organisational change, as 
suggested by Hyvönen et al. (2012). Few studies have attempted to explain how actors can 
become institutional entrepreneurs despite institutional pressures and in a way resolve the 
embedded agency paradox (Leca et al., 2008; Battilana et al., 2009; Hardy and Maguire, 2008). 
 
Fields consists of dominant and dominated actors who strive to usurp, exclude and bring in 
monopoly over the mechanisms of the field’s reproduction and the type of power effective in it 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Maguire et al., 2004), and in some situations change can be 
brought about by actors that are not in powerful positions (Maguire et al., 2004).  
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Dorado (2005) throws more light on institutional opportunities by referring to opportunities to 
mean the probability that an organisational field will allow actors to explore and identify 
opportunities for change, introducing new or modifying existing combinations which will 
facilitate the movement of resources needed for it to succeed. That is, opportunities arise when 
actors imagine and convince others to welcome them.  
 
4.2.3 Change drivers 
Drivers of change can originate from any angle. They could be internal or external, but are 
usually a result of observed institutional contradictions. In Yazdifar and Tsamenyi’s (2005) 
comparative study on ‘Management accounting change and the changing roles of management 
accountants’ change drivers ranked in order of importance were information technology, 
organisational restructuring, customer initiatives, e-commerce/ electronic business, new 
accounting software, external reporting requirements, new management styles, core competency 
aims, globalisation, quality-orientated initiatives, new accounting techniques, takeovers/ 
mergers, external consultants’ advice and production technologies. Innes and Mitchell (1999) 
from their seven field studies in the electronic sector also point out that factors such as a 
competitive and changing market environment, organisational structure, product cost structure, 
production technology, deteriorating financial performance and managerial influences can result 
in change.  
 
Organisational routines besides institutional pressures and isomorphism are one of the main 
drivers of institutional change (Quattrone and Hopper, 2001). In order to continue the 
exploration of the process model of institutional entrepreneurship, some other key issues such as 
enabling field conditions need to be considered, besides understanding who institutional 
entrepreneurs are, their roles and interest.  
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4.2.4 Enabling Conditions  
Few studies have attempted to explain how certain conditions surrounding an institution can 
force actors to act and become institutional entrepreneurs despite institutional pressures (Leca et 
al., 2008; Battilana et al., 2009; Hardy and Maguire, 2008). Hardy and Maguire et al. (2008) 
identify some initiating field conditions. They mention stimuli which appear to trigger 
institutional entrepreneurship and the field stages. In line with the stimuli they identified, 
uncertainty, tensions and contradictions do exist in the institutional field. In order to explore 
such stimuli, actors are seen as rational where they react to reduce any uncertainty in the field. 
Institutional entrepreneurship is somehow seen as an attempt to solve problems embedded in a 
field. For example the adverse performance of major accounting firms in Canada called for 
dropping the traditional organisational form and adopting a new multi-divisional form 
(Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). Once such new practices have been adopted, there is usually 
evidence to show whether they are improving, for example positive or negative market feedback, 
increase or decrease in legitimacy amongst other field actors and so on. Thus, new institutional 
arrangements, according to Hardy and Maguire (2008) are only promoted by actors attempting to 
reach a solution to a problem such as minimising uncertainty in organisational fields. It helps if 
actors are rational in an uncertain situation, as they will be able to predict if the change that they 
want is going to be beneficial before pursuing the action. 
 
Two main groups of enabling field conditions have so far received greater attention in the 
literature that also attempt to resolve the paradox of embedded agency: field-level conditions and 
the actor’s position in the organisational field (Leca et al., 2008). One major opportunity for 
institutional entrepreneurship to occur is through the organisational field. Dorado (2005) points 
out that institutional opportunity may arise as an objective condition of organisational fields. He 
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adds that “fields may be opportunity opaque, transparent, or hazy and such opportunities, of 
course, only become real when perceived by actors” (p. 385). 
 
Dorado (2005) further concludes from his findings that the perception of actors about fields 
being transparent giving them an opportunity is based on their orientation and social networks. 
The institutional entrepreneurship process does differ in the case where institutional 
entrepreneurs intend to develop an emerging field. In the case of an emerging field, they come 
up with a specific discourse in which they intend to establish a common form of identity made 
specifically for those who will take part in developing the new/emerging field. The two 
strategies can be used when dealing with emerging fields (Leca et al., 2008). Zimmerman and 
Zeitz (2002) suggest that institutional entrepreneurs should use rhetorical strategies in promoting 
new venture growth.  
 
Hyvönen et al. (2012) and Sarma (2011) further argue that institutional entrepreneurship 
opportunity arises not only when a new organisational field is created (emerging field) but also 
when institutional contradictions arise in a matured field. In the latter situation, institutional 
entrepreneurs often question the institutional arrangements and strive to create new ones or come 
up with solutions that will replace such existing arrangements (Hyvönen et al., 2012).  
 
However, Bruton et al. (2010) point out that institutional studies have given more attention to 
mature organisational fields (Greenwood et al., 2006; Lounsbury, 2002), omitting to accept the 
fact that institutional entrepreneurship also occurs in emerging fields (Maguire et al., 2004; 
Sharma, 2011). Hardy and Maguire (2008) added that emerging fields are more conducive for 
institutional entrepreneurship than existing or stable fields. It has been argued that emerging 
fields are usually those in crisis, even though others have argued that uncertainty, problems, 
tensions and contradictions are features of all fields, including matured ones (Hardy and 
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Maguire, 2008). Hence, the state of fields, whether mature, emerging or stable, is very important 
and striking in such discourse (Hardy and Maguire, 2008; Fligstein, 1997).  
 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) define a field from the institutional perspective to mean 
organisational sets made up of the institutional life where resources, product consumers, 
suppliers, regulatory bodies and other types of organisations that offer similar services are 
considered. Greenwood et al. (2002) point back to the definition, emphasising the main focus 
being ‘sets’ or ‘communities’. Maguire et al. (2004: 658) refer to Bourdieu’s (1990) definition of 
organisational fields, supported by Scott (1994), as “structured practices of social positions 
within which struggles take place over resources, stakes and access”. The implication is that the 
struggles and manner in which interested actors affect an institution must also be considered in 
institutional entrepreneurship (Fligstein, 1997). The words ‘resources’ and ‘social position’ are 
further discussed below as enabling conditions for which institutional change can occur. 
Properties and positions linked with specific actors will be further examined.  
 
- Properties 
‘Properties’, according to Hardy and Maguire (2008), means the distinct features, characteristics, 
qualities and skills that differentiate institutional entrepreneurs in a field, allowing them to 
change institutions. The properties perspective works more at the level of an individual. Smets et 
al. (2012) add that organisational properties are very important in a change process: they affect 
the manner in which individuals experience institutional pressures and shape how practice 
improvisations become absorbed at the field level. Properties help in “mediating the emergence, 
justification and diffusion of change” (Smets et al., 2012: 4). In order to further examine who 
institutional entrepreneurs are, the mutually constitutive nature of actors and fields needs to be 
considered (Hardy and Maguire, 2008; Leca et al., 2008).  
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- Actors’ Positions 
Actors’ position in the field is very important in understanding the roles of actors in institutional 
change. Garud et al. (2002), Maguire et al. (2004) and Smets et al. (2012) point out that 
institutional entrepreneurs or institutional change actors must be able to occupy certain 
position(s) in order for them to see themselves as champions, assume collective action role and 
be able to establish stable sequences of interactions with other field actors. The position could be 
of a social (Dorado, 2005; Battilana, 2006) or subject (Maguire et al., 2001) nature from which 
change action could be taken (Bourdieu, 1990). The role of an actor in a field or organisation is 
influenced by the actor’s position (Maguire et al., 2004). This actor’s position could either be 
social or subject in nature as explained below. 
 
• Social Position 
Social position, being an individual-level enabling condition for institutional entrepreneurship 
(Hardy and Maguire, 2008; Leca et al., 2008; Battilana, 2006), is a key factor that might 
influence the actor’s perception in the field (Dorado, 2005; Leca et al., 2008) and access to 
resources needed to involve themselves (Lawrence, 1999; Leca et al., 2008; Hardy and Maguire, 
2008). Social position is the “position in the structure of social networks” (Dorado, 2005:397) 
which conforms to the group of people directly linked to and affects their thinking about 
organisational fields, thereby forcing them to act as institutional entrepreneurs.  
 
Institutional entrepreneurs need to have enough social skills, which include interpreting, 
analysing situations and assessing how the field is configured and then act according to their 
social and or subject positions to bring about change (Leca et al., 2008; Fligstein, 1997; 1999). 
Context is of vital importance when using a discursive dimension in institutional 
entrepreneurship. Research has suggested that actors operating in matured fields prefer to come 
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up with discourses that will match the interests of dominant coalition members (Leca et al., 
2008). However, if the field is made up of diverse dominant field actors, institutional 
entrepreneurs need to come to a compromise or take a common stand that will satisfy the 
interests and values of the various actors (Fligstein, 1997). 
 
Leca et al. (2008) and Hardy and Maguire (2008) argue that actors at the periphery (margins) of 
organisational fields or interstices of various organisational fields are likely to act as institutional 
entrepreneurs. However, it has been argued that institutional entrepreneurs can also be found at 
the centre of organisational fields (Leca et al., 2008; Hardy and Maguire, 2008). Smets et al. 
(2012) add that “practice-driven change is significantly advanced by the location of a practice 
within rather than across the boundaries of the organisation” (p. 37). 
 
Dorado (2005), Wijen and Ansari (2007) and Hardy and Maguire (2008), in discussing various 
actors and their roles as institutional entrepreneurs, point out that there needs to be an interactive 
relationship between entrepreneurs or actors in order to bring about change. Leca at al. (2008) 
refer to the interactive relationship between actors as having special characteristics such as social 
skills. The social skill they add rotates around empathy. This means that institutional 
entrepreneurs give room for cooperation in an attempt to relate to the situations surrounding 
other actors. Social skills help to distinguish actors in an institutional field, implying an 
opportunity for institutional entrepreneurs to be able to line up their skills and execute certain 
projects (Leca et al., 2008).  
 
Bruton et al. (2010) add that entrepreneurs with such skills may collaborate in building new 
institutions or develop existing ones, evident in an emerging society where legal institutions are 
weak with newly established professional and business norms (Bruton et al., 2010). In such a 
situation, the role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society is not always the 
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best in terms of development (Ahlstrom et al., 2008). Bruton et al. (2010) further argue that in 
such a scenario where entrepreneurs do not have the legitimacy they need in a weak institutional 
environment, they may function as institutional entrepreneurs in order to develop the weak 
environment and create new institutions or modify existing ones that can help their business to 
grow. Unlike actors in the subject position discussed below, the social position of an actor can 
give them the power to bring about institutional change (Hinings et al., 2004; Hardy and 
Maguire, 2008). 
 
• Subject Position and Power 
Subject position does not only mean formal, bureaucratic positions but also socially constructed 
and legitimate identities in a field (Maguire et al., 2004; Oakes et al., 1998). Most work on 
institutional entrepreneurship tends to see agency as belonging to actors who occupy dominant 
subject positions (Hoffman, 1999) and can influence other field actors to change their activities 
due to their profession, socialisation and bureaucracy (Maguire et al., 2004). Maguire et al. 
(2004) in their emerging organisational field study were able to identify actors with subject 
positions which gave them legitimacy in the eyes of various stakeholders and the power (ability) 
to bridge these stakeholders, especially those who wanted them “to access dispersed sets of 
resources” (Leca et al., 2008:10). Hence the subject position as used in their study refers to a 
formal position which is socially constructed with legitimate identities that can be found in the 
field. This implies that power level relations amongst field actors, capital or resources and sense 
of social game can be said to be embedded in the field (Fligstein., 2001a; Hinings et al., 2004).  
 
The question Does institutional entrepreneurship brings about a strategic face of power? (Garud 
et al., 2007) has been highly contested in the literature; see for example Levy and Scully (2007) 
who argue for it. The concept of institutional entrepreneurship also lays emphasis on the fact that 
not all actors have the opportunity to produce desired outcomes (Maguire et al., 2004; Fligstein, 
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1997).The has been argued to be due to the nature of the organisational field. Hardy and Maguire 
(2008) add that the meaning of fields according to Bourdieu (1990) is that actors do not have the 
power but rather occupy (or fail to occupy) subject positions which permit them to exercise 
power. By subject position we mean what Oakes et al. (1998) refer to as the socially constructed 
and legitimated identities besides formal, bureaucratic positions available in a field. Some 
organisational fields have a limited number of subject positions  from which interest parties can 
act (Bourdieu, 1990). In line with Oakes et al.’s (1998) definition of subject position, Maguire el 
al. (2004) together with other scholars, are of the view that power can come from the subject 
position, not that actors have power without subject positions.  
 
Recent studies have found that despite the presence of the paradox of embedded agency, 
powerful actors located in dominant positions can bring about institutional change. Institutional 
fields can have dominant and dominated actors (Maguire et al., 2004) “both of which can 
attempt to usurp, exclude and establish monopoly over the mechanisms of the field’s 
reproduction and the type of power effective in it” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 106) and on 
some occasions institutional change can result from actors that are not in certain power positions 
(Hensman’s (2003) study of the American music industry). 
 
Garud et al. (2007) seek to examine a challenging question: what role do powerful actors play in 
a bid to bring about change? Child et al. (2007) throw some light onto the question. They argue 
in their study that the state was the main institutional entrepreneur in an unstable economy at the 
time which made them receive foreign aid but at the same time they used their international 
experience to bring about changes. These changes occurred during economic reforms that led to 
the decentralisation of their practices. 
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- Resources and Power 
Phillips et al. (2000) point out that the decision to engage in institutional entrepreneurship or 
become an institutional entrepreneur is not an easy one, as it is quite a demanding process. The 
efforts of such actors involved in the process can both be resource-intensive and risky. Hence, 
the potential way in which organisational actors can manage institutional structures will highly 
depend on the institutional context and the resources made available to those interested actors 
(Lawrence, 1999). Garud et al. (2004) argue that the capital or resources for actors to exercise 
the power they have in the field at any given point in time when deemed necessary cannot be 
ignored. DiMaggio’s (1988) definition of institutional entrepreneurship points clearly to the need 
for enough resource for institutional change to take place. 
Hardy and Maguire (2008) argue that different types of resource have been discussed in the 
literature, including the use of finance, knowledge and/or the actor’s social position within a 
social network, political, financial and organisational resources (Greenwood and Suddaby, 
2006); material resources (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006); cultural resources, and discursive 
resources. Dorado (2005) argues that actors need resources in order to take the risk of diverting 
from already established organisational norms, especially in situations where such new forms 
divert from legal orders and form a threat to dominant positions. However, it is very rare to find 
powerful actors with sufficient resources to bring about institutional change on the field. 
The success of institutional change depends heavily on access to scarce and critical resources 
and the skills needed to leverage such resources (Dorado, 2005; Leca et al., 2008). Three distinct 
resources mobilisation processes have been reviewed so far in the literature: leveraging, 
accumulating and convening (Dorado, 2005; Leca et al., 2008). 
 
Leveraging steps out from the collective work done by scholars who are interested in changing 
organisational forms. DiMaggio (1988), supported by Dorado (2005), lays down a good 
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description of the leveraging process. They talk about firstly defining the project, secondly 
making sure to gain support for that project from other actors and finally striving to gain support 
and acceptance from external agents who have a share or stake in the affected field. These 
external constituencies could be individuals or organisations. The talents or skills of such actors 
are of vital importance (at least to convince others to see the need for change) for such projects 
to succeed (Fligstein, 1997; Dorado, 2005). 
 
Resource mobilisation, according to Hardy and Maguire (2008), is central to the notion of 
institutional entrepreneurship. The resource mobilisation process is that of accumulating the 
work of innovative supporters (Van de Ven et al., 1999; Dorado, 2005). They argue that the 
origin of new industries cannot be traced back to a few entrepreneurs. There must be a collective 
interactive action of individuals over a certain time frame which will in turn accumulate 
probabilistically over time, resulting in a dominant design (Dorado, 2005). The design is then 
diffused and replicated. Hardy and Maguire (2008) point out that material resource are usually 
mobilised by institutional entrepreneurs or field actors, using them to serve as a lever against 
other subsidiary field actors. That is, institutional entrepreneurship will step in when there are 
material rewards for supporters and opponents are punished. 
 
Lastly, convening is inspired by the studies of scholars interested in the processes that can lead 
to solving complex social problems (Dorado, 2005). Such processes usually include establishing 
cooperative inter-organisational relationships; that is, field reorganisation in order to define the 
institutional arrangements that will help solve complex social problems. Convening studies have 
given greater attention to institutional change: the type of change that solves complex social 
problems. The change process requires the creation of inter-organisational arrangement for it to 
commerce. Scholars have thus attempted to study organisational arrangements that rotate around 
social or environmental problems; see for example the refugee problem (Lawrence and Hardy, 
  
109 
 
1999). Having mentioned the need for collaborative action in the field, it is worth stressing that 
such collaborative initiatives do not mean convincing the actors in the field about the desirability 
and viability of the project, but the desirability and viability of collaborating with other actors to 
reach a solution to a social or environmental problem (Dorado, 2005).  
 
The study highlights ‘power’ to be that over resources and decision-making, which has been 
argued in the literature to be the key facilitator in attempting to implement accounting change 
(Burns, 2000). 
 
- Emotions 
Recent studies on institutional change have contested the nature and origin of change in 
attempting to offer explanations for such changes. It is argued that change is not only driven by 
organisational external factors but can originate at field level through daily individual works 
which can be justified and diffused within the organisation: the movement towards a practice-
driven nature of change (Smets et al., 2012). Lawrence et al. (2011) add that such micro-level 
origins for change within an organisation can also be due to individual behaviours, which can be 
deliberate or, as suggested by Jayasinghe and Soobaroyen (2009) and Soobaroyen et al. (2009) 
due to the bounded emotions of individuals in the organisation from the subjective point of view.  
 
Jayasinghe et al. (2008), Jayasinghe and Soobaroyen (2009) and Soobaroyen et al. (2009) argue 
that the role of actors in a subjective study like this cannot be ruled out. Objective ontology and 
functionalistic epistemology see the entrepreneur as an economic actor (independent) detached 
from organisational social practices or relationships. The entrepreneur is assumed to be receptive 
to any ideas such as training, changes or developments surrounding the organisation. The 
functionalist methodological assumption and rationality in terms of human behaviour suggest an 
epistemological tradition that neglects the social and cultural contexts within which these actors 
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function. Far from this nature of reality, the study argues towards a more subjective reasoning 
where actors cannot be detached from environmental/organisational practices. Subjective 
reasoning takes into consideration actors’ emotions and culture besides other social norms in the 
change process. Jayasinghe et al. (2008), Jayasinghe and Soobaroyen (2009) and Soobaroyen et 
al. (2009) support the argument that the concept and study of bounded emotionality in 
entrepreneurial or organisational studies gives room for the relationship or link between the 
actions of actors and social structure to be established. Hence, it is important to explicitly treat 
“the emotional aspects of entrepreneurial behaviour that operate outside the consciousness of 
individual agency” (Jayasinghe et al., 2008: 243). 
  
In order for institutional change to occur, resources besides other enabling field conditions are of 
vital importance (Hardy and Maguire, 2008). The formal authority, for example, the state and or 
any professional body, are needed to bring about institutional change: these formal authorities 
can be classified as a resource to support change. Garud et al. (2002) further note that legal 
practice can also assist in making new rules or enforcing existing ones. Greenwood et al. (2002) 
show how professional associations used their authority to assist elite accounting firms in their 
struggle to adopt a new organisational form (a multi-divisional one) and how the state helped 
them legislation-wise to experiment such multi-divisional organisational forms.  
 
It has been further argued that institutional entrepreneurs cannot act to initiate change with 
certain enabling conditions alone. There must be certain institutional contradictions for actors to 
take advantage of and proceed to initiate and implement change within the institution (Seo and 
Creed, 2002). 
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4.2.5 Institutional Contradictions 
Borrowing from Seo and Creed’s (2002) discussion on how embedded social actors can 
subsequently become change agents of the same institutional arrangement, the following section 
explores the various institutional possibilities. The sources of institutional contradictions include 
inefficiency, non-adaptability, inter-institutional incompatibilities/ inconsistency, resource 
asymmetry and misaligned interest (Seo and Creed, 2002; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006), also 
seen as the impetus for institutional change The argument here is that institutional contradictions 
are not necessary bound to occur in institutions, but that various social relationships and actions 
that take place in institutions can lead to one or more of such contradictions. Thus, Seo and 
Creed (2002) further claim that the introduction of organisational legitimacy may create room 
for contradictions or undermine functional inefficiency, meaning that a place for inefficiency in 
the organisation where actors with a change vision can take advantage and explore as the success 
of the organisation also depends heavily on legitimacy, besides technical efficiency. In order to 
avoid such inefficiency produced as a result of liaising and abiding with the instituted rules and 
regulations, the resistance issue steps in. 
 
Organisational actors could be seen to resist adapting to the introduction of new sets of rules and 
routines or practices, as they are so used to the old ways of carrying out their functions and 
because there are huge investments made on economic resources in the organisation, hence, non-
adaptability to changes in the organisation. The implication is that another institutional 
contradiction can occur not only amongst individuals within the organisation but also between or 
with other organisations and the external environment at large. Furthermore, attempts to meet the 
demands of external environmental parties might give room for more 
inconsistency/incompatibility with existing organisational demands; that is, a conflict between 
the external parties’ demand and those of the said organisation itself or within the organisation at 
different levels. 
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Note should be made of the fact that the introduction of institutional contradictions on its own 
does not introduce agency (Beckert, 1999). There is a need to explore how agency comes into 
the institutional entrepreneurship picture, as institutional contradictions on its own cannot lead to 
institutional change. Human praxis is a very important mediating mechanism between 
institutional contradictions, also known as enabling conditions and institutional change (Seo and 
Creed, 2002). They also add that such contradictions will give potential change actors the power 
to explore, and hence greater changes for the praxis of institutional change. These change agents 
will reflect on what they intend to change and mobilise other actors to support them in their 
mission, and with such collective efforts, hopefully their change mission will be accomplished 
(Figure 4.1). 
 
FIGURE 4.1: Institutionalisation  
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Seo and Creed (2002: 232) 
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4.2.6 Implementation of Change 
Another major challenge that institutional entrepreneurs face, besides how to create or modify 
existing practices, is how to implement the institutional change they advocate, as most 
institutions, especially those that benefit from their current practices, will prefer to maintain 
these already established privileges/practices (Leca et al., 2008: Levy and Scully, 2007). 
Battilana et al. (2009) argue that actors need not be successful in their attempt to implement 
change in order to be known as institutional entrepreneurs. For example, if actors who mobilise 
resources and want to introduce the use of new accounting practices/ practice in turn fail to 
convince the actors who might be using it to change their routines, they will still be known as 
institutional entrepreneurs, even though the changes which they initiated were not successfully 
adopted (Battilana et al., 2009). Again, the concept of entrepreneurship and institutional 
entrepreneurship might seem confusing to many people. Note should be made of the fact that 
only when entrepreneurs generate new business models or create new ventures can they be 
known as institutional entrepreneurs (Battilana et al., 2009). 
 
Wijen and Ansari (2007) point out that the implementation of institutional change can only be 
effective if there is collaboration from various actors with divergent interests. Often it has been 
argued that institutional entrepreneurs sometimes do not seek the opinion of or convince 
dissenting actors to see reason with them and go ahead to impose institutional change on them 
(Dorado, 2005; Battilana and Leca, 2008). However, such situations are rare, given the fact that 
most dominant actors, especially those who benefit from the current institution and its ways, 
strive to support its maintenance rather than promoting changes (DiMaggio, 1988; Leca et al., 
2008).  
 
Furthermore, because such actors can rarely change institutions on their own, suggestions have 
been made in the literature pointing towards the need to mobilise allies, especially highly 
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embedded actors (Lawrence et al., 2002), professionals and experts (Greenwood et al., 2002; 
Fligstein, 1997; Leca et al., 2008). There is also a need to develop alliances and induce 
cooperation amongst actors in order to bring about change on the field (Lawrence et al., 2002; 
Wijen and Ansari, 2007; Leca et al., 2008). Thus, the need to mobilise different types of social 
skills makes institutional entrepreneurship a complicated cultural and political process, 
depending on what type of project they intend to carry out (Fligstein, 1997; Leca et al., 2008). 
The process in which institutional entrepreneurs can use available resources to bring about 
institutional change and its implementation has been argued to involve mainly strategies and 
skills (Dorado, 2005; Leca et al., 2008).  
4.2.7 Resistance and Decoupling 
So many challenges are set to arise in a bid to bring in institutional change (divergent change). 
Battilana et al. (2009) argued that implementing change that will build an already existing 
institution is very challenging, not to mention that which will break the existing institutions. 
Institutional entrepreneurs encounter more challenges compared to other change agents, 
especially when it comes to developing and mobilising support for a vision of change (Battilana 
et al., 2009). The fact that these institutional entrepreneurs are more concerned with initiating 
divergent change means that they are more likely to encounter challenges from opposing actors. 
The resistance or refusal of other institutional actors to welcome new changes has been a major 
challenge for institutional entrepreneurs (Gralund et al., 2004). 
 
Oliver (1992) argues that firms are sometime strategic in the way they respond to institutional 
pressures exerted or imposed on them. These organisations comply with regulations and adopt 
and apply formal procedures but in a more manipulative way for better legitimacy, securing 
grants, resources and so on which they sometime heavily depend on (Ribeiro and Scapens, 
2006). This brings in the idea of ‘decoupling’ and ‘window-dressing’, where actors accept 
certain institutionalised procedures but intentionally fail to put them into practice (Oliver, 1992). 
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Scapens (1994) adds that accounting practices are generally slow or resistant to change with the 
changing environment.  
 
Gralund et al. (2004) attempt to examine the reason behind the resistance of institutional 
accounting practices to change, explaining the stability in and around management accounting 
practices. Their in-depth longitudinal study focused on improving product costing practices, 
paying particular attention to the concepts of ‘change’ and ‘stability’. Even though the existence 
of such resistance to new accounting practices is widely known in financial institutions, it has so 
far been poorly understood. Gralund et al. (2004) argue that it is not because institutions must 
not adjust their practices, but simply because the environment is changing. 
 
It is further argued that the cause –effect relationship between accounting change and the 
environment are of vital importance in institutional studies (Kaplan, 1985). It is often argued that 
management accounting change is difficult to implement (Kaplan, 1985; Johnson and Kaplan, 
1987; Bromwich and Bhimani, 1994). A good example in line with the argument is ABC, or 
Activity Based Costing. ABC has been argued to be a very complex practice, with the problems 
associated with it ranging from lack of managerial support to difficulty in identifying cost 
drivers (Drury et al., 1993; Gralund et al., 2004). It is therefore possible that after identifying the 
actors who initiate accounting changes and the reasons why institutions are resistant to such 
accounting changes, it is then possible to look for solutions as to what needs doing in order to 
implement or institutionalise such changes in practice. For example, it has been argued in the 
literature that winning actors over, especially dissenting actors, regarding institutional change is 
very important for an institutional entrepreneur (Leca et al., 2008; Dorado, 2005).  
 
Deinstitutionalisation is likely to occur after repeated practices of decoupling. 
Deinstitutionalisation refers here to “the erosion or discontinuity of an institution allied 
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organisational activity or practice” (Oliver, 1992: 563). Oliver (1992) further identifies certain 
organisational and environmental factors that are likely to explain why institutionalised 
organisational procedures or behaviours will be vulnerable such erosion over time. Oliver’s 
(1992) argument is contrary to the emphasis placed by institutional sociology on cultural 
persistence and the endurance of such institutionalised organisational behaviours. Rather it has 
been suggested that such behaviours will be highly susceptible to dissipation, rejection or 
replacement following a variety of other conditions (be it internally or externally). Battilana et 
al. (2009) further demonstrate the process model of institutional entrepreneurship in Figure 4.2, 
summarised in question form by Busco et al. (2007b) in Figure 4.3 below. 
 
 
FIGURE 4.2: Process Model of Institutional Entrepreneurship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Battilana et al. (2009:87) 
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FIGURE 4.3: Institutional Change (Stability) guide 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Busco et al. (2007b: 127) 
 
4.3 Theoretical Framework  
In line with the theoretical framework of the thesis, the following questions serve as guidelines 
for the research questions to be further answered. The question what needs to be changed? Rao 
et al. (2000) and Leca et al. (2008) point out that actors can only mobilise resources only after 
framing the problem and identifying the failings of existing institutional practices. It is from 
identifying the problem that we can begin to talk about ‘change’. Secondly, more insights on 
why and how the change is taking place is obtained from the exogenous and endogenous 
pressures or forces, which, as argued by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Scott (2008she) could 
be normative, coercive, mimetic and/or cognitive. The origin or direction of the change answers 
the question where is the change coming from? The questions above tally with the contributions 
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made by OIE and NIS. The framework moves on to embrace issues around agents. The question 
who is initiating the change? is answered by referring to these agents as institutional 
entrepreneurs, and who are those accepting and practicing the change? as the disseminating or 
participating actors. However, the framework also later embraces issues around resistance and/or 
decoupling. Another series of important questions addressed by the framework is: what makes 
change possible to initiate (institutional contradictions discussed), what makes the change 
continue to exist (enabling conditions and drivers of change), when did the change take place 
(time and space), how is the change instituted (implementation or praxis) and lastly, the results.  
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FIGURE 4.4 Modified Theoretical Framework 
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4.3.1 Framework Justification 
Over the past couple of decades, institutional theory has become one of the most prominent 
theories in organisational analysis (leca et al., 2008). Institutional theory thus serves as a 
theoretical lens from which the understanding of the study started.  
 
Focused in the 1980s on the mimetic process whereby organisations eventually adopt the same 
kind of behaviour within a field of activity, the emphasis has shifted over the past decade to 
include issues of institutional change and agency (e.g., Dacin et al., 2002; Dillard et al., 2004).  
In as much as early institutional studies (Selznick, 1957) did account for actors’ agency, 
subsequent institutional studies tended to overlook the role of actors in institutional change (leca 
et al., 2008). According to these latter studies, institutional change was caused by exogenous 
shocks that challenged existing institutions in a field of activity.  
 
The emergence of OIE has been argued by Scapens (2006) to have concentrated on internal 
pressures that leads to organisational change (Burns and Scapens, 2000) whilst NIS focuses on 
the external pressures (Tsamenyi et al., 2006). Central to this line of research, the notion of 
institutional entrepreneurship initially introduced by DiMaggio (1988) emerged as a possible 
new research avenue to provide not only endogenous explanations in institutional change 
analysis but also as a way to reintroduce the actors’ agency to institutional change analysis (the 
research area). 
 
The thesis framework is a modification of Battilana et al. (2009) in line with Scapens (2004) 
suggestion that it is necessary to modify existing theories if they fail to provide satisfactory 
explanations. The framework conceptualises the research idea of change with more emphasis on 
the role of actors in bringing about change. The framework is therefore an ideal one to use in 
answering the research questions especially the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions (see chapter one). In 
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order to better understand how institutional entrepreneurship theory best fits in theorising the 
study, OIE has been used as a starting point of the study where Burns and Scapens’ (2000) idea 
of originality is welcomed. OIE theory looks at how management accounting practices are 
shaped by the taken-for-granted assumptions (rules and routines which inform and shape the 
operations of individual actors) as previously explained in the chapter. However, Burns and 
Scapens (2000) also point out that not all newly introduced rules and routines eventually become 
institutionalised. Here, the themes of environmental (external) pressures, enabling conditions and 
power surface (failure of OIE).  
 
Arguably, certain environmental pressures need to drive in change (Dillard et al., 2004; Scapens, 
2006; Hyvönen et al., 2012) and this is explained by NIS which also serves as a base in order to 
better answer the research questions. NIS (Scapens, 2006) could have been used to explain why 
change occurs but it fails to embrace the rules, social norms and expectations internal to the 
organisation and it also does not embrace actors hence the need to look further for a framework 
that will address such limitations. Institutional entrepreneurship addresses such limitations 
likewise answer all the research questions in this study. Institutional entrepreneurship theory 
embraces the fact that actors need to have certain position, resources and strategies to mobilise 
power (Scapens and Ribeiro, 2006), without which issues of resistance are assured. It has been 
extensively argued that actors operating in and around an organisation can exert pressures that 
will drive individuals to follow certain structures and procedures (actors as change agents).   
4.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has explored issues surrounding the process of institutional change. The chapter 
reviewed institutional theory, starting with contributions from OIE and NIS. It has gone beyond 
the theoretical lens to embrace discussions on practice where the concept of institutional 
entrepreneurship is embraced as an action theory simply because it welcomes the role of agency. 
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The chapter has also explored action theory, following a thematic approach supported by 
existing literature from different fields in which ‘change’ is explored as a process. The emerging 
themes explored include pressure levels, actors, change drivers, enabling conditions, 
contradictions, implementation and the challenge of resistance to change and decoupling issues 
mentioned.  
 
Scapens (2006) suggests a need to address the limitations of Burns and Scapens (2000), who 
failed to incorporate the external environment in their study. Hyvönen et al. (2012) suggest four 
pressure levels on which actors can act, especially in a divergent change process. Seo and 
Creed’s (2002) contribution on institutional contradictions remains that an impetus acted upon 
by human praxis to enable institutional change cannot be ignored. Furthermore, based on Leca et 
al. (2008)’s argument, the process of institutional entrepreneurs should begin by identifying who 
are the institutional entrepreneurs: the process model suggested by Battilana et al. (2009) 
attempts to identify and include institutional actors (Figure 4.2). Together with suggestions from 
Hardy and Maguire (2008) on the need for certain conditions to enable change to take place, the 
theoretical framework for the thesis was suggested (Figure 4.4). Figure 4.4 is therefore a 
modification of Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. Smets et al. (2012) emphasises the need to study the 
origin of change not just from the external organisational environment but also from the within 
the organisation itself. They lay more emphasis on including practice-driven institutional change 
in studying the origin of institutional change, which the study takes on board given the neglect in 
past research.  
 
The chapter has yielded considerable insights as to why, where and how changes in 
organisational structures and practices might occur, together with answering questions such as 
who, what, and when in line with institutional changes. The next chapter explains the research 
methodology used in the study.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
5.0 Introduction 
The chapter looks at the process by which the study will be carried out. Ahrens (2008) argues 
that: 
…a growing body of interpretive management accounting studies, often based on 
fieldwork, is continuing to develop approaches that seek to overcome distinction 
between objective and subjective research by exploring the various ways in which 
accounting can become part of the contexts in which it operates. (p. 292) 
 
The philosophical assumption underpinning any study helps to shape its research methodology. 
The choice of research methods depends on the methodology underpinned by a particular 
philosophical assumption (Saunders et al., 2011; Gray, 2013). Like any other research, social 
sciences research must consider the manner in which the world is viewed; that is, the nature of 
beliefs and values should be consistent with the philosophical assumptions before embarking on 
any research process (Hopper and Power, 1985; Scapens, 2004; Gray, 2013). In order to adhere 
with such a claim, a review of previous research methodology sorrounding accounting and 
accountability practices and MFIs has been made. Figure 5.1 shows a summary of the claims 
discussed in this paragraph and further applied in the study. 
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FIGURE 5.1 Relationship between Research Philosophy, Methodology and Methods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Gray (2013: 19) 
 
Social construction, which falls under the subjective ontological position, has been chosen for 
the study. This is where reality is seen as socially constructed. Unlike symbolic discourse ,where 
the meanings and norms structure the social practices of individual human actors, with social 
construction reality is seen as the recreation of the social world by these actors with every 
encounter. Reality in this case is further seen as the accomplishment of individual sense-making 
- thus the term ‘individual construction’- reality only exists in individuals’ imaginations. 
 
Ryan et al. (2002) define research as a process of intellectual discovery with the goal of 
eventually transforming the knowledge and understanding we have about the world. This implies 
that accounting research will be the focus of discovering, interpreting, understanding and 
transforming knowledge regarding such accounting issues and in the case study we aim at 
discovering, understanding, interpreting and transforming our understanding of the accounting 
and accountability change process in CSMFI. 
Some problems have now become critical for accounting researchers in line with other issues 
such as the nature of social reality, the role of the researcher and the social nature of any research 
process. All of these concerns have shaped the alternative approaches adopted in accounting 
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research. Social science researchers have particularly been interested in epistemology and 
ontology (Hollis, 1994; How, 2003).  
The chapter begins with the discussion of philosophical underpinnings in accounting research 
which are still contestable and debatable as argued by Gray (2013). The research philosophy tells 
us the way in which the world is viewed, understanding knowledge and how it is created 
(Saunders et al., 2011). The second section focuses on the research methodology underpinning 
the research process. The research methodology adopted in the chapter serves as a gateway to 
answering the research questions stated in Chapter 1 in order to arrive at the research aim and 
objectives of the study. Under the research methodology section, the research approach and 
strategy are also discussed. Third, the research method section explains the distinction between 
research methodologies and further looks at issues around research design and the reason for 
adopting a particular design deemed suitable for the study. Fourth, data collection is discussed as 
a process from preparation to final gathering of data before its analysis. Fifth is the data 
collation/analysis section. Research credibility remains vital in research and takes the chapter to 
the sixth section. Last is the chapter summary.  
 
5.1 Philosophical Assumptions  
Even though philosophical ideas remain widely ‘hidden’ in social science research today, their 
significance has still been argued for, particularly in designing research (Guba and Lincoln, 
1994; Creswell, 2012). Meyers (1997) adds that any research is guided by certain underlying 
assumptions as to what makes ‘valid’ research and deciding which methodology and methods 
are suitable to carry out such research. As with any other study, it is therefore important to unveil 
any such hidden assumptions.  
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The classification of philosophical assumptions has been suggested by different scholars. Crotty 
(1998) and Gray (2013) for example suggest four main questions in designing a study which 
include two main issues on philosophy and knowledge claims: that is, issues around 
Epistemology and Ontology. Epistemology informs the research (for example the objective or 
subjective nature of the research) while ontology talks about “the study of being that is the 
nature of existence and what constitutes reality” (Gray, 2013:19). Saunders et al. (2011) suggest 
that epistemology refers to the assumptions about the best ways of understanding the nature of 
reality, knowing how knowledge is created and what makes up acceptable knowledge - that is 
positivism, realism or interpretivism - while ontology looks at the nature of reality. 
 
Generally speaking, the aim of philosophy in designing research is to uncover and make sense of 
the various principles and assumptions that underlie various practices and beliefs (Huges, 1997). 
Starting research with a knowledge claim means that certain assumptions have been made which 
shape what will be learned and gained from the inquiry (Creswell, 2009). These claims or 
assumptions used in designing research are often referred to as research paradigms (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994) or philosophical assumptions, with the two main ones being epistemology and 
ontology (Crotty, 1998; Grary, 2013), which broadly determine the research methodology 
adopted (Neuman, 2000).  
 
Kakkuri-Knuuttila et al. (2008) argue the use of universal laws to confirm certain causes of 
social action, which is highly discredited in social research. The same situation holds for purely 
subjective accounts, in line with which the use of accounting cannot be claimed to contribute to 
understanding accounting from a contextual point of view. Following the argument, Kakkuri-
Knuuttila et al. (2008) conclude that interpretive research in accounting remains a ‘straddle 
paradigm’, meaning that it borrows from both subjective and objective schools of thought. The 
researcher believes that Kakkuri-Knuuttila et al.’s (2008) point is useful, however, the existing 
accounting (management) literature has developed a number of responses to challenge such an 
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idea of merging subjectivist perspectives with objectivist postures, leading to new innovative 
research in accounting. Conclusively, there has been substantial work on the debates to show 
“how social reality emerges from subjective understandings and is objectified through 
interaction lie at the heart of interpretive accounting research” (Ahrens 2008: 292). Vaivio and 
Sirén (2010) add that Interpretive accounting research appears to be undergoing a kind of critical 
self-reflection. 
 
The ontological assumption (Saunders et al., 2011) is further explored. Social construction has 
been argued to rather refer to an umbrella of all subjective reasoning approaches (Saunders et al., 
2011). The social actions under the category will be the focus of such research and not the 
meanings and norms that make up a particular structure, as the case may be with other 
ontological approaches. Researchers who share the view are therefore interested in the 
procedures through which individual actors make meaning/sense out of what is happening. The 
implication here is the possibility to have different realities, but researchers are only concerned 
with how these individuals make sense of their daily being. In this respect, Boland (1993) adds 
that accounting researchers can for example be concerned with how these individuals make 
sense from the accounting information they receive.  
Hopper et al. (2002) argue that in more subjectivist research, other means in which knowledge is 
gained are of vital importance while making sure that all of them reflect a particular ontological 
assumption of the researcher. Tomkins and Groves (2002) step in at this juncture with the 
naturalistic methods.  
The epistemological objective view, on the other hand, assumes that there is a theory and 
because of that it is possible to see the world from an objective angle of neutral observation. The 
subjectivists, on the other side, rather refuse to see the neutral observation: the best way to 
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understand the world is to gain in-depth knowledge on the inquiry (Hopper and Powell, 1985; 
Gray, 2013). Social research does not exist independent of human actions and its environment.  
Hopper and Powell (1985) came up with the taxonomy of accounting research, classifying 
accounting and organisational research into mainstream, interpretive and critical accounting 
research, as shown in Figure 5.1. 
FIGURE 5.2: The Taxonomy of Accounting Research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Hopper and Powell (1985: 432) 
Even though the above framework has received criticisms in the literature (Willmott, 1990), it is 
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thought in accounting research (Scapens, 2004; Saunders et al., 2011).  
RADICAL HUMANISM  RADICAL CHANGE  RADICAL STRUCTURALISM 
 
 
 
Subjectivism                   Objectivism 
 
  
 
 
INTERPRETIVE               REGULATION    FUNCTIONALISM 
Critical Accounting 
Research 
Mainstream 
Accounting Research 
Interpretive Research 
  
129 
 
Furthermore, the two main debates in accounting research have often arisen when making 
inquiries about the nature of the world (Epistemology) from the positivism (mainstream) and 
social constructionist (interpretive approach) point of view (See Figure 5.2). Mainstream 
accounting research, also referred to as the functionalist/ positivist approach, is mainly 
concerned about the functioning of accounting, where a natural science philosophical stance is 
adopted, with observable social reality dealing with ‘facts’ rather than impressions or feelings 
and with end product being a law-like generalisation similar to those produced by 
natural/physical scientists (Saunders et al., 2011; Gray, 2013). The view of the world is more 
objective, seeing individuals’ behaviour as deterministic, and uses empirical and a positive 
research methodology. Positivists or mainstream accounting research often see reality as external 
and objective. They assume knowledge is only significant if it can be measured, tested and 
observed (Hollis, 1994). However, this view of reality has been criticised by other researchers, 
including Collis and Hussey (2013), who argue that it is impossible to treat and understand 
people independent of their social life. It is argued that research needs to be subjective because 
reality is determined by people (Collis and Hussey, 2013).  
Gray (2013) describes the dominant alternative assumption to mainstream research as 
interpretive. Interpretive research is about understanding the social world (Hopper et al., 2002; 
Scapens, 2004). It seeks to make sense of the social character involved in everyday life and 
obtain people’s impressions and feeling not facts (Saunders et al., 2011). Unlike mainstream 
accounting research, interpretive research’s belief about knowledge is that theory is used to give 
explanations of human intentions (Hopper et al., 2002).  
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5.2 Research Methodology  
5.2.1 Research Approach 
Saunders et al. (2011) point out that the degree of theory clarification at the start gives an idea of 
the research design: a deductive or an inductive approach. The question often asked is which 
approach is better? Deductive research owes more to positivists’ epistemological position while 
inductive owes more to interpretivists’ epistemological position.  
After explaining the ontological and epistemological assumptions that underpin social science, 
particularly accounting research, it can be concluded that the study will be located within a 
subjective reasoning paradigm of an interpretive nature, given the aim of the study (see Chapter 
one, section 1.1) and based on the claim that the world is socially constructed and thus should be 
treated as such. This implies that the study is not seen as natural science, where there are 
universal laws and generalisations, and hence no predictions of possible theories are undertaken 
as the case with a positivist study.  
The study involves people via channels such as semi-structured interviews and informal 
discussions. Accounting does not occur naturally, as it is affected by individuals’ actions and 
societal forces at large. Thus, using the interpretive approach implies that the actions of 
individuals in society can better be understood by focusing on their perceptions. Thus, in reality 
it would be practically impossible to understand these actors in the microfinance field without 
examining what they think about microfinance and the world around them. Organisations such 
as MFIs are not passive but dynamic and bound to change, like the practices embodied in them, 
such as the accounting and accountability practices. Their accounting systems are socially 
constructed and thus, need to be understood from a social point of view. Human actions are 
deliberate and are surrounded by a social and historical reality (Chua, 1986; Collis and Hussey, 
2013). Moll et al. (2006) add that the world can better be understood by looking at the shared 
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realities of various social (institutional/organisational) actors, which the research draws attention 
to. 
The study aims to identify the rules and patterns which have brought about certain social 
changes in the case studied organisation. For this to be done, the organisational practices/ norms 
need to be situated in the world surrounding them (political, historical, economic, social) and in 
their organisational and individual context. This implies a rich understanding of the case study’s 
external and internal environment, hence, the adoption of a qualitative research strategy. 
5.2.2 Research Strategy 
Before deciding what research strategy to use in any piece of research, it is always good to start 
with the research questions to be answered followed by the research objective(s) (Saunders et al., 
2011). No matter the type of research embarked on, a clear research strategy is needed (that 
which has a clear research design). The research strategy could be qualitative or quantitative in 
nature (Creswell, 2012). Qualitative and quantitative research tends to ask different types of 
casual questions. Qualitative research, for example, often asks how ‘a’ plays a role in causing ‘b’ 
and how we understand the process that brings ‘a’ and ‘b’ together. Quantitative research, on the 
other hand, is interested in whether and to what extent ‘a’ causes a variance in ‘b’ (Maxwell, 
2005). 
A qualitative research strategy emphasises words rather than quantification, as opposed to 
quantitative research (Bryman, 2006). It could be inductivist, constructionist (ontological 
position) or interpretivist (epistemological position). Qualitative research is a non- numeric 
research technique and a field of inquiry which cuts across several research disciplines and 
subject matters (Saunders et al., 2011).  
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5.2.2.1 Why Qualitative Research? 
Unlike quantitative data analysis, there is generally no standardised approach used when 
analysing qualitative data. Four basic approaches that correspond to the strategies of data 
collection have been suggested by Saunders et al. (2011); 
• Understanding the characteristics of language 
• Discovering regularities 
• Comprehending the meaning of text or action 
• Reflection 
 
The first two categories suggest that in order to achieve an aim, a detailed structure with a formal 
set of procedures should be laid out which leads onto a more deductive data analysis approach, 
unlike the last two, which seem more flexible, loosely formatted and can easily follow inductive 
reasoning. By inductive reasoning we mean thinking way beyond the surroundings of current 
evidence or knowledge to draw conclusions about the unknown (Holyoak and Morrison, 2005). 
Hence, the researcher has adopted the last two categories in analysing the data gathered from the 
fieldwork. The researcher transcribed the details of the semi-structured interviews (tapes and 
field notes) and informal discussions (notes), converting the data into meaningful information for 
better analysis. 
 
The study seeks to give an explanation of changes that have taken place in the case study MFI, 
who the change initiators are and the process of instituting/implementing such changes. Thus, 
using a qualitative research technique will be more appropriate here, as it deals with explaining 
the roles of actors and how the change process was organised,  with particular focus on 
accounting changes that have come about, as opposed to a quantitative research technique, which 
deals with the scientific exploration of events that can be represented numerically (Bryman, 
2006; Saunders et al., 2011).  
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Furthermore, quantitative research aims at constructing and applying scientific models, statistical 
analysis and theories in order to prove some stated hypothesis (Saunders et al., 2011). This 
current study did not adopt a quantitative approach, as it is believed by the researcher that the 
outcome from the research cannot be represented numerically, but with words offering 
explanations. For instance, exploring the nature of microfinance accounting and accountability 
practices means understanding and explaining how such systems function, together with the 
challenges involved. This can be better communicated through a combination of words, numbers 
and diagrams to present a clearer picture of what the environment looks like. Thus, the data 
obtained would be in the form of words or sentences, which implies that adopting a qualitative 
research strategy is best when answering such questions. Thus, in order to conduct the analysis 
in this study, conceptualisations rather than statistical analyses are deemed necessary to 
understand how accounting and accountability practices unfold in MFIs.  
 
Qualitative research gives room for an open-minded interactive research approach between the 
researcher and those or the phenomenon to be researched (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006), yielding 
rich information which otherwise cannot be collected quantitatively. After discussing and 
adopting a particular research strategy like the case here, the next question is what method is best 
suited to that research strategy with particular philosophical assumptions?  
5.3 Research Methods 
The term ‘research methods’ refers to the particular techniques used in conducting research, for 
example statistical techniques, while methodology is the process of doing the research, which 
includes the techniques and approaches used in collecting and analysing data and the implicit 
ontological and epistemological assumptions followed in conducting the research. Methods are 
therefore a subset of methodology. Ahrens and Chapman (2006) point out that the problems of 
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methodology are sometimes reduced to those of method. A particular research method can be 
adopted for different methodologies (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006). Interviews, for example, can 
be used in qualitative or quantitative (by a positivist) research, depending how reality is 
conceptualised and explored. After deciding how to carry out the research, it is also very 
important to use a particular design or structure or situate the research. 
5.3.1 Research Design 
De Vaus (2001) argues that there is need for every social research to have a structure (design) 
before commencing data collection and analysis. A good design is one in which the  
components work harmoniously together, promotes efficient and successful 
functioning while a poor research design leads to poor operation. (Maxwell, 2005:2)  
Surprisingly, most researchers dealing with research design have come up with different 
conceptions of design (Maxwell, 2005, De Vaus, 2001). Marshall and Rossman (2010) point out 
that while some views of design have been noted to be circular; others still remain recursive. 
Harmmersley and Atkinson (1995) suggest that research design should be “a reflexive process 
operating through every stage of a project” (p. 24), especially in qualitative research. Creswell 
(2012) further suggests the use of literature sparingly at the beginning of a plan in qualitative 
research in order to convey an inductive design, unless the qualitative strategy type requires a 
substantial literature orientation at the outset. It is important to note that ‘research design’ deals 
more with a logical problem and not a logistic problem (Yin, 1989: De Vaus, 2001; 
Robson1993; Booth et al., 2003). 
A case study design has been chosen for the research. A case study is  
… a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a 
particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple 
sources of evidence, (Robson, 2002: 178) 
 Moll et al. (2006) point out that three main research designs best fit into yielding satisfactory 
qualitative research results: case study, field study and field experiments. The case study has 
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however been adopted in this qualitative study for the reasons discussed in Section 5.3.2 below. 
The case study adopted will be of an explanatory nature.  
5.3.2 Why Case Study? 
Case study design can answer key research questions via interviews, to include ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
(Yin, 1984). The thesis involves ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions which are best answerable through 
the use of a case study. According to Yin (2003), the how and why questions involve relational 
links that can only be enquired upon with time, not instantly. The case study is a design that 
seeks to explore past and current issues that affect an organisation(s), and its future is determined 
based on existing data. A case study design enriches the researcher with an in-depth 
understanding of the study, focusing on the specific problem area (Saunders et al., 2011). This 
confirms the argument of Sue (1997) that a case study design offers a holistic view of the 
research question and allows the researcher and reader to gain a comprehensive and thorough 
understanding of the research. Case studies are used to achieve high understanding of 
organisational practices (Morris and Wood, 1991), as is the case with this study. Case studies are 
not necessarily on individuals but also institutions, neighbourhood, innovations, decisions, 
services, and programmes, amongst others (De Vaus, 2001).  
 
In line with understanding organisational practices, Scapens (2004) adds that it will be necessary 
to modify existing theories if they fail to provide satisfactory explanations. Thus, the explanatory 
case study used in the research aims at modifying some existing unsatisfactory theories in order 
to yield satisfactory explanatory results of the phenomenon studied: accounting and 
accountability practices in MFIs. 
 
Ryan et al. (2002) discuss the differences that exist in case study research (See Table 5.1 below) 
and Yin (2003) explains when case study research design is preferred (see Table 5.2). 
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TABLE 5.1: Differences in Case Study Research 
Type of research Positive Interpretive √ 
View of the world External and objective Social construction 
Type of study Exploratory Explanatory 
Nature of explanation Deductive Pattern 
Nature of generalisation Statistical  Theoretical 
Role of theory Hypothesis generalisation Understand 
Nature of accounting Economic: decision making Objective of study 
 Source: Ryan et al. (2002: 146) 
 
 
TABLE 5.2: When Case Study Research is Preferred 
Strategy/ Design Type of research 
question 
Required control of 
behavioural events 
Focus on 
contemporary 
issues 
Case study How, why No  Yes 
Source: Yin (2003: 5) 
 
The case study design adopted in this study follows an interpretive approach with subjective and 
inductive reasoning, as those with a positivist approach fail to situate accounting practices within 
their historical, socio-economic and political context (Ryan et al., 2002).  
 
The case study research steps suggested by Ryan et al. (2002) and Yin (2003) discussed below 
have been followed in the present study. These steps include as a first step preparation (through 
review of existing literature as Scapens (1990) argues, research training courses and field 
work/case work preparation, plotting, ethical review process, development of research 
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instruments, for example interview questions, and so on). These preparatory steps increase the 
research reliability by guiding the researcher through the data collection stage (Yin, 2003).  
 
The collection of evidence is done through the gathering of data using various instruments. In 
the study, both primary and secondary data collection methods have been used. A triangulated 
data collection approach was used through semi-structured interviews, informal discussions and 
documentation. The approach allowed the researcher to gain an in-depth understanding and 
allows them to explain the changes inherent in the case study MFI’s accounting and 
accountability practices as well as the process and actors involved in the change. The use of in-
depth semi-structured interviews allowed the researcher to ‘probe’ the respondents’ answers 
when there was a need to, and vice versa (Saunders and Thornhill, 2007).  
 
Third, the assessment of the evidence collected is vital, as further discussed below. Reliability, 
as argued by Ahrens and Chapman (2006), is not easily separated from validity. The idea of 
research validity was initially developed for quantitative research with objective reasoning about 
the nature of reality, and this has been argued to be unsuitable for qualitative studies like the 
present one. This argument is supported by Chua (1986), who points out that, “social reality is 
emergent, subjectively created and objectified through human interaction” (p. 615). Furthermore, 
we cannot pretend to study the reality of how, for example, the case study MFI accounting and 
accountability practices function or have changed if we do not understand the roles of the actors 
initiating the changes or operating in the environment and independent of the theoretical interest 
of the researcher (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006). Hence the idea of obtaining replication in 
qualitative studies is inappropriate, and as Ahrens and Chapman (2006) point out, the same 
results should not be expected when two different researchers study the same organisation but 
we would rather expect their descriptions to be compatible, where the conclusion drawn by one 
person should not contradict that of the other. Hence, agreeing with the suggestions made by 
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Ahrens and Chapman (2006), Scapens (2004) is of the view that interpretive case studies should 
follow procedural reliability (where the correct and reliable research method and procedures are 
followed) and contextual validity. A proper research plan was developed for the study in order to 
pursue procedural reliability. Nearly all of the interviews that were conducted were recorded and 
transcribed. Field notes were also taken in addition to gathering further evidence from 
documents and informal discussions. The aim is to show reliability in the eventual findings, such 
that if the same procedure was followed by another researcher, the same/similar results will be 
obtained. Ryan et al. (2002) see the triangulation of research as very useful in achieving 
contextual validity. The aim of triangulation is to enrich the understanding of the researcher by 
collecting data on the same issue from alternative sources. As mentioned above, this study uses 
semi-structured interviews, informal discussion and documentation in order to achieve some sort 
of contextual validity. 
 
Fourth is the identification and explanation of various patterns found. For more details on this 
step, see Section 5.5. The researcher was able to identify and explain key patterns found during 
the study. Miles and Huberman’s (1994) data analysis method was adopted in the study. The 
data analysis method consists of three complementary flows of activities: data reduction, data 
display and conclusion drawing and verification, as further explained in Section 5.6 below. 
 
The fifth step is about theory development. Scapens (1990) suggests that in cases where existing 
theories cannot be used to justify or explain the research, a modification of existing theories can 
be embraced to suit the new areas under investigation. The study has therefore modified some 
existing institutional theories and has also done so following some suggestions/contributions 
from the existing literature. 
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The last step to be followed is writing up the thesis. At this point the case results and findings are 
discussed; making sure it is authentic, plausible and critical.   
 
5.4 Data Collection 
5.4.1 Preparation: Review of Literature 
In line with preparing for data collection, a substantial literature was critically reviewed in order 
to gain in-depth knowledge on the area to be researched and identify questions that should be 
investigated and collect adequate data to enable these questions to be answered. After thoroughly 
and carefully reviewing the relevant literature in the area, interview questions were framed in 
such a way as to cover both the areas that were mentioned in the literature and those lacking 
from the literature. Hence, the initial review of existing literature served as a foundation for the 
research findings and also shaped the transcription and interpretation of the data. 
5.4.2 Preparation: Access Negotiation/ Research Technique 
Before collecting the data, access was negotiated with the case study organisation. The 
researcher was able to leverage informal contacts with key people in the case organisation to 
arrange formal access for the study. Final access was granted for the study after presenting a 
letter from the University introducing the research and the objectives of the study.  
5.4.3 Preparation: Ethical process 
The study went through the University of Birmingham ethical review process. This required the 
submission of an ethics application to the University ethics committee detailing what ethical 
issues are likely to be faced during the study and how these issues will be handled. The ethics 
process also required the submission of the interview guide and participant information sheet. 
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5.4.4 Conducting: Data Collection/ Ethical issues 
Interviews are one of the main social science data collection methods. Information in the case is 
obtained mainly by asking a variety of questions from different contexts through direct 
interaction between the researcher and the participant (Saunders et al., 2006; Mathews and Ross, 
2010). Data for the study was collected through semi-structured interviews, informal discussions 
and documentation. The triangulation of data collection helps to strengthen the research internal 
validity (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The data collection instrument was carefully designed to 
gather information about the case study firm, its context, accounting and accountability practices 
and the various changes that occurred in the organisation.  
 
Semi-structured interviews usually follow a common set of interview questions, but these 
questions may be introduced in different ways to best fit the situation and allow participants to 
approach these questions in their own way, using their own words. This approach is particularly 
important as these participants have experience and practical knowledge in the area under 
investigation. Structured interviews were considered inappropriate because these would have 
asked questions in exactly the same way using the same words and presenting lists of answers 
from which the participant can choose, thereby limiting the flexibility of the study (Mathews and 
Ross, 2010).  
 
The semi-structured interviews were conducted face to face and by telephone. The researcher 
spent four months in the field to gather rich sets of data from the case study MFI. The semi-
structured interviews were held with employee, regulators, Board members, and clients of the 
organisation. A purposive sampling technique was used to select participants. The participants 
chosen were those who had knowledge and some experience in the topic area under research, 
especially regarding with the changes that had taken place within the organisation. This was 
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done based on lists provided by the organisation of employee members who had worked there 
for at least two years, and this was double checked during the interview.  
Only three branches and the head office were visited due to cost and time constraints. The clients 
were informed through the client care representative and those who were willing to participate 
were interviewed at their branches. Some clients preferred to have informal discussions and their 
decision was respected by the researcher. Regulators were notified/ informed through a letter 
seeking an appointment sent on the researcher’s behalf by the general manager of the case study 
organisation.  
 
Just before the interviews were conducted, participants were given consent and participant 
information sheets (see Appendix) which stated and explained their roles and that of the 
researcher, what was expected from them, and what the research is about. The interview only 
started once the participant had read and signed to confirm they were willing to participate. The 
interview lasted on average one and half hours, most of which was recorded with the 
participant’s signed consent. The semi-structured interview gave both the interviewer and 
interviewee an opportunity to express their opinions at any time during the interview process, 
thus an opportunity for both parties to remain open minded. New questions based on the answers 
from the interviewees were asked (probing).  
 
The atmosphere was made such that there could be freedom of opinion. The researcher was 
provided with a quiet room where the interview took place. They were conducted on a one-to-
one basis (just the interviewer and the interviewee). These made the participants feel at ease to 
express their opinions and share their observations about the case study organisation. Overall, 49 
people were interviewed besides informal discussions. Among these 49 participants, 1 was a 
regulator, 1 a supervisory representative, 2 were board members/ shareholders, 25 head office 
employee, 9 branch employee and 11 clients. At any point when the researcher felt the interview 
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question was not well framed or did not suit the participant, the question was either dropped or 
modified to suit the interviewee. On many occasions probing took place during the interview, 
after explaining issues of confidentiality at the beginning through the use of the participant 
information sheet. Forty-five of the interviews were audio recoded with accompanying notes. 
Four participants refused to have their interviews recorded, which was complied with by the 
researcher for ethical reasons.  
Participants who refused to have their interviews recorded confirmed the main reason to be that 
they were not comfortable with the tapes, and in such cases notes were taken exhaustively. Notes 
were also taken in order to complement the recording. These notes helped the researcher to 
prepare follow-up questions and probe further in order to capture some issues under 
investigation and facilitate data analysis. The interviewer decided to end the interview when the 
participant did not seem to know anything about the questions being asked, the reason being that 
some participants were new to the case organisation or had refused to acquire knowledge in 
certain areas. Even though the participant information sheet (see Appendix) stated that the 
interview would last for a maximum of 30 minutes, some participants’ interviews extended to 
90minutes and above due to probing and the fact that these participants wanted to explain 
themselves more. This was permitted by the interviewee while maintaining the right ethics. 
 
The researcher noticed that many key organisational employee who were in a better position to 
talk about the changes that had occurred in the organisation, especially changes that impacted on 
the firm’s accounting and accountability practices, could not be traced (they had resigned or 
been dismissed). This presented some challenges but was overcome with the use of evidence 
from other sources such as documents. The interviews were held at different 
organisational/management levels in order to obtain a complete true picture of the nature of the 
MFI’s accounting and accountability practices.  
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Furthermore, data was also collected through informal discussions. 13 informal discussions were 
held with 8 employee members and 5 clients. These informal discussions were mostly arranged 
between the participant and the researcher with negotiating help and consent from higher 
authorities within the organisation. This followed a purposive sampling technique, where 
participants with experience, knowledge and opinions on the research topic were chosen. The 
researcher was given a list by the DGM in charge of operations and control, from which the 
researcher conducted the discussion based on those who were willing and had time to do so. The 
longest discussions lasted for about 2 hours 30 minutes. Documentary evidence was gathered 
from the organisation’s documents such as annual/semester reports, flyers, brochures, job 
descriptions, minutes of meetings and other publications. Problems such as participants failing to 
turn up, postponing interviews and incomplete interviews due to urgent meetings led to further 
rescheduling to suit the participants.  
 
Questions about and around the changes in the case study’s accounting and accountability 
practices were mostly directed to the employee concerned (especially the accounting 
department). After exhausting the period for which the field work was scheduled, contact details 
were taken from some participants for follow-up interviews. These were conducted through 
Skype, the telephone and by email, to clarify certain issues within the study area. 
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FIGURE 5.3: Data Collection Triangle  
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5.5 Data Collation/Analysis 
The process of ordering and making sense from large sets of data is referred to as data analysis 
(Marshall and Rossman, 2010). Modes of qualitative data analysis usually provide the means to 
explore and interpret meaningful patterns identified from data collected in a piece of research 
(Mile et al., 2013). Meanings can only be determined following the research aims and objectives 
and guided by the research question(s).  
 Different scholars have argued that this stage in conducting research particularly in using case 
study research design is very difficult and challenging (see for example Miles and Huberman, 
1994; Yin, 2003). Various approaches have been suggested in analysing qualitative research 
including thematic, discourse, textual, content analysis, all corresponding to the type of data, 
DATA COLLECTION 
• Documentation 
• Informal discussions 
• Semi-structured interviews 
(recorded and non-recorded) 
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disciplinary tradition, objectives and philosophical assumptions underpinning that research 
(Mathews and Ross, 2010). Robson (1993) argues that the main trick as to which data analysis 
method to use lies in the type of research questions to be answered. He adds that for trustworthy 
answers to be generated, the analysis has to treat the evidence fairly without any bias of any sort: 
there must be some degree of rigour in the analysis especially when analysing qualitative data. 
Following Robson’s (1993) argument, a thematic data analysis method was adopted.  
Thematic analysis seeks to uncover the themes that are hidden in a text at various levels and 
facilitate the structuring and depiction of these themes. A “thematic analysis is a process 
working with raw data to identify and interpret key ideas or themes” (Mathews and Ross, 2010: 
373). Thematic analysis is all about segmenting, categorising and rethinking different angles of 
the data before drawing final conclusions. What the qualitative study intends to do is to 
understand, interpret and be able to explain the words and stories of all participants and the 
information gathered from documents. This implies describing the data, deducing the meaning 
out of it and exploring (answering the why and how questions) the data for meaning or 
information (Mathews and Ross, 2010; Miles et al., 2013).  
In order to undertake a good rigorous thematic analysis, different approaches have been further 
suggested in the literature. Most notable are those of Miles and Huberman (1994); Yin (2003) 
and Miles et al. (2013), who attempt to achieve a corresponding degree of rigor in qualitative 
data analysis. Miles and Huberman’s (1994) framework has been adopted in the study. 
According to Miles and Huberman (1994), data reduction refers to the process of choosing, 
focusing, sampling, abstracting and transforming data from field work, tapes, etc., into 
transcripts. The data reduction process started at the early stages of fieldwork, when the 
researcher undertook sample/material selection, focused on the target case/groups and research 
questions. The researcher also conducted some simplification of terms in the interview 
questions, explaining to the participants what some of these terms meant. This was followed by 
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the transformation of data into field notes and interview transcripts. These transcripts, field notes 
and tapes were then restudied carefully, reflected upon and remarks made. Possible emergent 
themes from field notes and interview transcripts were noted. Participants were contacted for 
follow-up when needed. It took the researcher four months to collate the data collected ready for 
analysis. All interviews were transcribed and coded within the four month period.  
 
The process of coding then followed, whereby broad codes were initially produced based on the 
questions under investigation and data gathered. As the research process continued, these broad 
codes were narrowed down into sub-codes and at the end of the data analysis 33 codes were 
produced. The transcription and coding were conducted both manually using Microsoft Word 
and Excel and using the qualitative data analysis software NVivo to help arrange the data. The 
manual transcription and some coding was done in order to give the researcher the opportunity to 
feel, understand and become more familiar with the data for better interpretation/ analysis. The 
NVivo software was used to show clearly the categorisation/organisation of the data for clearer 
and better interpretation/analysis.  
 
The study was conducted in both the English and French-speaking regions of Cameroon, so 
some interviews were conducted in French and some in English. For fear of losing data, the 
French interviews were not translated as such as the researcher understands French (No need for 
an external translator). Emerging themes were identified as a result of continuously reviewing 
the interview transcripts, field notes and documents gathered in the field. The emerging themes 
that were in French were translated into English to match the other English ones. The researcher 
attempted to identify convergent and divergent views of various participants and/or from 
documents.  
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In line with Miles and Huberman’s (1994) framework, data display is the second phase of 
qualitative data analysis. This phase goes beyond data reduction to organise, compress and 
transform data into information that allows conclusion drawing. A display could mean an 
extended piece of text, diagram or chart that gives a new way of conceptualising textual data. 
The data display can either be in words or in a diagrammatic format that will permit the analyst 
to easily extrapolate meanings from the data to start creating systematic patterns or 
interrelationships. Further higher categories of themes might emerge at the data display stage. In 
the study, the various data sets gathered were further organised and displayed in diagrams, charts 
and tables for further analysis. The data display was performed using Microsoft Word and Excel.  
 
Finally, at the conclusion drawing level, the researcher needs to step back and see what the 
analysed data means and its implications, given the research questions under investigation. 
Verification means revisiting the data frequently and cross-checking to see if the emerging 
conclusion actually follows what the data says. The “meanings emerging from the data have to 
be tested for their plausibility, their sturdiness, ‘confirmability’ or validity” (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994: 11).  
 
The validity issue takes us to the next section on research credibility. Conclusions were drawn 
following the data collected, emerging themes and analysis. Verification was made by revisiting 
the data sets many times, listening to tapes frequently, going through the field notes, studying 
emerging themes and so on. The conclusions drawn followed the patterns, themes and categories 
identified. Explanations of the results stemmed from linking the findings with the modified 
theory in the theoretical framework of the thesis (Chapter 4). 
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5.6 Research Credibility  
The value of social science research is usually owing to its degree of validity (internal validity), 
reliability and generalisability (external validity) (Johnson et al., 2006). Credibility aims at 
making sure that the subject of the enquiry has been well identified, described and explained 
(Robson, 1993). In order to ensure that the findings, interpretations and conclusions drawn from 
a study are credible and trustworthy, the research issues of validity and reliability cannot be 
ignored. Research validity owes more to the manner in which we interpret our data, while 
reliability looks at the manner in which data was collected and if a study repeated by different 
people following the same setting and using the same data collection methods arrives at the same 
conclusions. Lukka and Modell (2010) clearly define validity as making sure readers are 
convinced about the authenticity of the research, at the same time ensuring that the explanations 
from the research are deemed plausible.  
These two issues cannot be discussed separately. If data was poorly collected it will not be 
reliable and thus the interpretations will not be valid. Thus, the degree to which research findings 
are accurately interpreted is referred to as research validity. 
Internal validity relates to issues of research design: it focuses on the question is the research 
design arriving at the conclusions that we claim it arrives at? The validity of the measures used 
in the study also needs to be evaluated (De Vaus, 2001). The triangulation of data, as with the 
case in this study, helps to enhance research credibility. Data collected from semi-structured 
interviews, informal discussion and documentation enhances the understanding of the research 
area and the case, hence making the study more internally valid. External validity on the other 
hand refers to the level of generalisability of the results beyond the study to include other similar 
studies, while internal validity only applies to a particular study/investigation (De Vaus, 2001).  
Content validity looks at how the well the measures tap the different aspects under investigation, 
whereas construct validity examines how well the results obtained from the study suit or fit the 
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theoretical framework. The study has been able to achieve not only internal validity, as argued 
above, but also content and construct validity. External validity is somewhat wanting in the 
study, as the changes that occur in the particular case study cannot be the same in another case 
study or country: this is a limitation of case study research (Hakim, 1992; De Vaus, 2001). The 
idea that research is valuable when the same results can be reproduced in another similar 
study/context is true in quantitative studies with a positivistic approach where there is objective 
reality. However, qualitative studies with an interpretive approach like the case in this study see 
reality as being constructed, and can be reconstructed given changes inherent in the environment. 
Meanings are seen in the case to be changing with time. Thus, generalising the case study results 
will not be valid here. Reliability is:  
The extent to which results are consistent over time and an accurate representation of 
the total population under study is referred to as reliability and if the results of a study 
can be reproduced under a similar methodology, then the research instrument is 
considered to be reliable. (Joppe, 2000:1)  
 
De Vaus (2001) adds, “a reliable measure is that which gives the same reading when used on 
repeated occasions” (p. 30). It is worth noting here that research credibility owing to reliability 
and validity may vary from one study to another depending on the study’s philosophical 
assumptions, methodology and theoretical underpinnings. Thus, imposing particular criteria to 
follow in order to evaluate research credibility, particularly in qualitative studies, may be 
misleading. 
 
5.7 Chapter Summary 
The chapter has discussed issues on various philosophical assumptions and methodological and 
ethical issues. The discussion on the philosophical assumptions underpinning social science 
research focused on accounting and was followed by the research methodology, where the 
research approach and strategy were discussed. The chapter then narrowed down to look at the 
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research methods used in social science, mentioning various research design and adopting a case 
study approach, explaining why this suited the study. It further looked at the practicality of doing 
the research in terms of data collection: preparation, the field work process and after field work. 
It concluded by discussing the credibility of the research, exploring issues around research 
validity and reliability. 
 
It has been emphasised in the chapter that the word 'qualitative' should not be used as a synonym 
for 'interpretive', which are often confused. Qualitative research may or may not be interpretive, 
depending on the underlying philosophical assumptions of the researcher in the study. 
Qualitative research can not only be interpretive, it could be positivist or critical. The chapter has 
pointed out that the choice of research method is independent of its underlying philosophical 
standpoint: case study research might not be interpretive but could also follow a positivist or 
critical approach. These three philosophical perspectives have been discussed within the chapter. 
The next chapter looks at the case study environment which might impact on the institution, 
resulting in changes. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CSMFI’S ACCOUNTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY PRACTICES 
 
6.0 Introduction 
 
In order to understand the nature of CSMFI’s4 accountability practices (in line with its mission 
and objectives), it is argued that such practices cannot be understood separately from its 
accounting system. Such accounting and accountability practices in organisations like MFIs have 
further been argued to have been shaped by internal and/or external pressures (Robert and 
Scapens, 1996; Burns and Scapens, 2000; Dillard et al., 2004; Tsamenyi et al., 2006). The 
chapter first looks at the overview of CSMFI and then further analyses the case study’s 
accounting and accountability practices under sub-headings of the external, internal and social 
environment. 
  
The chapter is divided into eight sections. Following the introduction, the chapter begins with 
the case context, which also attempts to understand the type of products and services that CSMFI 
offers in line with its mission in order to assess whether it actually alleviates poverty as it is 
thought of in the literature. The chapter also seeks to understand the concept of accountability 
according to CSMFI. The third section discusses the nature of CSMFI’s internal control and 
internal accountability system. The fourth section focuses on the external environment to do with 
external control and external accountability practices surrounding CSMFI. The firth section is on 
the social sphere, where social control and the social nature of accountability practices in CSMFI 
are explored. Last comes the chapter summary. 
                                                          
4 Anonymised for confidentiality purposes 
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6.1 The Case Context  
CSMFI is one of Cameroon’s fastest-growing MFIs5. The company started as an association in 
the early 2000s but later converted into a Co-operative Society.6 CSMFI as an organisation was 
initiated by a group of Cameroonians from a particular small village. These individuals had 
different experiences and various professional backgrounds. The idea to set up the organisation 
was brought up in the early 2000s, when the concept of microfinance was still new and warmly 
received in Cameroon. The original members are today either part of CSMFI’s BOD or 
shareholders. Initially, they formed an association with the aim of assisting individual poor 
farmers with farming products within the local village. As time went by, the association thought 
it wise to extend a helping hand to other neighbouring villages. One of the pioneers of CSMFI 
and also a member of the BOD commented on the rationale for setting up the organisation 
We just learnt about the concept at that time and as Christians who wanted to respect 
one of the Ten Commandments that say you should love your neighbour as yourself, 
we decided to help the poor farmers in our village and later on expanded to other 
neighbouring villages and today in urban areas offering lots of products and services. 
 
In a bid to continuously assist these rural farmers, the association decided to move to urban 
areas, where they could seek funding for their project from rich urban dwellers. While seeking 
funds, they discovered that there are also poor people resident in urban areas and thus decided to 
extend their ‘financial hand’ to such areas. The DGM added that; 
After a year of embracing the urban regions, CSMFI became a co-operative society 
and was classified under Category 1, following the classification structure of MFIs in 
Cameroon . That is, CSMFI was accredited in early 2000 and officially registered to 
start functioning as an MFI in late 2000. CSMFI today is part of an association of 
MFIs in Cameroon known as ANEMCAM. 
 
 ANEMCAM is charged with providing general information on all MFIs within the CEMAC 
zone and in Cameroon particularly. Over the years, CSMFI has continuously grown bigger, 
employing more Cameroonians and embracing different objectives and missions which have 
                                                          
5From CSMFI’s website not reference for ethical (confidential) reasons 
6 See Table 2.2 for a guide to the various categories of MFIs. The researcher could not get the document to proof the 
classification of MFI  in Cameroon so relied on interview quotes. 
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changed some of the structures and processes of the organisation (as will be discussed later in the 
chapter). To sum up, CSMFI, is today in the process of becoming a Category 27 MFI (with a 
focus on becoming a fully-fledged bank).  
 
CSMFI, besides poverty alleviation, also seeks to harness the power of its human capital 
integrated in its mission in order to build a financially sound world-class institution and promote 
the development of Cameroon’s economy. CSMFI has more than 100 employee delivering 
financial services to its customers. CSMFI embarks on employee training; development 
opportunities that will in turn provide an empowering and motivating work environment. The 
Human Resource Manager confirmed this statement, adding that, 
We make sure we employ young talented experienced people who can easily digest 
our trainings and use their expertise knowledge to implement them. This will solve 
the problem we have been having where old employee get trained but tend not to 
implement such trainings for some low educational level, pioneer employee or 
cultural organisational reasons amongst others. Employing our young talented 
citizens with open minds will make it easy for us to train them. This way we will not 
be spending money on such indirect costs in vain. This is usually the case where we 
cannot get already banking trained employee. 
 
CSMFI is one of those financial institutions that aim at maintaining a diverse, resourceful and 
dynamic workforce while at the same time providing customers with quality services (through 
training employee to their best levels of client service, for example). In a bid to maintain a 
diverse workforce, CSMFI aims to become the first 100% bilingual bank in Cameroon. The 
Board Chairman added that, 
In order to succeed we believe in embarking on sourcing, attracting, developing and 
retaining the best talents. We provide an environment that identifies, encourages, and 
rewards excellence, innovation and quality client service. Besides focusing on our 
customers, we embark on developing our main assets – our employees. 
 
 
                                                          
7Owned by members and non-members and operate like micro- banks (see Fotabong, 2012). The categorisation of 
MFIs in Cameroon where CSMFI falls does not follow the categorisation according to Lafourcade et al. (2005) and 
Greuning et al. (1998), as discussed in Section 2.3. 
  
154 
 
He further reiterated that,  
CSMFI is the most diverse and international microfinance in Cameroon, welcoming 
people from different cultural backgrounds. However, English and French are the 
main official languages spoken at CSMFI. Also, our workforce is 46% female 
following our belief that a mixed workforce gives us an upper hand in meeting our 
ever changing customers’ needs. 
 
CSMFI adopts a holistic approach to investment, giving it the advantage of benefiting from 
operational synergies and efficiencies and in effect realising its business expansion plans.  
Since its creation, CSMFI has had changes in its missions over the years. The MFI started as an 
association with the mission of extending a financial hand to poor people within the local 
community. After succeeding in achieving this mission, the association expanded its financial 
services to other neighbouring villages (rural areas) with the mission/vision of becoming a 
cooperative8 in the near future. It later became a cooperative or Category 1 MFI in which the 
urban areas (urban poor people) were also visited. During the years of operating as a Category 1 
MFI, CSMFI had the vision of becoming a formal financial institution, especially when it was 
formally accepted to operate as a Category 2 MFI.  
In line with such a formal finance (banking) mission, today CSMFI is in transition to becoming a 
fully and officially recognised Category 2 MFI. CSMFI’s present mission of transforming into a 
fully-fledged modern bank with strategic partnerships has impacted on its organisational and 
governance structure, which is discussed later in the chapter. Despite the continuous drift 
(change) in CSMFI’s mission, the organisation today still embarks on creating wealth and 
contributing to the improvement of the sustainable livelihoods of its members. This shows that 
the future of CSMFI might be more challenging, especially as competition is becoming stiffer, 
with several foreign and local banks operating in the country. CSMFI’s strategy for the coming 
years therefore takes into consideration both the potential opportunities offered by a booming 
sector and the real challenges faced by the banking industry. Today, CSMFI is taking some 
                                                          
8 a type of MFI, see Chapter 2 for more details. 
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measures on how to remain competitive and adapt to various environmental (market) changes. In 
order for the organisation to remain competitive, it has decided to embrace the general public 
and started moving from operating just as a microfinance organisation to operating more like a 
bank in a bid to accomplish its mission of becoming a banking institution in the near future.  
In line with the company’s mission, the Head of the Marketing Department in the 2012 
marketing and research report pointed out several things that the company has attempted to do in 
order to accomplish their mission: 
… everywhere we find ourselves, we make efforts to be known for the good 
price/quality ratio of our services. We capitalise on that awareness and do what’s 
necessary to create further awareness nationwide. It is in that light that it is believed 
that the success of any marketing strategy lies in the strength and integrity of the 
products and services offered and the brand elements.  
 
Furthermore, 
There is a need to have more investment in publicity and marketing and useful 
content and features on the website. There should also be some work done on the 
face view of our branches, many of which still need renovations and all need new 
sign boards. This would make our sales points more marketable. The website and 
various adverts could then stand as vehicles for promoting our services and facilities. 
Once these things are worked out, marketing CSMFI would be relatively simple and 
inexpensive. 
 
The report also talked about gaining the confidence and trust of customers gradually over the 
years, and ensured that communication is being conducted properly, both internally and 
externally, when the need arises.  
 
CSMFI today is charged with the provision of financial services and providing reliable, efficient 
and trustworthy solutions to its customers, who it claims are the poor. For example, CSMFI helps 
customers to set up their own business or increase their profits in their already existing business. 
This implies that CSMFI operates a reverse methodology to that of the formal financial sector 
(including banks). One BOD member pointed out that: 
Traditional formal finance or banking sector operates on the idea that more is given 
to those who have more and nothing to those who have nothing, but we do not 
  
156 
 
operate on this basis. We are out to give more to those who have less or to the less 
privileged in terms of finance and social support. 
 
At CSMFI, credit is seen as a human right where honest people who possess nothing are given 
priority. CSMFI’s aim is to explore and groom the potential of their customers and not exploit 
their possessions. This confirms what the Managing Director said:  
At CSMFI we see our Customers as opportunities not burdens and the belief here is 
that people including the poor are blessed with endless potential, the reason why we 
do not focus on assessing customers’ material possessions but their potential and 
groom them in our own way. 
 
Like the Grameen bank of Bangladesh with its social mission (Bateman, 2010), CSMFI from its 
creation was geared towards poverty alleviation, targeting mostly rural farmers. They originally 
aimed at farmers and other low income earners in villages who they could lend to in order to 
enable them to finance their social mission. After two small-scale operational years in the mid-
2000s, CSMFI started moving towards becoming an agricultural MFI cooperative, still focusing 
on farmers and small-scale traders referred to in Cameroon as ‘buyam-sellams’ amongst many 
other client groups. By the late 2000s, the focus and vision of CSMFI had started changing to 
include financial sustainability (long-term finances). CSMFI then began to pursue its financial 
sustainability objective with the idea of becoming a commercial microfinance. Dorado (2013) 
argued that it is at this point that MFIs become focused on profitability. This is especially true 
with CSMFI after it gained its accreditation. CSMFI further expanded its branches to include 
some in urban areas, still targeting both the poor and middle income groups (members and non-
members: the general public) even though in theory today operating as a Category 1 MFI 
(serving only members). The idea of moving from being a MFI with solely a social mission to 
one which includes both social and profitability missions was in order to remain financially 
sustainable and in return finance small and medium sized businesses and reach the poor with its 
financial services. In this way, long-term finances are assured and continuously help the poor to 
improve their standards (more under the dual mission and objective argument). In a nutshell, 
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CSMFI in practice serves both members and non-members, thus operating informally9 as a 
Category 2 MFI.  
The poverty alleviation objective of CMFI agrees with what the Board Chairman said in the mid-
2000 annual report after appreciating their customers, employee, shareholders and the state for 
their efforts towards the success of CSMFI: 
Our main objective is to provide the poorest with financial services that will help 
them fight against poverty, stay profitable and financially sound. We believe in and 
aim at a poverty-free world. 
Diverse views were expressed during the interviews about what interviewees think the objective 
of the organisation is. It became evident that the views of the interviewees were based on the 
changes that they had seen the organisation going through over the years. Despite differences in 
opinion, it can however be noted that the majority of the interviewees were still of the opinion 
that the objective of CSMFI is primarily poverty alleviation.  
The Marketing Manager, for example, unequivocally pointed out that, “CSMFI aims at poverty 
alleviation, employment and the financing of projects”. One of the internal auditors said, 
CSMFI provide loans to poor sector and embrace world round customers including 
the rich in order to raise capital. Thus the objective of CSMFI is to make profit 
besides growth and poverty alleviation. 
These views are consistent with the arguments in the microfinance literature that the key 
objective of MFIs is to reach low-income, poor and excluded people with financial services, 
leading to an increase in income and standards (Hammill et al, 2008; Parikh, 2006; Rhyne, 
2001). However, even though poverty alleviation remains the publicised objective of CSMFI up 
until today, in practice however profitability has become a major focus, with poverty alleviation 
being relegated to the background.  
One of the Board of Directors members pointed out that, 
                                                          
9 Application not yet approved as at 2013 but submitted for approval to COBAC and MINFIN. 
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Our main objective is to assist those with limited finance - the poor, and in the 
process of doing so we also want to be profitable and encourage people to save more, 
this will give us more room to make profits and grow. 
 
The Head of Risk Management was of the view that CSMFI has many objectives, mainly: 
Efficient and rapid services to society, alleviation of poverty through the creation of 
wealth, financial micro projects with the aim of promoting small and medium size 
enterprises, encourages customers to save through attractive increase rates and out 
for development projects through the provision of funds through loans to customers 
and indirectly to non- customers. 
 
One of the branch customers interviewed added,  
I don’t know the objectives of CSMFI but think they are out to make profits as they 
no longer come to collect our little savings like when they started. My friend who 
works in the bank tells me how the marketing agents from CSMFI come to his 
house or sometimes his business place encouraging him to save and reduce his 
transportation cost. They visit him and collect the money he intends to set aside for 
savings and save it at CSMFI for their future use. 
  
It could be argued at this point that CSMFI now combines dual objectives of social development 
through provision of financial services to the poor and profitability objectives that lead to self-
sufficiency and sustained services. This conforms the argument for dual mission argued by 
Hermes et al. (2011), who are of the view that microfinance’s commercialisation objective may 
bring it greater amount of funds, which can be used in assisting the poor who cannot afford to 
bank with banks, thus increasing the outreach goal of such MFIs. This implies that the amount of 
loans provided to these poor customers will increase and for a longer secured period of time, 
unlike when they receive funds from foreign aid bodies which might not be guaranteed long-term 
funding for the MFI. This being the case, efficiency is assured and more poor people can access 
the services of the MFI. It is in such scenarios as the case may be with CSMFI that outreach, 
financial sustainability and efficiency remain compatible objectives.  
 
CSMFI has also demonstrated its social contribution by embarking on providing educational, 
health and other social support through loans and other projects. CSMFI has a section under the 
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Human Resource Department known as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) where all social 
engagement projects are carried out. Customers with health issues can, for example, apply for 
speedy loans, which usually have lower rates of interest and a quicker approval process. There 
are also loans set out to support customers who want to start up a business and many more, as 
later discussed in chapter. 
CSMFI also carries out educational campaigns in order to sensitise the community about the 
services it renders. This is geared towards motivating low-income earners to be able to save 
regularly, borrow wisely and repay promptly. CSMFI’s dual objective therefore strives to 
balance its social and financial objectives.  
CSMFI has new banking software that permits it to carry out timely, fast and accurate 
transactions within the country and oversee new products such as Western Union Money transfer 
and other organisational restructuring. CSMFI also offers a wide range of other products and 
services that help to foster its growth. These products and services offered by CSMFI clearly 
show how it has moved from solely poverty alleviation objectives to include that of profitability, 
especially when the different account types are examined. These product and service types are 
further discussed in the next section. 
The dual objective argument with a drift from the original and to the up-to-date documented 
mission is supported by the comments of the Head of Client (Retail) and Client Care (General). 
He pointed out, 
CSMFI has a dual objective of poverty alleviation and financial sustainability. The 
missions of CSMFI were initially more customers orientated (poverty alleviation in 
terms of outreach) but now more commercial orientated, making profits even though 
not stated in the books. In theory CSMFI has a sole objective of poverty alleviation. 
Well to me all I need do is perform my duties and maintain my job no matter the 
objective of the MFI. We can only make suggestions but cannot make decisions and 
whatever the decision from top management is, we follow it even if you are of the 
opinion or not.  
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Furthermore, a member of the Board of Directors pointed out during the interview that, 
Even though we are seeking to make profits, we are also striving to achieve our 
initially stated objective of poverty alleviation. This is reflected in a glance at our 
client base which clearly shows that we have got all sorts of customers, the majority 
of who come from the lower base with lower spectrum of business. That is people 
earning between 30,000 FRS10 and 50,000 FRS. Thus, by empowering this class 
financially I think we are already helping to reduce the level of poverty in our 
society. However we also strive to make profits by bringing the rich to bank with us 
in order to remain competitive in today’s business environment where MFIs are 
adding up on daily basis while some are closely down due partially or mainly due to 
the fact that they are not financially viable. 
 
Furthermore, the stated values of CSMFI remain respect for individuals, responsiveness and 
accountability, accessibility, confidentiality, convenience and safety. The products and services 
offered by CSMFI solely depend on its objectives and mission at the time.  
6.1.1 CSMFI’s Mission vs. Products and Services  
In line with its sole objective of poverty alleviation, the main products offered by CSMFI in the 
early 2000s (as an association) were agricultural products and small loans to help farmers 
improve their crops. By the mid-2000s, when CSMFI became a cooperative, it offered many 
other services and products in addition to these agricultural products and loans to include 
training programmes tailored for farmers and small-scale traders in order to improve farmers’ 
farm products or small businesses. The aim here was not just business improvement but also 
improvement in standard of living from the intended gains or profits. Insurance and payment for 
services (including daily collection (‘dayness’11 and ‘futuris’12), money transfers and deposits) 
were also introduced to help farmers and small traders.  
 
By 2010, when CSMFI included profitability (long-term financial sustainability) to its social 
(poverty alleviation) mission, more and different additional products and services were offered. 
                                                          
10 Where, £1 = 755.97 CFA as at 22/03/13 on http://www.ukforex.co.uk/currency-converter 
11 Very small amounts of money saved on daily basis and available for withdrawal at any time. As little as 50 pence 
a day to help the poor save against future projects. Charges apply. 
12 Like dayness, but can only be withdrawn after an agreed length of time, the minimum being six months. No 
interest paid and no charges apply. 
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These new products included international money transfers, the provision of bank (debit and 
credit) cards, online banking services and different improved quality services such as improved 
client services. 
 
The National Accountant, who is now the Assistant General Manager in charge of Operations, 
pointed out in the 2010 annual report: 
2010: The year of marketing and image building. In a bid to reduce the incidence of 
administrative costs on overall turnover the institution has recently created a first 
class service centre.  
 
The head office acts as the service centre, with the aim of providing first class high- quality 
services to the larger customers of CSMFI (CSMFI’S annual report, 2010). CSMFI continues to 
embark on credit opportunities via granting overdrafts, express credit, speedy loans and normal 
loans. In a bid to create wealth during this period, CSMFI further embarked on the financing of 
micro projects and providing other financial services to their customers. This can be argued to be 
a way to promote the country’s developmental projects and enhance growth. This conforms to 
what the Head of the Marketing Department at the head office said; 
… we are out to promote extraordinary growth as stated on our flyers and we make 
sure we do things that will give the organisation this stated value. 
 
As an advocate of economic development and growth, CSMFI aims at growing along with its 
customers. This is the reason why CSMFI embarks on identifying their priority customers with a 
strategy known as ‘know your client’ (KYC). This strategy is important not only to select the 
right group of customers but also to be able to recover the loans entrusted to them. Thus, 
knowing the repayment capacity of customers and not their securities offered has in recent times 
always been the emphasis of the General Manager to the credit department.  
 
Furthermore, CSMFI hopes to realise its objectives by engaging in the provision of normal retail 
banking services, including savings accounts, current/salary/business accounts, term deposit 
  
162 
 
account, and machine cash withdrawal services besides other services already mentioned such as 
online banking. One of the branch managers added: 
Cash withdrawal services via cash machines together with online and mobile 
banking services introduced at CSMFI are in a bid to remain a competitive in 
Cameroon especially as MFIs are rapidly growing here and seems to be the new 
order of the day. In this way we will be able to achieve our dual objectives of poverty 
alleviation through financial sustainability. Having said this, we are still working on 
our website and practices which recently have been giving customers lots of 
problems.  
 
International money transfer via Western Union services has been newly introduced in CSMFI 
even though it seems to be informal (still awaiting approval from the MINFIN and COBAC). 
CSMFI also offers assistance to micro projects through counselling and financing, cheque 
clearance and providing paper statements to their customers. Most of CSMFI’s customers seem 
to be happy with the services they offer and these services are usually what motivate them to join 
the organisation. This tally with what one client said; 
I was in a bank before which offered minimum of 2million FCFA but CSMFI offers 
products that fit my needs such as small loans and the process of getting it is easier 
than in the bank where I was. With CSMFI you can save as little as 500 FCFA or 
less per day and still get a loan on top of that together with other benefits. There is 
easy access to your money at CSMFI. You can request the money to be brought 
home to you with the MFI unlike with the bank. 
 
However, the majority of CSMFI’s products and services today are more focused towards 
targeting profitable customers. CSMFI embarks on financing small and medium size enterprises’ 
projects, but most of these projects are medium size businesses or financing big public contracts 
instead of concentrating on small businesses or private contracts (the poor). The fact that CSMFI 
lists one of its requirements for taking part in following up public contracts as for the client to 
have an account with any domestic bank shows clearly that CSMFI concentrates on high-income 
customers. This is because such formal financial institutions hardly ever open accounts for the 
low-income (poor) group. A full-time payslip from a job with a regular income above a certain 
level is required, which scares the poor off banking with such financial houses, particularly in 
Cameroon where MFIs have embraced them. Also, CSMFI has not until recently expanded its 
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network to include urban areas, where more branches are still to be opened as argued by the 
General Manager: 
It was pointed out at one of the recent annual general meetings that in order to 
remain financially stable and pursue our objectives, the network of CSMFI needs to 
be expanded and made known especially in urban areas where our target customers 
reside. 
 
Again, many savings account types operated by CSMFI cannot be opened by people who are not 
financially well-off (for example having a good paid job or involved in operating a medium or 
large business or owning valuable assets). The Head of Client Services added: 
One of the conditions to open a savings account is to show proof of income, assets or 
business ownership documents, as certain savings account are only run by people 
who can still boast of enough income after tax and disposable income. 
 
The Head of the Marketing Department added: 
In as much as we promote big companies and already started business projects, we 
do this because we want to grow. No business man is out to make losses but generate 
more profits which can be ploughed back in the business. Also because we are 
working towards becoming a bank we need to start performing like banking 
institutions, seeking big contracts and gaining more wealthy and retainable 
customers. 
 
A client of CSMFI also pointed out that:  
I don’t know the clear objectives of CSMFI as I was not told when my friend 
introduced me to the bank but think they are out to make profits because I get so 
many charges on my account especially when I save more. 
 
Even though the last interview quote also shows some degree of inadequate marketing or 
publicity from CSMFI, these are mostly people whom CSMFI for some reason cannot reach. The 
Assistant General Manager in charge of Operations added, 
…some of our customers are located in the interiors of some rural areas that we do 
not visit all the time due to the bad roads and network. However, this problem is 
currently being looked into.  
 
It is only recently that CSMFI has started improving on their level of advertisement 
(communication, education of employee and client, trainings, product development, etc.) in order 
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to remain competitive and in line with its missions. Table 6.1 shows how the products and 
services offered at CSMFI have changed over the years to reflect changes in their objectives and 
missions. 
 
TABLE 6.1: Basic Summary about CSMFI  
Yearly 
change 
CSMFI 
(Type) 
Mission(s) 
and Vision 
Objective(s) Geographica
l coverage 
Products and services Structure 
Early 
2000s 
(2000-
2002) 
Association Expansion  Poverty 
alleviation 
Rural areas Agricultural products 
(such as fertilizers, 
seeds, etc.) and small 
loans13 
Decentralised 
and informal 
Mid 
2000s 
(2002-
2008) 
Cooperativ
e (category 
1 MFI) 
Growth and 
expansion  
Poverty 
alleviation 
Rural and 
urban areas 
Deposits, medium size 
loans, funding of 
projects, national money 
transfers, daily collection 
and training 
programmes14  
Decentralised 
and informal 
Late 
2000s 
(2009- 
present) 
PLC 
(Category 2 
MFI) 
Formal 
finance (a 
bank) 
Poverty 
alleviation 
and Financial 
sustainability 
More rural 
and urban 
areas  
Online banking, cash 
machines, debit cards, 
online cheque clearance, 
international money 
transfer (western union) 
and improved or quality 
client service15 
Centralised 
and Formal 
 
The trend in changes to CSMFI’s objectives and missions has not only impacted the types of 
products and services offered by CSMFI but also CSMFI’s governance or organisational 
structure. There have been recent changes at CSMFI in terms of additions and modifications of 
existing functions, job descriptions and operations and reporting styles (see Chapter 7 for 
discussion of the change process). 
6.2 Understanding ‘Accountability’ 
CSMFI has a formal accountability system in place used to monitor and evaluate the 
organisation’s performance. This accountability system has more of a social nature, with internal 
                                                          
13 Basic and start up products and services 
14 In addition to footnote 8  
15 In addition to footnote 9 
  
165 
 
and external types and evidence of upward accountability. One of CSMFI’s most publicised 
values is “responsiveness and accountability” (CSMFI’s 2012 flyer). The study attempts to 
explore the meaning of accountability in the organisation and the evidence gathered revealed 
diverse interpretations of accountability. Generally, accountability has been construed in the 
organisation as justification of actions carried out in the organisation where a call memo16 is 
used in justifying such actions, usually from the branch to the head office, auditors or senior 
management. This form of accountability is compulsory, as officially stated in the job 
descriptions. Call memos are also intended for comments.  
However, views differ slightly across disciplines. For example, the views gathered from 
accountants suggest that accountability relates to: 
Reporting of one’s activities whereby actions are formally reported to top 
management and only justified to customers when need be. These reports and 
disclosures are done in the form of financial statements (usually consolidated at the 
end of the fiscal year) or weekly, monthly, quarterly and annual reports. These 
disclosures and reports are compulsory and usually for regulators, top management 
and shareholders. More often than not the reporting process is done with details 
making sure the parties concerned have a clearer understanding or picture of the 
organisational performance. 
 
For the Human Resource and Corporate Social Responsibility department, accountability takes a 
social dimension (social accountability). Accountability to them simply means justification of all 
corporate responsibilities carried out, with the relationship between the funders and customers 
emphasised. The Head of the Human Resource and CSR department added, 
As the word social responsibility goes it is the responsibility of employee and any 
other party in the network (to include customers) to justify through reports for 
example their social performance in given projects following certain laid down 
procedures. 
                                                          
16 A employee network where what went on during the day is shared and reported for each service. You can 
choose which employee you want to see what you have sent. Each memo carries details of what was discussed in 
each place. 
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At the general macro organisational level, the word accountability is generally understood to 
mean reporting, as reports remain the most frequently and intentionally used accountability 
mechanism in CSMFI. Thus, the terms accountability and reporting are used in the organisation 
interchangeably.  
CSMFI has different stakeholders to whom or and from whom accountability is due. These 
stakeholders include employee, the financial community, suppliers, customers, local 
communities, competitors, government/state, and other public organisations. The social 
accountability functions in CSMFI rest in the hands of the Human Resource and CSR 
department. Before 2013, this department was simply called the Human Resource department. In 
order to strengthen the social objective of CSMFI, its management made the suggestion to 
change the name if this department to a more social term. This suggestion was deliberated upon 
by senior management and approved for implementation by the general assembly. The head of 
CSR added that; “the change of name of the human resource department was in order to sell the 
image of CSMFI and have CSMFI’s impact felt by society”. CSMFI carries out various social 
projects in order to impact positively on society. The financial accountability responsibility of 
CSMFI in terms of producing the financial statements/ disclosure and end of year financial 
reports is mainly the work of the Accounting and Financial department. 
An integrated approach has been adopted in the following discussion on the nature of CSMFI’s 
accountability (financial and social) system, identifying and describing certain approaches used 
to assure good accountability. Different accountability mechanisms are identified and explained, 
to include social projects, disclosure statements, performance assessments and evaluations, rules 
and regulation, self-justification and social audits under the sub-headings of internal, external 
and social accountabilities.  
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 6.3 Internal Control and Internal Accountability  
The discussion here focuses on exploring the structure and internal accounting processes at 
CSMFI which are necessary for understanding their reporting and accountability system.  
6.3.1 CSMFI’s Governance Structure  
The COBAC law (latest version 2009/02) adopted in Cameroon in Article 1 requires every MFI 
to have accounting practices in place in order to provide information to both internal and 
external users.  
FIGURE 6.1 Accounting Departmental Structure of CSMFI 
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The accounting service prepares all of the management reports and accounting statements 
including budgets (back office functions) that are used by the institution in making decisions. 
They also perform front office duties, dealing with customers’ queries directly besides the client 
service, especially those queries to do with transactions on customers’ accounts. The Financial 
Controller, on the other hand, verifies the figures inputted to avoid errors, the GIS is charged 
with anything to do with the stocks and fixed assets of the company while the Treasurer 
evaluates the ratio of liquidity, prepares daily reports of the company’s liquidity situation and 
needs to finance the business, and what opportunities it can venture in the market (forecast). This 
is a vital service, as without cash CSMFI cannot function. 
At the time of its creation, CSMFI had no formal organisational or governance structure. The 
group of individuals saw themselves as equals from the same village. They were equally 
accountable to each other, especially when helping their village members with agricultural 
products and small loans which they drew from their small savings. The organisation expanded, 
registering an increase in both its client base and number of employee. These pioneers formed 
part of the company’s BOD and/or shareholders, followed by other senior managerial functions 
(branch managers, accountant and cashiers). The organisational structure was somehow 
decentralised, as most of the branches tailored their services to suit customers within the 
particular rural or urban area in which they operated. One of the BOD members who were 
present by the mid-2000s added that; 
... the structure of CSMFI around 2005 and 2006 was based on what the needs of the 
people were. Each branch had their own organisational structure which was 
structured depending on what functions were needed to meet the need of the 
customers in that particular branch area. Some branches gave priority to financing 
micro projects (farmers, ‘buyam-sellams’, etc.) while others focused on loans (to 
help families pay school fees, etc.). It was entirely up to the branch manager to 
decide how their branch would operate. CSMFI had decentralised practices from 
then until recently when, with the centralisation, all branches follow what they have 
been told by the head office and report to the head office by the close of each 
business cycle. 
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The year 2009 started with some adjustments and restructuring in CSMFI, giving birth to a new 
organisational chart showing new departments instituted and new services employed. The 
restructuring, besides giving CSMFI long-term financial stability, also arguably assisted in 
alleviating poverty through financial aid given to customers through social projects and loans. 
 
Besides the introduction the new organisational chart, the administrative affairs, control and 
external supervision, marketing, public relations, research, finance, accounting and management 
information practices (MIS) improved. CSMFI today has share capital of about 320 million 
CFA. CSMFI’s network now covers five out of the ten provinces of Cameroon. CSMFI has 
equally expanded its network to rural areas and is currently hoping to develop a branchless 
banking project that will aid in offering its services to the remotest areas of the country. This 
idea is a bid to embrace the majority of the poor (those who cannot afford to bank with 
commercial banks or formal finance), assuring outreach (Hermes et al., 2011) with their 
financial services; such customer groups are argued to be located in remote areas like these.  
 
CSMFI has its head office in one of Cameroon’s main cities for reasons dating back to its 
official place of birth. CSMFI is also represented in two developed countries that at one point 
extended their financial hand to promote its social and developmental mission. In 2005 there 
were fewer branches in CSMFI’s network. The South-West region, for example only had two 
branches and there were no branches in the East and North regions of Cameroon, unlike today. 
This geographical expansion was initiated after research was conducted on customers’ needs and 
segments. The findings showed that more poverty-stricken people were living in rural areas and 
the outskirts of urban areas. In a bid to embrace and accommodate the needs of these extreme 
poor, CSMFI decided to expand their economic activities to the new regions mentioned above. 
One of its customers confirmed this expansion: 
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Initially we did not know about this idea of MFIs and we were used to keeping our 
money in our nganji17 but this did not help most of us as there were always many 
villagers in the queue to borrow money. This even led to a shortage of money and 
those who were not able to join such organisations as they could not afford a certain 
amount of savings felt left out completely. Today, we feel happy having a MFI like 
CSMFI in our village that tolerates micro savings and also helps us with microloans 
and many other services all the time. 
 
In line with CCSMFI’s structure and growth objectives, the General Manager added that, 
CSMFI aims at leaving a remarkable impact on Cameroon’s economy through its 
way of governance and mission to cooperate in solving future economic problems in 
the form of present-day decisions.  
 
CSMFI started with just two individuals and later expanded to about fifteen people two years 
later with its first BOD at the time when it became a cooperative society. The first semester 2009 
annual report shows: 
Employee situation as at 31st December 2008 stood at 67 employees. This area has 
witnessed significant changes due principally to the recruitment or confirmation of 8 
CSMFI temporary workers and two phases of recruitment which brought on board 21 
and 6 respectively. At the end of the probation, 23 were confirmed while 3 saw their 
probation period renewed and one abandoned. This has greatly increased the 
workforce of the company. The administrative and personnel department itself had an 
increase in personnel from one to three: one human resource officer and one 
equipment and procurement officer (p. 11). 
 
 
 
TABLE 6.2: Staffing Evolution in CSMFI 
 
 
Source: First semester annual report (2009:11) 
 
 The increase continued and today CSMFI employs over 100 people (CSMFI 2012 annual 
report)18 who work together with the common goal of achieving the organisation’s objectives, 
mission and values. Today, the employees of CSMFI follow a hierarchical order in performing 
                                                          
17 Informal financial house meant for savings and meetings, usually with people from the same community or 
background. 
18 The researcher was only allowed to read this report and not to print or photocopy it for reasons of 
confidentiality. This is why a copy is not attached to this thesis. 
Gender 31/12/2007 31/12/2008 30/06/2009 Variance  Percentage 
change 
Male 18 37 49 12 32.3% 
Female 13 30 47 17 56.6% 
Total 31 67 96 29 43.2% 
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their duties with centralised practices. There is a General Assembly/ shareholders followed by 
the Board of Directors alongside the Audit Committee, the General Manager working hand in 
hand with the Audit and Compliance department and his Administrative Secretary, the DGMs 
who control the Production, Risk Management, Operations and Finance, Human Resource and 
Legal Affairs and Information Technology departments which underlie many other functions, as 
shown on the recent or new organisational chart drawn up in early 2012 (Appendix). When 
CSMFI started, no formal organisational chart was drawn up as such, but the various employees 
knew their positions and ranks in the organisation. By 2005, a formal organisational chart had 
been drawn up (old organisational chart) and this was revised in 2009 with suggestions made but 
not effected as such. This organisational chart, together with its suggestions to include new 
services critical to achieving the organisation’s mission such as instituting the function of 
DGMs, made it similar to the recent or new organisational chart. However, this new 
organisational chart includes not just the functions of DGMs but also the services and 
department of Small and Medium Size Enterprise (SME) and Consumer and Client Care. The 
organisational chart was further revised in 2012 to embrace key organisational changes. 
 
By 2009 there were eight BOD members and four Supervisory Committee members (President, 
Vice President, Secretary, two members). Today, CSMFI has ten BOD members and five 
supervisory committee members occupying various positions. The BOD members include the 
Board Chairman, Vice Chairman and Director of Human Resource, Board Secretary and 
Director of Operations, Director of Marketing and Public Relations, Director of Corporate and 
Regulatory Affairs, Director of Legal Affairs, Director of Investments and Director of Credit 
(CSMFI’s 2009 annual report). This increase led to an organisational restructuring started at the 
level of the BOD and Supervisory Committee members. By mid-2012, CSMFI had witnessed 
further restructuring activities which were in line with its additional objective and mission. This 
restructuring affected certain but not all departments, as already mentioned. CSMFI still 
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continued to record a financial performance level below predicted expectations after the change 
in its objective and mission to include profitability. Thus, the company saw the need to match 
the company’s objectives with its strategy in order to improve its financial performance and 
profitability and in turn assist the poor; hence the company’s efficiency and country’s growth 
rate assured strategy for approving credits and investments, needed an additional member of the 
BOD and an improvement in the governance structure (CSMFI 2009 annual report). 
The CEO of CSMFI added that,  
The inclusion of the Small and Medium Size Enterprises department together with 
updating the practices software used in CSMFI was a bid to adapt to the changing 
focus of our organisation to become financially and socially sustainable. It is thanks 
to customers’ complaints and their increasing demands that we had to rethink a 
strategy that will not force us out of the market. 
 
CSMFI’s BOD members are partitioned into various committees, of which there are three main 
ones. Firstly, there is the Credit and Loan Committee. This committee found both at board level 
and management level, implying there are two levels of credit and loan committees in CSMFI. 
Both of them are charged with the control of loans and credits given out to customers to avoid 
situations of bad debts, but at different levels. Secondly, there is an Investment Committee, 
where investments decisions are made. Lastly, CSMFI has an Audit Committee. This ensures 
that internal controls are working properly and ensure employee discipline, even though they are 
not directly involved with the employee’s day-to-day activities. 
The restructuring of CSMFI in 2009 led to more centralisation and formal accountability 
structures (see appendix for CSMFI’s organisational charts). This structure today gives 
CSMFI’S senior management more power, especially in regard to decision-making. The 
decisions are then expected to be followed by employee and customers. As already mentioned, 
when CSMFI was created in 2002- 2003, it only comprised a few individuals. 
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6.3.2 CSMFI’s Accounting System 
CSMFI has an internal centralised accounting system where all of its operations, be it at the head 
office (HO) or branches, can be viewed at any CSMFI location and all are managed by head 
office in collaboration with various branches. This implies that all requests sent from the branch 
accompanied by proofs such as receipts or application forms are channelled to the head office for 
final decision-making/approval and execution. Filing is done at the HO, with a file opened for 
each branch. For example, all of the loan files of various branches are held at the HO with copies 
of various documents at the respective branches. The migration from a decentralised system to a 
centralised system only started in early 2011 and finally started operating in late 2011, since the 
organisation saw the need to give room for their employee to adjust as a process of 
implementing this change. With the decentralised system initially used at CSMFI, every single 
branch operated a different but informal kind of system. Filing was done at various branches by 
the branch employee, making it difficult to control the branch from another location. The DGM 
in charge of Operations added,  
… as far as I know initially when CSMFI was created, there was no accounting or 
book keeping system as such in place. Accounts were done informally and manually 
with little or no records. This is the reason why we do not have such records in our 
database or archive. However, when CSMFI became a cooperative society, a semi-
formal accounting system was instituted where reports were prepared. There was 
more book keeping until about 3 years later when management saw the need to 
restructure the organisation based on several complaints received from auditors and 
even customers whose records could not be properly traced. Ever since then there 
have been great changes and improvements in CSMFI’s accounting system. For 
example, we now have a centralised system with a formal accounting system put in 
place. 
 
 
CSMFI has an accounting and operations procedures manual19 which describes and explains 
how transactions are to be treated and how to record such accounting entries in line with 
OHADA. CSMFI’s management accounting system works strictly by objectives. One of the old 
BOD members added in an informal discussion that,  
                                                          
19 CSMFI’s accounting and operations manual cannot be attached to the thesis for reasons of confidentiality, which 
the researcher abides by. 
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… as an existing culture of CSMFI, we have what we usually refer to as management 
by objective strategy (MBO). It is in line with this long existing organisational 
culture that we draw our budgets and revise them yearly to suit the organisation’s 
vision/missions. We also measure our performance in line with set objectives, be it 
social or financial, in order to achieve our mission. 
 
The MBO strategy at CSMFI also means that various departmental heads are allowed to decide 
their departmental objectives for each year that will help to achieve the organisational objective 
and missions. For example the Marketing department’s objective by 2012 was to increase the 
customer base, review operation documents, ensure operational documents are in English and 
French, oversee and increase the volume of transfers (speedy cash and Western Union) and 
facilitate the processing of civil servants’ files at MINFIN (CSMFI annual report, 2012). The 
Customer Service section’s objectives in 2009 were to provide training for all front office 
officers and put in place mechanisms aimed at increasing customer satisfaction (CSMFI annual 
report, 2009). Furthermore, Publicity and Public Relations’ objectives in 2009 were to revive 
CSMFI’s newsletter, work on CSMFI’s website with the MIS department, work on the 
harmonisation of all signboards and reply to commercial and other business-related 
correspondence (CSMFI annual report, 2009). The Finance and Accounting department’s 
objective in 2012 was to embark on the preparation of timely and accurate accounting 
information (CSMFI annual report, 2012).  
 
Today, the accounting system of CSMFI has been readjusted to suit its recent additional 
objective and mission focus in accordance with the COBAC law. In line with the management 
by objective strategy at CSMFI, the Accounting and Finance department has been sub-classified 
into internal and external activities. The internal activities include incorporating proposals from 
the AGM into action and reflecting such actions in their reports, following regulatory rules or 
better still conforming to the accounting plan laid down by COBAC for MFIs in preparing 
financial statements and budgets, and in-house accountability and managing the systems in 
place.  
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The development of the managerial accounting system at CSMFI could be linked to changes in 
the objectives as well as the culture of the organisation. There have been changes over the years, 
especially in line with the management of the organisation. “Today, the head office is the centre 
for strategic thinking and decision-making at CSMFI” (2010 annual report: 1). The centralisation 
and restructuring is in line with the growth objective, as suggested by evidence gathered during 
the research. Within CSMFI’s management accounting system are the functions of planning, 
budgeting, control, performance evaluation, reporting (and accountability) and decision-making. 
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FIGURE 6.2: Structure of CSMFI’s Management Accounting System 
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Planning  
The Accounting, Planning and Control departments at CSMFI are mainly responsible for 
producing management accounting information for the organisation. There are two types of 
planning at CSMFI: planning necessary to set or review the firm’s overall objectives and mission 
and planning necessary to implement the actions’ needs in order to achieve the set or revised 
objectives and mission. The strategic planning at Stage 1 in Figure 6.2 above is that which sets 
out the overall objectives or mission of the institution, usually done at the AGM by shareholders 
assisted by the BOD and the GM. The strategic planning process has existed in CSMFI from its 
creation and is still on-going. The general manager,  
Our aim in doing strategic planning for the organisation is to make sure we leave a 
positive impact on the society at large by involving the right stakeholders in the 
whole planning process from one step to another. As a developmental organisation, 
most of the issues addressed in the planning stage usually influence other managerial 
functions such as control.  
 
Summarily, CSMFI’s 2009 annual report states that; “… better planning was especially required 
to make sure that control of overall activities can be done from a central server”. 
The operational planning at Stage 2 is effected by the management team supervised by the GM 
and his assistant. Operational planning at CSMFI starts from suggestions from stakeholders. 
Usually the organisational performance following various organisational reports and financial 
statements also contributes towards better planning at CSMFI. The budget is then prepared, 
following the organisational plans. CSMFI’s overall planning towards achieving stated missions 
and objectives are achieved by distributing and monitoring the effectiveness of individual 
responsibilities through branches, departments and functions.  
 
Budgeting  
The budgeting process at CSMFI starts at the level of the branches. These branches make a draft 
budget (line) and send it to the HO, defended by the Branch Manager and Operations Officer. 
The same budgeting process holds at the level of the HO, where various departments, supervised 
  
178 
 
by their departmental heads, come up with a draft budget for the departmental needs that will 
help them achieve the organisation’s objectives. Then the HO Operations and Finance 
department consolidates all budgets, including those from HO (defended by the departmental 
heads). The DGM in charge of Operations and Finance controls and reviews the budgets, making 
sure they have been inputted correctly with the help of new accounting software, and submits 
them to the GM for review and comments. The DGM in charge of Operations together with the 
GM then takes the budget to the BOD for more comments/advice. Corrections and rectifications 
are then effected if need be, usually by the HO Operations Officer in collaboration with the 
DGM in charge of Operations and Finance Control.20  
The final draft budget is then forwarded to the GM, who sends it to the AGM for deliberation 
and approval. After its approval, the budget is then put into operational use. This budget is 
usually a flexible one that can be moderated with substantial reason.  
Before the recent change in mission, the branch managers sent their planned budgets directly to 
the BOD, who took them to the AGM for deliberation, but with the centralisation that is a result 
of the new mission, all budgets are sent to the HO for verification and approval before being sent 
forward to the AGM. 
There are three main budgets prepared at CSMFI: an investment budget, operational budget and 
production budget. The assistant manager in charge of operations pointed out: 
The investment budget is linked to all investments the company wants to undertake 
while the production budget is then related to marketing activities such as portfolio 
management: loans, overdrafts, recovery, etc. The operational budget relates to 
salary, electricity, networking, security, telephone bills and any other day-to-day 
activities of the company. 
CSMFI’s budget plan is usually developed based on the previous year’s budget realisation, and 
evaluation of the budget is done at the end of the year. CSMFI operates a line and incremental 
                                                          
20 These functions are occupied by the same person. 
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budget type: incremental in that the current year’s budget and the year proceeding the current 
year are usually compared, and this serves as a starting point in preparing next year’s budget. 
When CSMFI was created, budgets were not prepared, for the simple reason that the group of 
individuals just used whatever spare personal funds they had to pursue its poverty alleviation 
objective. One of the BOD members added, 
When CSMFI started, the organisation was only concerned about helping farmers in 
our village and nothing else. They didn’t border to do any budgets, planning or any 
managerial stuff. All we wanted to do was extend our hand of friendship to talented 
farmers who lacked financial support. However, by 2002 when CSMFI became a 
cooperative, budgeting was thought of and initiated even though more informally 
done by the branch accountants and later on followed the regulatory guides to 
prepare one. It was done branch wise, unlike today where it is being done 
departmentally and line wise. 
More is done on budgets today at CSMFI besides preparing them. CSMFI, especially by 2009, 
had embarked upon the improvement of its budgets in line with effectively managing and 
monitoring these budgets. CSMFI’s 2009 annual report suggested that, 
In order to ensure effective budget management, CSMFI introduced a new pay 
voucher which was accompanied by a budget manual. This enables the organisation 
in the process of monitoring and managing as well as ensuring proper accountability 
of all expenses incurred at all levels. This new pay voucher serves as a tool for 
effective budget control. CSMFI having in place provision for budget analysis 
(quarterly and annual budget) will help in conducting a proper monitoring process of 
expenses using various budget heads. (p. 22) 
Furthermore, 
The budget manual gives information on the allocation made for the various budget 
heads per branch. This document serves as a guide to proper application of the 
budget. It also gives the description on the various budget, expenses that relate to a 
given budget head and information on engaging each budget head. (CSMFI, 2009 
annual report: 22) 
 
Control System 
Initially, employees were simply not bothered about the management of the company, especially 
on improving the control system in place, until recently when a huge need for it was envisaged. 
They saw no need for generating positive cash flow, profitability or any aspect of financial 
  
180 
 
management in the early 2000s. However, after 2009, all of these operational/ financial and 
technical aspects within CSMFI became one of its priorities in a bid to have a greater chance of 
achieving its mission. For example, more control training programmes have been conducted 
since 2009 and five more controllers recruited, more machines provided and new credit 
management systems instituted, in order to intensify the orientation of controllers and manage 
the organisation better towards achieving its objective. The general manager added: 
A meeting was held for all controllers on the theme – devising internal control and 
ensuring security of operations. This was a two day meeting involving 11 controllers 
from all of the branches. Issues focused on included: inter-branch reconciliation 
review, review of internal audit manual, use of some basic techniques of risk 
identification and evaluation such as flow charts, control questionnaires, etc. 
 
Today, two departments in CSMFI are charged mainly with the functions of control. The 
Finance Control department and the Auditing department are responsible for carrying out 
internal control duties in the organisation. In the Finance Control department there is a Financial 
Controller at the head office level who verifies mainly on a daily basis what has been done so far 
and sees to it that such activities are in line with the organisation’s proposed budget. This is to 
make sure that certain transactions are not accepted without having enough money to execute 
them, due to the tight nature of their budget. Control is managed at the level of operations and 
investment following the planned budget. At the level of operations, the expenses and income of 
CSMFI are the main focus. 
 
Furthermore, the Audit Committee is made up of internal and external auditors. The Internal 
Audit department is charged with the general verification of what is done in the system and 
making sure all transactions follow the set organisational procedures as well as the rules and 
regulations of their regulatory (COBAC) and supervisory (MINFIN) bodies. The Internal 
Controller and Auditor supervise and control all internal activities of the organisation, and they 
are audited by the external auditor (see Section 6.3). 
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The methodology of the internal audit process at CSMFI has changed in recent times. Initially, 
the control process was done manually. The auditors moved from one branch to another, started 
at the branch level, usually done from one department to another and usually at the level of the 
head office, unlike before between 2000 and 2008, when audit controls where completed by 
physical movements from one branch to another by one or two internal auditors.  
- Internal Control 
Internal control at CSMFI is carried out by the Finance Control and Audit departments. The 
Finance Control department has a Financial Controller who is charged with the daily verification 
of the budget to avoid a situation where monetary transactions are authorised without having 
money budgeted or set aside for such transactions. There are control mechanisms put in place at 
the levels of operations (income and expenses of CSMFI) and investments. 
Secondly, the Audit Control department carries out the function of the internal auditor charged 
with the general verification of what is done in the system and if this is done following set in-
house and regulatory procedures. There is what we call control of engagement, where all 
controls relating to loans and audits are done internally.  
Internal control at CSMFI has helped in reducing cases of fraud, especially fraud by senior 
management employee and daily collectors.21 Internal controllers are also charged with the 
function of risk management, which involves the verification and follow-up of the speedy cash, 
daily collection and credit products as well as suspense monitoring. It includes the development 
of procedural and regulatory service notes aimed at strengthening the security of operations 
(CSMFI’s annual report, 2009). Despite all of these control measures that have been put in place, 
the General Manager in his 2009 management report added, 
Employee misconduct and indiscipline persists, procedures and policies are not only 
incomplete but have so far been poorly communicated to and/or perceived by the 
employee in a harmonised and consistent manner. 
                                                          
21 Daily collectors are employee charged with the collection of customers’ day-to-day savings from their locations, 
be it from their homes or business units, to reduce customers’ transportation costs. 
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Credit management is also not only the duty of credit officers but also that of internal controllers. 
In line with continuously improving the management of CSMFI’s credit portfolio, the General 
Manager in his 2009 management report proposed the organisation to start by presenting the 
main problems faced at branch level with proposed solutions followed by an action plan and 
projections. A new system of granting credit was then introduced. This system had a new loan 
and overdraft form design to respond to the problems encountered in analysing such applications. 
This led to increase in loans given out as well as productivity. The centralisation of the credit 
management process since 2009 has led to an increase in loan delinquency ratios. 
Performance Measurement  
The performance evaluation of CSMFI is done at both the financial (measurement process) and 
non-financial (employee efficiency) levels. In line with the financial evaluation of CSMFI, it is 
done based on the organisation’s mission at the time, and most often structured according to 
departmental objectives and to meet the requirements of the regulators. The financial statements 
play a vital role in this process (annual report, 2010). The Marketing department usually has its 
own objectives, different from those of the Human Resource, and Loans and Accounts 
department, all in a bid to accomplish a particular organisational mission (for example wanting 
to become a bank, which is the case now). Depending on the objective, CSMFI want to achieve 
measurement by objective. CSMFI’s Head of the Finance and Accounting department located at 
the head office usually comes up with a plan of action (to include planned budgets) and follows 
up to the realisation stage. This financial performance measurement function is performed by the 
Finance and Operations department of CSMFI. In terms of financial performance measurement, 
the branch accountant at the branch level compares and contrasts the planned budget with the 
actual, prepares financial statements following the law (which stipulates the use of OHADA 
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accounting, which replaced OCAM in preparing financial statements and the specific regulations 
from COBAC). However, a management22 employee member added,  
Depending on the target group, we can manipulate the figures on our financial 
statements for tax purposes and to protect the image of the organisation. For 
example, for tax purposes if we report so much profit as the case maybe we risk 
paying more tax. If we make a loss, we don’t report it as such to the public for fear of 
winding down or losing our customers. This usually results in situations where we 
can have different reports for different stakeholders.  
Furthermore, in line with financial performance evaluation, usually all of the financial 
statements from various branches are then sent to the head office for consolidation and 
reassessment before a final financial report is produced on the company’s performance. The 
report is then sent to the Deputy General Manager in charge of Operations, who after reviewing 
and amending it sends it to the General Manager and they defend it at the BOD meeting. The 
financial reports prepared in CSMFI are usually done following already existing templates and 
the accounting system in place. This implies that financial performance measurement at CSMFI 
follows a quantitative format, however there are usually accompanying notes of accounts and 
reports to give a better explanation of the company’s financial situation. 
 
There has been a change in terms of improvement in achieving the planned budget (plus budget 
format) recently. A template has been filled and designed by the new software (Banker’s 
Realm). The Deputy General Manager now in charge of Operations and Finance Control added, 
CSMFI has monthly performance indicators which tell us how we are performing 
financially and we also base our future decisions on this. If we notice that there is 
a problem somewhere that will not help us achieve our target objectives then we 
readjust our action plan or come up with a fresh new one. Our budget plan is 
usually developed based on the previous year’s budget realisation and evaluation 
at year end. The statements that we use to measure performance are mainly those 
relating to investment, production and operations. So we have the investment, 
production and operations budgets we use. 
CSMFI uses a performance appraisal form (Appendix) for carrying out a more structured 
quantitative type of evaluation where scores are given by departmental or service heads to 
                                                          
22 Job title not disclosed for reasons of confidentiality. 
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subordinate employee. The form has five sections: performance (knowledge, skills and ability, 
quality and quantity of work, work habits), behavioural traits (initiative, judgement and 
punctuality), supervisory factors and planning (planning and organisation) and interpersonal 
relationships (communication with hierarchy, peers and customers). Based on the evaluations, 
recommendations are given for promotion, encouragement or warnings. Such scores are usually 
signed, dated and justified with practical evidence. Interpersonal relationships, for example, can 
be argued to mean internal accountability.  
Normally, non-performance measurement at CSMFI is done by the Head of Human Resource 
department leading employee evaluation. Besides sending an evaluation form to all employee to 
evaluate their colleagues, the Human Resource Manager together with departmental heads and 
DGMs evaluates the administrative performance of the organisation, besides its business 
(financial) performance. The code of conduct is often used in judging the behaviour of 
employee.  
The signing in and out book is used to evaluate employee punctuality and many other key 
attributes are also considered in undertaking employee evaluation. Employee evaluation is also 
done at the department and branch level. At the departmental level, the Head of Department 
evaluates all employee under them and the Head of Department is then evaluated by the Deputy 
General Manager and the Human Resource Manager. Branch Managers also evaluate the 
employee in their respective branches and are in turn evaluated by the Human Resource and 
General Manager. The DGMs and human resource managers are then evaluated by the General 
Manager, who is evaluated by the BOD. The Assistant General Manager now in charge of 
Operations and Finance Control further pointed out  
We are now working towards a system that will motivate performance and not just 
having the evaluation done. Initially non-financial performance was done in a 
qualitative manner but is now more quantitatively structured with various evaluation 
forms (performance appraisal form) to fill and less room for so much writing and 
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explanations like before. Explanations are only given when need be and usually 
verbally.  
  
CSMFI evaluates job performance and interpersonal work relationships for every employee 
member. At the job performance level, the organisation seeks to evaluate the branch manager’s 
portfolio management, for example, focus is given to how many accounts they have opened or 
activated, loans recovered, etc., compared with the target. This assessment helps CSMFI at the 
level of their decision-making as to whether to promote or dismissed them or whether more 
training is needed depending on the situation and reasons. At the interpersonal level, CSMFI 
seeks to investigate the employee member’s collaboration with other employee, relation to 
customers, and respect for hierarchy, sense of initiative and sense of responsibility amongst 
many other matters.  
Furthermore, regarding improving CSMFI’s performance measurement system, in  2010 it 
adopted the Balance Scorecard (BSC) system despite how expensive it has proven to be (see 
General Manager’s quote below) in order to reinforce strategy. BSC also helps CSMFI to align 
its resources with its objectives and measure the company’s overall (strategic) performance. This 
is in line with the argument from Crabtree and DeBusk (2008) in the management accounting 
literature. The General Manager added, 
Even though we strive to improve our performance by implementing new strategic 
management tools, usually those that combine the use of financial and non-financial 
performance indicators like our BSC by training our management employee on them, 
some of these employee still don’t use them well. We have recently incurred so 
much cost in attempting to shape CSMFI to look like a future bank. How CSMFI is 
viewed externally and internally needs to reach equilibrium. 
Kaplan and Norton (1996; 2001) argue that BSC is usually grouped under four different 
categories: financial, internal business, customers and learning and growth. Usually CSMFI 
aligns its objectives in various sections some of which fall under the perspectives suggested by 
Kaplan and Norton (1996; 2001). The financial perspective is usually on how shareholders of 
CSMFI view the company, while the customer perspective is how customers view CSMFI. The 
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internal business process looks at the areas where CSMFI needs to improve or work hard on in 
order to satisfy shareholders and customers. The learning and growth usually focuses on what 
needs doing in line with research and development within the company if it is to achieve its 
goals and objectives. Besides the four perspectives of the BSC, the BSC also transforms the 
traditional concept that just focuses on financial performance measurement into intangible and 
long-term development (Wang et al., 2013). Thus performance measures at CSMFI, following 
the above quotation from the General Manager of CSMFI, must strike a balance between 
external pressures from customers and shareholders and internal measures around the innovation 
and learning and growth aspects of the business. 
 
The BSC was brought into CSMFI following a year of centralisation as the organisation became 
bigger with challenging strategic goals. However, issues of decoupling are still evident today at 
CSMFI, in line with instituting this BSC. Certain key performance indicators are still 
continuously used by CSMFI. The Head of the Accounting department added 
We keep using our old style performance indicators because it makes our job easy as 
this is what we have been used to. BSC only assists us to decide how the company’s 
yearly structure/ strategy will look and not much as far as I am concerned. 
Reporting 
In-house reporting is done both qualitatively and quantitatively depending on the type of report. 
Initially the accountability function in CSMFI was done qualitatively, but with the introduction 
of new software it is possible to perform quantitative reports to save time and make performance 
analysis easier. The financial/management reports prepared in CSMFI include income 
statements, cash flow statements, trial balances, balance sheets, general ledgers, operational 
budgets and ratios to measure performance/evaluation. These reports are generated directly from 
the system and then verified manually to avoid system errors. 
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Decision-Making 
Strategic decisions at CSMFI are currently made at the head office, unlike in 2000-2009. 
Decisions made at the head office are usually followed by meeting(s) held by the annual General 
Assembly at which most or the entire BOD are usually actively present. This process is only 
followed when sensitive decisions are to be made; otherwise they are dealt with by departmental 
heads, who are now located at the head office. However, regulatory accounting decisions still 
remain the responsibility of the government/ regulatory body. In the early 2000s when CSMFI 
was created, decisions were made by the few individual shareholders who started the association. 
In 2002-2009 it was entirely the responsibility of a branch manager together with their 
accountant to make strategic decisions for their branch. One of the branch managers in an 
informal discussion added, 
CSMFI has changed a lot. When CSMFI just started operating as a cooperative and 
a Category 1 MFI, I use to make all the managerial decisions for my branch even 
though with the support of the branch accountant. I thought about what needs to be 
done in order to achieve the set objectives for my branch and then made decisions 
which were audited. 
 
Another branch manager pointed out, 
 
At CSMFI we have witnessed a kind of centralisation today as most of the 
decisions are now made at the level of head office. Before 2009, we were used to 
making various decisions in our branches. This decision-making process was 
usually headed by me, my accountant and financial control. We decided on how to 
control bad debts and other administrative costs amongst so many different things. 
This usually helped us to meet our target for that year. The head office was then 
informed and necessary support given to achieve such objectives. 
 
The National Accountant since 2010 said,  
Strategic decisions taken from 2010 consisted more of imposing a very strong 
image of CSMFI in the financial market. However, much work has recently been 
done to this effect which includes improvements in service delivery time, quality 
service offer, improved communication with branches and purchase of services cars 
and refurbishing of branches. All these have contributed significantly in 
communicating to the public that CSMFI is a thriving microfinance. However, 
much work needs to be done after securing the image of a booming microfinance in 
the mind of the public. 
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FIGURE 6.3  Decision-Making Ladder at CSMFI 
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was drastically contested by certain employee, especially those who were used to the previous 
organisational norms. Again, the organisational culture can be argued to be the reason why 
certain employee members resist new and especially sophisticated changes within the 
organisation. 
 
In summary, the new mission of CSMFI to become a bank besides its social mission has shaped 
the nature of its accounting system, for example, the increase in employee, change of accounting 
software (from Global Bank to Banker’s Realm) and extra positions created within the 
management structure (the new position of DGM). The COBAC law Article 11 also requires 
CSMFI’s accounting system to be able to deliver requested documents to users within certain 
legal time frames. This statement brings the discussion to the next section on accountability. 
 
6.4 External Control and External Accountability  
 
6.4.1 Regulatory Accounting of MFIs in Cameroon  
Before the late 1990s, the microfinance activities were mainly supervised and controlled by the 
Ministry of Agriculture. This was because at that time microfinance services were geared 
towards the promotion of rural and agricultural activities (Fotabong, 2012). However, due to 
ineffectiveness and irregularities in the area of supervision from the Ministry of Agriculture, 
made more noticeable only after the collapse of major players such as CONFINEST and 
CAPCOL, and the urge to protect depositors, the responsibility to supervise MFIs was then 
shifted to the MINFIN and COBAC in the late 1990s. The shift of regulatory/supervisory 
functions from the Ministry of Agriculture to the MINFIN was in line with the Prime Ministerial 
decree that decided the granting of licences and supervision and control of all MFIs in the late 
1990s. 
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The regulation of MFIs in Cameroon follows three sets of different laws: the national law, 
CEMAC law instituted through COBAC, or general rules, and OHADA, or specific rules. MFIs, 
like other financial houses are expected to comply with these laws, focusing more on the basic 
prudential norms as stated by COBAC. However, despite the existence and clear definition of 
these regulatory laws and regulations, Fotabong (2012) argues that the dissemination of 
information between various stakeholders remains relatively poor. Also, the fact that the state 
participates in the provision of microloans via MFIs makes matters worse as activities through 
these different channels should be carefully regulated.  
 
Note should be taken of the fact that the main original text prepared by COBAC for MFI 
regulatory and control purposes is directed towards the nature of activities of these institutions 
and not their legal form. In the CEMAC law instituted through COBAC, microfinance is has the 
same meaning as previously stated by Rhyne (2001) in Section 2.1 (stated in Article 1) and in 
Article 5, MFIs are categorised under three different classes (Table 2.2). COBAC’s23 supervision 
could be onsite or offsite. One of the chiefs of service added, 
We do conduct on-site visits whereby we inform the case organisation well ahead. 
We also let them know when exactly we will be visiting and what will be required 
from them to help us perform our supervision. With on-site, we look at the loans, 
savings, transfers, structure of organisation and other services. While off-site we 
demand financial statements be sent to us through our official email address and we 
inform the organisation of the outcome. 
 
Fotabong (2012) adds,  
The control mission from the regulatory and supervisory authority – COBAC for 
example became increasingly present in major MFIs to scrutinise their activities with 
respect to basic prudential norms. (p. 2)  
 
                                                          
23 Note should be taken of the fact that COBAC is the supervisory body while MINFIN is the regulator of MFIs in 
Cameroon. 
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Furthermore, the various attempts made by the state to gain the interest of various stakeholders, 
especially during the crisis in North Africa and the Presidential election billed for October 2011 
led to a corporate citizenship image:  
COBAC recently started a nationwide evangelism to sensitise promoters of MFIs in 
Cameroon on the need of professionalism so the sector does not become an all-
comers affair. (Fotabong, 2012: 2)  
 
6.4.2 MFIs’ Regulatory Accounting Plan  
Following the accounting plan stipulated by COBAC in 2009 (COBAC MFI Regulation 2009/01 
related to the accounting plan of MFIs), various laws have been stipulated. The OHADA 
accounting practices remain a fast-growing accounting practice and many countries particularly 
in Central and West Africa use it as their national GAAP.24 OHADA25 accounting practices help 
to organise or classify activities of an organisation in a logical manner with the help of numeric 
codes.  
The codification of the OHADA Accounting Practices is arranged so as to identify 
patterns and parallels may help to remember and understand the accounts. (OHADA 
accounting plan, Chapter 1, section 1B)  
 
The first part of the accounting plan stipulated by COBAC talks about individual accounts, with 
the first chapter focusing on general provisions with nine articles (see Articles 1-9 in Appendix). 
In line with Article 8, all intermediation operations carried out by any MFI must only be within 
the country where it is established. For any intermediation operations with other countries, all 
MFIs must pass through a commercial bank, or other financial institutions within the country of 
operation. 
 
In the OHADA accounting plan, Chapter 2 is all about the organisation of accounting records 
with ten different articles (see Articles 10-19 in Appendix). Chapter 3 concerns regulations 
                                                          
24 http://www.imfagroup.org/en/site/ohadaAccounting 
25 For more details on how to apply OHADA accounting see Appendix: OHADA accounting plan 
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regarding periodic statements (see Articles 20-26 in Appendix). Chapter 4 contains regulations 
with regard to rules of evaluation and determination of results. Chapter 5 is the last section in the 
first part, covering probative force of documents, account auditing and collection and disclosure 
of accounting information (see Articles 50-57 in Appendix). The second part of this document 
relates to issues concerning combined accounts and consolidated accounts of MFIs. The first 
chapter in this second part is basically on consolidated accounts (see Articles 58-84 in 
Appendix). Chapter 2 in this section relates to combined accounts (see Articles 85-92 in 
Appendix). The third part of this document contains regulations regarding final provisions (see 
Articles 93-95 in Appendix). This document was created for the Central African Banking 
Commission in the presence of the President himself and various members of the CEMAC zone. 
6.4.3 CSMFI’s Regulatory Accounting System 
 
MINFIN works through COBAC (the arm that enforces regulatory rules). CSMFI uses 
legislative texts which are enforced by MINFIN containing all regulatory norms. OHADA 
accounting is the accounting plan used by the 14 countries under the Central African States. This 
OHADA accounting plan stipulates that those in the banking sector and insurance companies 
within the CEMAC region in Central Africa can have a specific accounting plan. This is the 
reason why CSMFI adopted and uses the COBAC accounting plan, keeping OHADA to serve as 
the base. This OHADA accounting plan26 serves as a national GAAP not only for CSMFI but 
also for the country at large, as required by the COBAC law as stated in Article 14 of the 
OHADA accounting plan. In brief, OHADA is a legal tool designed specifically for Africa with 
the aim of achieving regional integration and economic growth. OHADA also ensures that 
African countries have a secure legal environment by adopting a more harmonised business law.  
 
In addition, OHADA gives each member state the opportunity to enjoy a more flexible, reliable 
and modern single business law where the use of arbitration is seen to be appropriate and a 
                                                          
26 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/plaquette_english.pdf 
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trustworthy way to settle disputes. These two accounting plans have the same general rules in 
terms of principles. The adoption of the COBAC accounting plan by CSMFI gives the 
organisation room to deal with account types rather than stock of raw materials, and all of its 
transactions are mostly dealing with the value date, unlike the case with the OHADA accounting 
plan.  
 
 
For the purpose of external accountability, CSMFI prepares regular financial reports for various 
stakeholders, including shareholders, government, regulators, supervisory bodies and customers. 
The main financial statements prepared by CSMFI for external purposes include cash flow 
statements, balance sheets and income statements (see Appendix). The Head of Operations 
added,  
Before preparing financial statements, we ensure all inter-branch reconciliation 
statements are at zero. We also do a journal of correction, posting corrections into the 
system followed by a final report, prepared in accordance with the OHADA and 
COBAC accounting framework.  
Important ratios calculated from the financial statement include liquidity and profitability ratios. 
The accountant uses such ratios in producing the compulsory end of year evaluation report. The 
Branch Accountant said, 
In order for CSMFI to achieve its banking mission by the set date, a fair ROI 
following the set regulations from COBAC is needed. 
 
The implication here is that calculating ROI gives management an idea about where they are in 
pursuing the organisation’s mission. The external auditor and regulators also control the 
activities of the internal auditor to ensure that the organisation is meeting its objectives as 
advertised.  
 
The regulation of CSMFI started in early 2002 when COBAC mandated MFIs in the country to 
be regulated. CSMFI’s accounting procedures are influenced by the regulatory requirements; for 
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example, the preparation of the company’s financial statement is done in line with Chapter 3 of 
the COBAC accounting plan following Article 10 which states, 
The accounting system established in the institution must comply with the regularity, 
accuracy and security requirements that are necessary for assuring the authenticity of 
records; enabling accounts to serve as an instrument for measuring the rights and 
obligations of partners, as evidence of information of third parties and as a 
management tool. 
 
CSMFI sees to it that all transactions are completed on time and most of the recording is done on 
daily basis in order to ensure the timely processing of recorded data and that users receive the 
information on time. CSMFI also attempts to follow all other regulations and security 
requirements stipulated within the COBAC accounting plan (see Appendix).  
 
Regulatory performance evaluation is carried out in line with the rules stipulated in Chapter 4 of 
the COBAC handbook (appendix) and is based on achieving their set objectives (organisational 
objectives and departmental sub-objectives) and the available budget (planned and actual). The 
performance management process is usually carried out following the set instructions stipulated 
by the regulators, supervisory body (external rules and regulations) and in line with in-house 
(internal) rules and regulations. Organisational management has been further compared 
(appendix for organisational charts), as shown on the table below. The Assistant General 
Manager in charge of Operations said, 
There was no performance measurement and control system put in place initially 
until recently. The emphasis before was on expansion and assets building unlike 
today where emphasis is on financial sustainability. 
 
The external control in CSMFI is carried out by COBAC, MINFIN, Taxation, NSIF and the 
external auditor. In line with the set standards, CSMFI prepares and submits official formal 
reports to external controllers monthly, quarterly, yearly and semesterly and whenever need 
arises. The external controllers visit CSMFI’s HO to verify the authenticity of submitted reports. 
Before, in order to verify such reports, they needed to move from one branch to another, but now 
  
195 
 
centralisation has eased the work of the external controllers. The external auditors have the right 
to either give notice or pay a surprise visit to CSMFI. Giving CSMFI advance notice gives them 
the opportunity to prepare all necessary documents. Even though all HO departments are usually 
visited, they rely on the reports from the internal auditor. Branches can be visited for better 
justification and perhaps more information, but this is rare. The CSMFI National Accountant 
commented,  
Category 1 MFIs do not really attract much external control from the taxation office, 
COBAC and MINFIN which was the case with us but now wanting to belong to the 
Category 2 umbrella, more control is required from the tax office, COBAC and 
MINFIN to make sure we meet the requirements of becoming officially a Category 2 
even though the theory is still in process.  
 
The mission of the NSIF is usually charged with several objectives, mainly verifying the 
declaration of employers and employee and the contribution by the institution and reviewing the 
methods of presentation. In addition to the taxation control and NSIF is the control from 
MINFIN and the audit performed by the auditors (CSMFI’s annual report 2012). MINFIN 
handles issues in line with the mission of the institution. Bearing in mind that CSMFI has not yet 
received accreditation from MINFIN to operate fully as a Category 2 MFI, MINFIN has 
continuously asked questions about the validity of CSMFI’s Category 2 declarations, hence the 
reason why CSMFI continues to maintain Category 1 on its signboards while operating as a PLC 
(CSMFI’s annual report 2012).  
According to the regulatory norms of MFIs operating in the CEMAC zone, it is compulsory for 
MFIs to belong to an association who will act as a mediator between the MFIs and their 
supervisory bodies. In the case of Cameroon, the association of MFIs is called ANEMCAM, and  
CSMFI is part of this. When there is a new regulation to be developed, especially one that will 
affect MFIs, they ask MFIs’ opinions through ANEMCAM. There is only one association per 
state.  
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CSMFI is accountable to the government by using the stipulated codes of conduct. These codes 
are set to control the behaviour of MFIs as reflected in their reports. It is from these reports that 
regulators and supervisors can determine whether CSMFI is following the set standards. The 
formal regular visits of the supervisory committee to CSMFI to carry out its supervisory 
functions also present it with accountability practices. The DGM for Operations added, “In line 
with accountability I report to top management and the employee under my department report to 
me”. CSMFI does not only focus on formalised rule-based accountability but also social 
accountability.  
6.5 Social Control and Social Accountability 
This form of social accountability in CSMFI is referred to as corporate social responsibility. The 
DGM for Operations commented, 
CSMFI is not only focused on making profits but invests in social projects 
(education, health, sports, agriculture, etc.). This investment is based on the 
assistance that we give to various organisations are based on their open demand for 
help and our assessment to determine where exactly to invest in line with our 
objectives.  
 
CSMFI promotes both the academic and professional experience of students through internship 
programmes in the organisation. CSMFI trains students at no extra cost. However, at the end of 
each training session, the students are expected to account for the experience and knowledge 
gained via a minimum 10-page report. These academic interns are usually students who are still 
to finish their studies. The professional interns are those who have graduated and are preparing 
for the job market. The head of CSR said, 
In CSMFI we help cement the gap between graduates and the job market making it 
easier for our interns to build employability skills and quickly gain the right 
employment. CSMFI has had up to 109 interns in total since creation and is hoping to 
have more. 
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Unlike academic interns, the professional interns also receive an allowance to help meet their 
transportation costs. They are also required to present a detailed report of what they have learned 
at the end of the internship period. CSMFI goes on to employ some of these interns who prove to 
be exceptional. At the end of each internship term, CSMFI presents interns with an attestation as 
a sign of appreciation and to help them get a job. The aim of this attestation is to serve as a 
stepping stone for quicker employment in other organisations. The presentation of this attestation 
and financial assistance is not compulsory, but is done formally. 
CSMFI also acts as a charitable organisation for the less-privileged in Cameroon, for example by 
providing clothes and shoes to the handicapped and orphanage centres. This goodwill gesture 
makes the organisation stand out amongst MFIs in Cameroon. as argued by the Head of CSR. 
Feedback is often expected and given to CSMFI from such centres on how the items were 
distributed and what they think of CSMFI’s services. Even though such feedback is expected, it 
is not compulsory. CSMFI also visits prisoners, providing them with their basic needs. The Head 
of CSR added,  
Even though prisoners are seen as bad people in our society, they still need help. 
They need to feel the right of belonging to our society through which we will also be 
promoting the image of our organisation. This is the reason why we provide them 
with food and clothing for example.  
CSMFI also acts as a sponsor to football activities in rural areas where it believes the poor are 
located in order to make their presence felt in such communities and clubs. Even though 
voluntary, these football clubs usually account to CSMFI formally about their performance in the 
sponsored matches. The reports and concerns are further used for internal planning, budgeting 
and decision-making processes in CSMFI.  
Furthermore, CSMFI provides employee and customers with gifts at the end of every year, for 
example at Christmas, including cards, pens, wall clocks, T-shirts and diaries, usually featuring 
the logo of the organisation. CSMFI believes that such gifts also help to market the organisation 
as well as making the employee and customers feel happy. CSMFI also believes in visiting 
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customers to get feedback from them on how such gifts have impacted in their life and their 
thoughts about the organisation. 
 
CSMFI also gives out various financial loans, including school fees loans, business loans, 
speedy loans and group loans. These are given to different target groups with varying interest-
paying capacities. School fees loan are meant for customers who cannot afford to pay their 
children’s fees, based on their household income, number of children per household, jobs of 
parents and relatives per household. These loans are paid back with varying interest rates 
depending on the prevailing market rates, usually not less than 2% per month of the outstanding 
balance of the loan, that is, the current plus the delinquent balance (CSMFI’s accounting and 
operations procedures manual, 2008). CSMFI also fines borrowers for defaulting on loans, 
ranging from 5–20% depending on the situation. The total amount of loans CSMFI gives to 
borrowers does not exceed 15% of the total equity and not more than 20% of the equity of 
CSMFI to employee. CSMFI groups its loan types under three sub-headings: normal loans, 
intended for all customers but with a longer granting process; Speedy loans, aimed at meeting 
customers’ urgent need for money, reducing the lengthy procedures for low-income earners and 
taking a maximum of 20 minutes to be processed and granted; express credit, which, like a 
speedy loan, is aimed at customers with an urgent need for money but takes up to an hour to be 
processed and granted. It is based on the customer’s salary. Lastly is an overdraft, which is an 
agreed monthly or regular amount of money which customers borrow for their monthly upkeep. 
 
CSMFI also give out larger amounts of loans with insignificant rates of interest, unlike normal 
loans and mainly to sell the organisation’s image. Such loans are usually targeted towards the 
poor located in rural communities with small businesses. In line with the loans given to farmers, 
CSMFI assists via village farmers groups and gets them to open an account with CSMFI through 
which the loans are paid, for better management and accountability. CSMFI is of the opinion that 
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it is easier for a member belonging to a group to obtain a loan if another group member can 
present collateral security on their behalf. The CSR Manager commented, 
Before such loans are given, CSMFI ensures that more information about the loan 
client or group is collected. Such information includes: client’s address, occupation, 
contact number and marital status. The information is then used to follow up the 
usage and repayment of the loan. 
 
Particular employee members are assigned to follow-up all loans given out to customers and 
report on the progress or situation of loan customers. In monitoring the loans, the allocated 
employee make sure, for example, that farmers buy their seeds and plant them up to harvesting 
point. After the harvesting period, CSMFI expects the farmers to pay back the loans with low 
interest as originally stipulated. However, CSMFI remains very understanding in cases of bad 
weather conditions that impact negatively on the crops and postpone the repayment period of the 
loan.  
 
“Client participation in social and developmental projects in CSMFI is increasingly becoming 
vital for the continuous existence of the MFI,” the Head of CSR added. CSMFI attempts to make 
sure customers are fully involved in the businesses that they are sponsored or financially assisted 
to run via follow-up field meetings and observations. This is done twice a month on average, and 
usually unannounced. In this way, the client is liable to give a true account of how they utilised 
the loan entrusted to them and if there is any progress with their situation regarding their health, 
education, standard of living, business turnover and household or other commitments. 
 
The decision to have certain internal formal in-house CoCE is made by the Board of Directors of 
CSMFI. The BOD laid down the CoCE in order to ensure the management of its code and 
employee (CSMFI’s employee CoCE, 2013). CSMFI’s CoCE helps to bring out guiding 
principles on which it operates with various stakeholders with whom it is linked. It also 
acknowledges the fact that the organisation is a “trustee and custodian of public money in order 
to fulfil its fiduciary obligations and responsibilities” and therefore must “maintain and continue 
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to enjoy the trust and confidence of public at large” (CSMFI’s employee CoCE, 2013: 4). It is in 
line with its objectives that CSMFI has guiding formal principles set to express the high 
standards which serve as the bedrock of its CoCE. The internal conduct of CSMFI is usually 
judged from external behaviour, thus making the institution conscious about maintaining a good 
reputation. The job descriptions of all employee also stress how employee should represent the 
organisation in terms of their behaviour. The CoCE of CSMFI helps to govern the way employee 
relate to each other and with shareholders, customers, competitors and communities. 
In addition, certain other business rules are also used where and when necessary in CSMFI 
including regulatory rules, operational procedures and the compliance manual. Some CSMFI 
employee also owe professional responsibility to professional associations, self-regulatory bodies 
or regulators. It is within this framework that CSMFI’s CoCE points out that the employee of 
CSMFI are expected to show good judgement and be accountable for their actions, as 
emphasised in the contract of employment. The employee are expected to review and attest to 
their compliance with the codes yearly. Obligation violation reports are prepared by the directors 
when the need arises.  
The first section of CSMFI’s CoCE dwells on issues about respect for the law, with unlawful acts 
prohibited within the organisation, to prevent corruption. The second section provides insights on 
personal integrity, with emphasis laid on criminal record, excessive personal debt, gifts and 
entertainment, punctuality, alcohol and substance abuse, harassment, discrimination and violence 
in the workplace, use of the Internet, email and electronic media, irregular business conduct, 
dealing with the organisation’s assets and the organisational brand. The third section focuses on 
conflict of interest amongst relatives, corporate opportunities, and financial transactions for one’s 
self and so on. It further looks at issues of confidentiality, credit processing, appearance and 
courtesy as well as employees’ responsibilities, where it is emphasised that it is the responsibility 
of all employees to understand and put into practice the CoCE and other organisational policies. 
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Failure to comply with the codes usually results in disciplinary actions ranging from an informal 
meeting to dismissal depending on the gravity of the case. 
The impetus for developing internal organisational CoCE in CSMFI also relates to the threats 
(such as the closure of the organisation) that CSMFI has received from the regulators and 
supervisory body and lessons from the past related to the closure of MFIs. This type of 
accountability is also supported by Ebrahim (2003), who points out that good governance 
standards necessitate all organisations to have an independent BOD and even specify some of the 
tasks of the board. These BODs have laid down organisational tasks which CSMFI respects. 
Based on the reports that management submits to the BOD and the respect for hierarchy as 
stipulated in CSMFI’S codes of conduct and job description, with lower management reporting 
to senior management, for example, there is bound to be an internal or upward accountability 
relationship in CSMFI, as well as the feedback or advice the BOD gives to management 
(downward accountability). Horizontal accountability relationships exist amongst employee or 
BOD members themselves, following organisational codes of practice or when one feels the need 
to report to their colleagues. However, there remains evidence of challenges that CSMFI receives 
from different stakeholders in an attempt to deliver proper accountability to its stakeholders. 
 
6.6 Chapter Summary 
The chapter has discussed the case study results in line with its accounting and accountability 
practices. After the introduction, the chapter explored the concept of accountability as 
understood by the case study organisation. Different meanings of accountability were advanced 
by different departments, all ending up to mean ‘held responsible’, as suggested by Ebrahim 
(2003). The internal form of accountability (‘felt responsible’) is missing.  
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The chapter has further explored accounting and accountability practices under sub-headings of 
internal control and accountability, external control and accountability, social control and 
accountability and the challenges which CSMFI encounters in a bid to deliver proper 
accountability to its stakeholders. Under the internal control and accountability section, the 
control and reporting practices that take place inside the organisation have been explored in line 
with the changes that have occurred within the organisation such as centralisation and new 
software systems, which have all impacted on such internal practices. Besides control, this 
section has also explored other accounting functions such as planning, budgeting and decision-
making and further looked at the accountability functions of performance evaluation and internal 
reporting.  
 
The chapter further embraced the external control and accountability environment where 
regulatory and supervisory duties step in. In line with external accountability, more was 
discussed on the types of financial reports which CSMFI have to prepare for external 
stakeholders such as shareholders, government, regulators, supervisory bodies and customers. 
The external performance evaluation process was also discussed.  
 
Lastly, the chapter has also explored the social nature of accounting and accountability practices 
based on the argument that human beings operate in a social world. It looked at the social 
accounting concept, where issues around management and regulatory accounting were 
discussed. Issues like social projects, loans given to the community, participation of customers in 
social projects and social audits were discussed. The next chapter discusses of the institutional 
change process and how it has impacted on CSMFI’s accounting and accountability practices. 
  
  
203 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
AN INTEGRATED DISCUSSION USING LITERATURE, THEORY AND DATA  
 
7.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter aims at discussing the results presented in the preceding chapter. The discussion is 
necessary in order to understand how the various accountability practices observed in the 
organisation are shaped by institutional processes. In particular, the study discusses how the 
various institutional changes that have occurred in CSMFI due to several factors such as 
enabling conditions (see actor’s positions in chapter four - page 104) in the organisation gave 
them power to change or influence the accountability practices. In line with Dorado’s (2013) 
argument that social groups are institutionally embedded and institutional entrepreneurs do not 
operate in a social vacuum, the analysis and discussion in the chapter is informed by institutional 
theory, and in particular institutional entrepreneurship. As a result, the role of agency in the 
change process is central to the analysis. The chapter mainly answers two specific questions: (i) 
why and how do actors bring about changes within CSMFI’s practices (ii) how do the resulting 
changes become accepted as taken-for-granted values and beliefs (institutionalised) or not? The 
answers to these questions provide insights for answering the research questions stated in chapter 
one. 
The process of institutional entrepreneurship adopted perceives change not as an outcome but as 
a process (Battilana et al., 2009). This chapter also recognises the fact that ‘change’ is not an 
easy phenomenon, by further discussing the challenges encountered during such change 
processes. The chapter is divided into five main parts. Following the introduction is a discussion 
of CSMFI’s accountability practices in regard to the existing literature. In this section issues 
such as the meaning, types and mechanisms of accountability evident in CSMFI are explored. 
Second is a discussion of CSMFI’s missions and objectives, which demonstrate the main 
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organisational change. Third is a discussion of the mission change process, which has arguably 
led to further organisational changes. The change process discussed here is supported by the 
existing literature and is examined according to the themes stemming from the theoretical 
framework of the thesis, including institutional pressures, actors, institutional contradictions, 
enabling conditions, the implementation process, results and change classification. Last comes 
the chapter summary.  
7.1 Accountability Practice(s)  
Fonchingong (2009) argues that in order to ensure effective development, developmental 
structures (like CSMFI) need to implement good governance strategies to ensure proper 
accountability. CSMFI does have some form of accountability system in place, as discussed in 
Chapter 6. The accountability practice in CSMFI recently changed from having an informal 
grassroots (downwards) nature to being more upwards. Initially there was more emphasis on 
grassroots (downwards) with a socially orientated mission, but today, following the change in 
mission of CSMFI, the commonly practiced accountability type remains upwards. This implies a 
need to redefine the concept of accountability to capture and better understand the practices 
within the organisation. 
 
7.1.1 Redefining Accountability  
Accountability in CSMFI can also be seen to be a contestable concept, which agrees with 
Bovens’ (2007) suggestion. Its importance in CSMFI cannot be doubted, which also confirms 
Gray’s (2014) point of view. CSMFI’s role in society is backed up by its accountability function, 
which supports Moir’s (2001) point of view that a business can only contribute fully to society if 
it is socially responsible, besides other attributes. Based on the data collected as stated in chapter 
six, there seems to be different understandings of what the term’ accountability’ means. This 
  
205 
 
confirms Gray’s (2014) argument that accountability can mean different things to different 
people. Accountability is thus analysed below starting from the broader to a narrow view.  
 
Drawing on the views of Ebrahim (2003) and Unerman and O’Dwyer (2004), accountability in 
CSMFI today can be concluded to be seen as ‘held responsible’ (a broad view). This is supported 
by the various definitions offered by interviewees at CSMFI as pointed out in Section 6.2. Even 
though accountability at CSMFI is concluded to be compulsory to senior management and 
shareholders (upwards), as reported and analysed in Chapter 6, it was also observed that an 
‘unintended’ form of accountability also occurs in CSMFI. The management of CSMFI fails to 
understand that by embracing certain organisational responsibilities voluntarily, where they 
intend or provide feedback to other stakeholders, this is seen as ‘taking responsibility’, according 
to Ebrahim (2003) as discussed in Chapter 3. When CSMFI was created, the founders were not 
under obligation to justify their actions to any officials or stakeholders on a formal basis. They 
related to the farmers and villages whom they wanted to help on an informal basis. It can be 
argued here that accountability could be construed as ‘taking responsibility’ (Ebrahim, 2003). 
 
In line with Boven’s (2007) definition of accountability (Section 3.2.1), the use of regulatory 
standards by COBAC and MINFIN to evaluate the performance of CSMFI is seen to mean 
accountability. Accountability in this context remains broad, meaning evaluative. However, 
there has been a change in the accountability practice of CSMFI over the years to include 
stakeholders’ perspectives besides shareholder accountability. Stakeholder accountability seeks 
to address the criticism of the descriptive nature of the shareholder perspective not involving the 
behaviour of other stakeholders, as pointed out in Chapter 3.  
 
Moving away from the broad meaning of accountability, various specific views have been 
suggested from which accountability can best be defined (Section 3.2.1). In regard to the 
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function-to-function (stakeholder responsibility) view, CSMFI does have various job 
descriptions for each function which specifies their responsibilities, which confirms Gray’s 
(2001) definition of accountability (Section 3.2.1).  
 
Furthermore, the person-to-person (stakeholder-to-stakeholder) view of accountability is also 
evident in CSMFI through open dialogues and discussion forums such as meetings in which 
various stakeholders are allowed to express their views on which decisions are made and not just 
accepting shareholders’ primacy. This, according to Cooper and Owen (2007), is known as 
stakeholder accountability. Drawing from Boland and Schultze’s (1996) definition of 
accountability, the act by which daily collectors, the Head of CSR and loan providers have to 
explain their actions by telling a credible story could mean accountability. 
 
7.1.2 Types of Accountability 
The dual nature of CSMFI’s objectives implies that CSMFI is accountable to different 
stakeholders (see Section 6.2), leading to a complexity in CSMFI’s accountability structure in 
line with Ebrahim (2003) and Ahmed’s (2004) suggestion (Chapter 3). Drawing on Ritchie and 
Richardson (2000) and Dixon et al.’s (2006) accountability framework, CSMFI seems to be 
practising more of Types 1 and 2, which can be explained by the recent change in mission (to 
profitability, see Section 7.2).  
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FIGURE 7.1 Accountability Practices at CSMFI  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to Figure 7.1, type 1 accountability is to regulators, shareholders and tax authorities 
and Type 2 to senior management from the subordinate employee of CSMFI. The accountability 
to COBAC and MINFIN from the management of CSMFI confirms Kearns (1994) and Dixon et 
al.’s (2006) argument on accountability being imposed on management by external stakeholders. 
However, the dual nature of CSMFI’s objectives and the fact that CSMFI is inhabited by social 
actors makes it possible for Types 3 and 4 to also occur, even though little attention is given to 
them. Hilhorst (2003) and O’Dwyer and Unerman’s (2007) argument about social accountability 
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occurring in organisations occupied by social agents, a move from functional accountability 
(Types1 and 2), can thus be concluded in the case of CSMFI.  
 
Type 3 exists via reaching the community through social projects while Type 4 is mostly through 
meeting the demands of customers even though informal and often through loan officers and 
daily collectors. However, there is hardly any evidence showing that CSMFI reports to its 
customers or to the community in which it operates. The social projects, loans and others forms 
of banking activities are usually reported by customers to management when the need arises. 
Even though some employee are assigned to follow up loans and the progress or social welfare 
of clients who enjoy services offered by CSMFI, there is hardly ever proof as to the outcome of 
such monitoring activities in CSMFI. The implication here is that even though the story told by 
daily collectors to the management of CSMFI might seem credible (accountability, according to 
Boland and Schultze (1996)), the researcher observed that there is much ambiguity in such 
stories (see quotations below from a loan officer and in Section 7.1.6.2). Hence, there seems to 
be downwards accountability in CSMFI, but mainly Types 1 and 2 from regulators or 
supervisors and tax authorities and shareholders to the management of CSMFI (as shown in 
Figure 7.1 above). Today, the accountability relationship between management and clients is 
missing, unlike originally when CSMFI’s mission was solely social. 
 
Upwards, formal, horizontal and vertical accountabilities remain the commonly practised forms 
of accountabilities in CSMFI (see Ritchie and Richardson, 2000; Dixon et al. 2006). The 
evidence lies in the justification and reporting format of actions in CSMFI as discussed in 
Chapter 6. The subordinate employee reports to the head of departments, managers, BOD, 
regulators, taxation and even auditors when the need arises. For example, the Accountant reports 
to the Head of Operations and Finance, who then reports to the General Manager, who reports to 
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the BOD. The management also report to regulators, the supervisory body and the tax authorities 
when the need arises, and these groups also report back to CSMFI (downwards) when necessary. 
  
The upwards accountability in CSMFI and according to Hilhorst (2003) is of a formal and 
hierarchical nature, as subordinate employee are observed to be reporting to senior management 
and management to shareholders or regulators. The accountability in CSMFI is also based on 
both organisational and regulatory rules and laws, which again supports Boven’s (2007) 
definition of accountability (Chapter 3 and Section 7.1.1). For example, the reports generated in 
CSMFI follow a particular organisational format according to internal rules and are presented to 
regulators in line with regulatory text. This confirms Hilhorst (2003) and Lewis and Madon’s 
(2004) argument about accountability in organisations which has to do with justification mostly 
being given by the organisation to higher authorities proving the use of the resources entrusted to 
them is mainly supported by rule-bound responses. Again, accountability here, as stated in 
Section 7.1.1, means ‘held responsible’ (Ebrahim, 2003). 
 
Horizontal accountability, as shown and suggested in Ritchie and Richardson (2000) and Dixon 
et al.’s (2006) accountability frameworks, is common within departments in CSMFI. Colleagues 
report to each other to generate better results from the department. The departmental heads see to 
it that this relationship is maintained for effective results. For example, at the Head Office level, 
the Credit and Loans department controls related functions at the branch level. This department 
includes the functions of Head of Service for Credit and Risk Management, Loans Officer, 
Credit Controller, Recovery Officer and Risk Manager. All of these employee work 
collaboratively through reporting to each other for easy and effective performance and they all 
report to the Head of Service, who generates a final report to be submitted to the General 
Manager of CSMFI when due.  
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Even though Dixon et al. (2006) suggest the need for accountability to and from the grassroots, 
there seems to be no evidence today of any accountability to, but rather from, the grassroots in 
CSMFI. This again can be argued to be due to the change in mission. Based on Dixon et al.’s 
argument (2006) that the real offices of loan officers and those who deal with clients are out in 
the field, loan, recovery and daily collection officers were further interviewed. Following their 
interview scripts, it is evident that reports on field observation are strictly based on attempts to 
recover or get clients to save more. Little or nothing seems to be said about the clients’ welfare, 
business progress, health or living standards. The clients or benefactors of CSMFI’s social 
projects are rather expected to report to CSMFI about their progress and success. Clients who 
ask for loans from CSMFI are expected to submit a business plan to the Loans department before 
the loan is disbursed to them, and CSMFI loans recovery employee are also expected to monitor 
the progress of such projects through field visits and unannounced audits. It is a similar case for 
household clients who are awarded loans for health reasons. They are expected by CSMFI to 
give a report, even though it is informal, to explain how the loan was or was not able to resolve 
their health issues. Close to 75% of daily collectors’, loan and recovery officers’ job in the field 
is self-supervisory and this group of employee develop the list of clients on their own and make 
recommendations to the line manager or head of department concerned. This nature of work 
confirms the suggestions by Ahmad (2002) for example, arguing that trust and autonomy is what 
shapes the jobs of loan and recovery officers. One loan officer with over 6 years’ experience on 
the field commented, 
… as you may now know we (loan and recovery officers) can decide on where we 
want to go when we leave the office for the field. We can even choose to go see our 
loved ones or go home for some food and even sleep. This is because we know what 
clients will say, they will keep promising us that they will repay the loans or telling 
us different stories that will still end up not fulfilling our mission. Since the field 
allowance we get is usually not enough, we decide to spend the little money we have 
wisely and make up our reports by ourselves most often than not since we must 
submit this when we return to the office. We are our own managers on the field with 
nobody to tell us what to do. I like this job. 
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There is no form of obligatory accountability, as Dixon et al. (2006) argue. The loan officers feel 
scared to open up to their line managers and tell them what exactly takes place on the field as 
they don’t want to lose their jobs. Loan officers at CSMFI seem to be the mediators linking the 
accountability types between the clients and the organisation through first vertical (formal) 
accountability so as to satisfy the demands of their line managers (Type 2) and second horizontal 
(informal) accountability to satisfy the needs of customers (Type 4). This analysis is similar to 
Dixon et al.’s (2006) case of CETZAM. 
 
Burns and Scapens (2000) further add that changes in accountability processes could be the 
result of changes in the organisation’s structure and accounting systems, as the case may be in 
CSMFI, which has experienced a drift in its mission which further impacted on its structure as 
well as its accounting and accountability system (Chapter 6 and Figure 7.3). For example, the 
change in CSMFI’s mission to profitability implies a need for better accounting software that 
could perform complex banking transactions. This means the types of report generated will be 
affected, which is the case today: CSMFI has more quantitative reports, unlike before where 
qualitative ones were produced for disclosure, performance measurement, and reporting, 
amongst others.  
 
The use of disclosure statements or reports for accountability purposes is supported by Ebrahim 
(2003), who argues that to a greater extent these disclosure statements and reports provide 
information to funders and oversight agencies (upward accountability) and to a lesser extent 
provide information to clients or members who read the reports from the MFI (downward 
accountability). Figure 7.1 provides a summary of accountability change in line with the change 
in CSMFI’s mission. 
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FIGURE 7.2: Mission vs. Accountability Change Cycle in CSMFI  
A. As an Association: Relational and downwards accountability 
 
 
 
B. As a Category 1 (Cooperative): Upwards rules-based accountability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. As a Category 2 (Bank): Upwards and potential downwards accountability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FARMERS/ 
COMMUNITY 
FOUNDERS/ 
FUNDERS 
COBAC/MINFIN/ 
ANEMCAM 
shareholders/ Tax 
 
CSMFI Management 
COBAC/MINFIN/ 
ANEMCAM 
shareholders/ Tax 
Customers  
 
 
Community Customers  
 
CSMFI Management 
 
 
Horizontal (relational based) - informal 
 
 
  
213 
 
 
7.1.3 Accountability Mechanisms 
Dixon et al. (2006) argue that good governance can be assured from aid and developmental 
organisations through various accountability mechanisms which should capture the grassroots, or 
downwards to the clients and community. Self-regulation in CSMFI, for example, was initially 
not compulsory, as individuals were the funders and understood each other, but as the 
organisational objectives increased to embrace profitability, unethical and unlawful issues 
stepped in, and these issues have received attention from two different broad pressure levels 
(Chapter 4). There is internal pressure from the senior management of CSMFI (BOD) via the 
organisation’s CoCE due to the fear of losing its reputation. The external pressures stem from 
the regulatory accounting rules (COBAC and OHADA respectively) that CSMFI is obliged to 
comply with in order to continue existing in the class of business chosen. This supports 
Ebrahim’s (2003) argument that in order to maintain public confidence, organisations like 
CSMFI must comply with certain internal (to main reputation) and external (to continue 
existing- maintain funds) rules. CSMFI with its dual objectives imposes formal rules and codes 
on employees and sees to it that such rules are obeyed. Any deviations are usually followed by 
sanctions. Table 7.1 below is a summary on CSMFI’s accountability practices following 
Ebrahim (2003) suggestion as pointed out in chapter 3 (Table 3.2). 
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Table 7.1 Summary on CSMFI’s Accountability Practices  
 
Accountability 
mechanism (tool or 
process) 
Format of 
accountability 
Accountability types - 
to whom? (upwards 
or downwards or to 
self) 
Drivers (internal or 
external pressure 
areas) 
Disclosure/ Reports 
(tool) 
-  Daily 
- Weekly 
- Monthly 
- Quarterly 
- Semester 
- Yearly 
- Upwards to funders, 
regulators, taxation etc 
- Downwards (to a 
lesser degree) to 
customers or members 
who read the reports 
- Regulators 
- Taxation 
- Shareholders/ 
Funders 
- Public 
Performance 
assessment and 
evaluation (tool) 
- Financial 
- Non- 
financial 
(social) 
- Upwards to funders/ 
shareholder, top 
management (BOD, 
AGM) and community 
- Significant potential 
for downwards from 
CSMFI to communities 
and from funders to 
CSMFI (missing at 
present) 
- Funders/ 
shareholders 
- COBAC (external) 
- Management 
(internal) 
Participation 
(process) 
- Consultation  
- Involvement 
in social 
projects 
(own 
initiative and 
negotiation is 
missing) 
- Downwards from 
CSMFI to customers 
and communities (loan 
officers/ social 
projects) 
- Internally to CSMFI 
themselves 
- Significant potential 
for downwards from 
funders/shareholders to 
CSMFI 
- Organisational 
values (internal) 
- Funding 
requirements 
(external) 
Self-regulation 
(process) 
- CoCE  
- Job 
description 
- To CSMFI itself, as a 
sector 
- Potentially to 
customers and donors/ 
shareholders 
- Erosion of public 
confidence due to 
previous scandals of 
MFIs shutting down 
and making away 
with clients’ finances 
(external loss of 
funds; internal loss 
of reputation) 
Social auditing 
(tool and process) 
- Internal 
auditor 
- External 
auditor 
- Supervisory 
committee 
(COBAC) 
- Internally to CSMFI 
itself (by linking values 
to strategy and 
performance) 
- Downwards and 
upwards to various 
stakeholders 
- Erosion of public 
confidence (external) 
- Valuation of social, 
environmental and 
ethical performance 
(internal) 
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Besides individuals drifting away from the organisational mission, it was also noticed that 
CSMFI itself has drifted away from its original missions and objectives. 
7.2 Mission Drift  
When poverty alleviation was the sole objective of CSMFI, its accountability structure was 
mainly to and from farmers (grassroots) even though informal and optional. That is, 
accountability was seen to mean ‘felt responsibility’ according to Ebrahim (2003) and Bovens 
(2007). The group of individuals who started CSMFI focused on assisting farmers with small 
loans to buy farm products and had reports (verbal) from the farmers on how the loans helped 
them and how they were faring in terms of cultivation, living standards and health. These 
individuals also told farmers of their aims and mission and the source of their income during 
meetings. The story, however, changed when CSMFI became a cooperative, and still more so 
nowadays where more emphasis is placed on financial sustainability compared to poverty 
alleviation. Evidence is seen from the types of report generated within the organisation, mostly 
targeting senior management, shareholders or regulators. 
 
Battilana and Dorado (2010) argue that in order to keep up with the continuous high demands of 
microfinance services by the poor, especially the provision of loans via NGOs, a 
commercialisation objective needs to be pursued whereby enough profit should be made to cater 
for the on-going microfinance operations as well as fulfil the needs of the poor. While it is 
imperative that MFIs like CSMFI pursue dual roles – social and commercial. The mission drift 
argument suggests that the social objective is very often abandoned in favour of 
commercialisation (Woller, 2002). The mission added argument, however, suggests that a 
commercialisation objective can be added to the social one, with both pursued concurrently. The 
empirical evidence gathered during the study suggested that CSMFI started purely as a social 
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organisation providing financial assistance to poor farmers. However, this objective has changed 
over the years with a shift towards commercialisation. While attempts are now being made to 
pursue both social and commercial objectives, it is clear from the analysis that CSMFI 
concentrates more on the commercialisation agenda at the expense of its social mission to the 
poor, hence a mission drift. 
 
Based on the above, an argument could be made that there has been mission drift in CSMFI from 
the initial solely poverty alleviation (social) to a more commercial (profitability) objective (see 
Woller, 2002; Christen, 2001). We saw evidence which suggested that even the accounting and 
governance structures changed significantly when CSMFI became a recognised regulated 
accredited entity in early 2009. Before 2009, CSMFI focused on its sole social objective to 
alleviate poverty through financial assistance given to farmers in various communities, and there 
was barely any formal reporting during this period. After CSMFI gained accreditation, its focus 
was to make sure it stayed in operation and met regulatory and accounting requirements while 
making a profit. While during the early years the company made efforts to follow up with 
farmers to monitor their progress, we found that nowadays there is little investment in following 
up clients to monitor their progress and welfare. The General Manager justified this in the 
following context: 
It is not that CSMFI has not attempted to invest on monitoring the progress of 
customers but there is a problem of trusting employee employed to do so. In the past, 
the employees encouraged customers to save ended up collecting the little clients 
have laboured for and end up in thin air with the money. CSMFI has had to pay 
several customers as a result of fund mismanagement by employee. Also, when the 
employee is sent on a mission to follow up clients’ welfare mostly end up not doing 
the job. With such failure on several attempts CSMFI suspended such social follow-
up services. 
 
Although a mission drift argument has been made above, it can also be counter-argued that some 
elements of social objectives are still being pursued by CSMFI. Hence this cannot be completely 
argued to be mission drift but rather ‘mission added’, with the organisation still pursuing some 
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social objectives in addition to its commercial mission in a dual mission (Tucker and Miles, 
2004; Cull et al., 2009). Woller (2002) pointed out that commercialisation comes with other 
benefits such as increased outreach to the poor and development as well as increased financial 
viability. Hence, MFIs’ adoption of a commercial approach may not only assure long-term 
financial sustainability through financial self-viability or increase profits, but also increase 
length of outreach. 
 
Irrespective of the line of argument (mission drift versus mission added), there is clear evidence 
to suggest that the mission of CSMFI has changed over the years. This change with more 
emphasis on commercialisation has also led to changes in organisational processes, including 
accounting and reporting systems.  
7.3 CSMFI’s Change Process 
A number of institutional, organisational, accounting and accountability changes have been 
identified within CSMFI. CSMFI started as a charity organisation known as an association, with 
few individual members, socially focused and modelled on the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh 
(Tulchin, 2003; Sengupta and Aubuchon, 2008; Bateman, 2010). CSMFI’s main concern at the 
time was to alleviate poverty, focusing initially on small groups of farmers from neighbouring 
villages, which confirms Zeller’s (2006) argument that socially focused MFIs are usually 
associated with poverty alleviation objectives and member-based. The accountability was like a 
‘community accountability’ where reporting was mainly to farmers in a very informal way. The 
accountability at the time included fewer stakeholders and can argued to be downwards, as more 
interest was placed on the farmers in those villages, hence this can be referred to as community 
accountability (Dixon et al., 2006).  
The association later became a cooperative in 2003 under the Category 1 MFI classification in 
Cameroon and Type 4 under Category B according to Greuning et al.’s (1998) classification of 
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MFIs. Later on in 2009, CSMFI started moving towards becoming a Category 2 MFI, intending 
to become a fully-fledged bank by 2014/2015. In support of Mersland and Strom’s (2007) 
argument, CSMFI at this stage became more commercially focused, geared towards maximising 
profits and welcoming the general public (non-members) besides its members. During this 
period, the accountability moved towards more formal rules-based accountability, as 
demonstrated by Ritchie and Richardson (2000) and Dixon et al. (2006), externally to COBAC, 
MINFIN, the tax authorities and shareholders and internally to management. This type of 
accountability can be argued to be upwards, according to Dixon et al. (2006), to the above-
mentioned stakeholders. The migration from one type of organisation to another (change in 
mission) led to change in CSMFI’s organisational structure in terms of centralisation, creating 
more jobs via increased numbers of branches, departments, new functions and employee, such as 
the presence of the HO. The change in structure further impacted on CSMFI’s accounting and 
accountability practices assummarised in Figure 7.3. New management information and 
accounting software was also introduced following the change in mission, even though there 
remain evidence of decoupling and resistance to such changes within the organisation.  
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FIGURE 7.3: Change Impact Summary for CSMFI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The discussion here focuses on why and how such changes in mission, structure, accounting and 
accountability took place and the success levels of such changes. Institutional entrepreneurship 
provides the theoretical lens to tease out and understand the process of such an institutional 
change in CSMFI with more insights and focus on agency besides other issues. A number of 
studies (Burns and Scapens, 2000; Seo and Creed, 2002: Hardy and Maguire, 2008: Battilana et 
al., 2009; Hyvönen et al., 2012) are drawn on to support the analysis. The following section, in 
line with the thesis framework, focuses on institutional pressures, actors, contradictions, enabling 
conditions, the implementation process and the outcome. 
 
 
CHANGES IN MISSION AND OBJECTIVES OF CSMFI 
CHANGES IN THE STRUCTURE OF CSMFI  
CHANGES IN ACCOUNTING AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY PRACTICES 
OF CSMFI 
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7.3.1 Institutional Pressures  
 
The notion behind institutionalism is that behaviour is driven by pressures which can come from 
either the external or internal organisational environment (Burns and Scapens, 2000; Seo and 
Creed, 2002; Hyvönen et al., 2012). Hyvönen et al. (2012) argue that institutional entrepreneurs 
(change initiating actors) can act at these different levels, sometimes at the same time, in order to 
achieve their aims. The above argument supports the claim by Oliver (1991) that institutional 
pressures on institutional practices can bring about institutional change. Starting the explanation 
of ‘change’ from the institutional pressure point of view, four different pressure levels suggested 
by Hyvönen et al. (2012) have been discussed in the case of CSMFI, as shown in Table 7.1. 
Such pressures have been argued to be the reason for the change in mission, rules and routines at 
CSMFI.  
 
TABLE 7.2:CSMFI’s Change level(s) of Analysis  
 
 
Burns and Scapens (2000) point out that categorising the pressure level also helps enrich our 
understanding of the interplay between institutional and organisational practices (new), routines, 
power and politics. As regards the case study, pressures coming from the regulatory and 
Macro (External) /  
Inter-organisational level 
Micro (Internal)/  
Intra- organisational level 
 
Regulatory (COBAC, 
MINFIN), Political, 
Socio-economic  
Organisational 
Field (ANEMCAM) 
Organisation 
(Shareholders, 
Management) 
Individuals  
(Employee/ clients) 
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supervisory body (MINFIN and COBAC), at the organisational field level (ANEMCAM 
competitors), organisational level (management, shareholders, clients of CSMFI) and individual 
level form the four levels of analysis on which the discussion is centred.  
 
7.3.1.1 Regulatory, Political and Socio-economic Dynamics  
Cameroon’s financial sector is being shaped by external forces, some of which are regulatory in 
nature. First, the power over decision-making in regulated financial institutions like CSMFI is 
very significant in the country (Mayoux, 2006; Oyono et al., 2006). The regulatory authority 
(MINFIN) works through the banking commission (COBAC) to enforce its regulations, as seen 
in legislative texts containing regulatory norms (laws for creation, value and supervision). 
CSMFI as a regulated financial institution is bound to respect such regulatory norms in order to 
continue operations; these include disclosure of all financial operations to COBAC for further 
control and evaluation. COBAC also supervises CSMFI’s operations to ensure that its practice is 
in accordance with the rules and regulations laid down in the legislative texts. This confirms 
Tsamenyi et al.’s (2006) argument that organisational changes often result in a bid to respond to 
certain regulatory requirements which can in effect directly or indirectly influence changes in the 
organisation’s accounting system. Also in support of the NIS explanation for organisational 
changes, also known as institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), in this case it is 
seen as coercive isomorphism, since CSMFI is forced to adopt certain practices in order to 
respond to the external pressure exerted on it by COBAC and MINFIN. 
In addition, MINFIN has the power to shut down any financial institution that deviates from the 
regulatory agreed ways of practice. The power to regulate CSMFI was initially non-existent, 
since CSMFI was seen as a charity organisation with more accountability given to the 
community and farmers. According to Dixon et al.’s (2006) accountability framework, this type 
of accountability falls under Types 3 and 4 (Section 3.2.2).  
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Furthermore, the regulatory rules require that before CSMFI changes to become a fully-fledged 
bank, it must provide all necessary documentation required by MINFIN and COBAC. The 
implication here is the accounting and accountability practices of CSMFI have been redesigned 
in order to respond to regulatory requirements. This statement confirms Sunders’ (2010) 
argument on how regulatory standards can impact on an organisation’s accounting and 
accountability practices (financial reporting). CSMFI will be required to declare more taxes to 
the government and must be assessed in that area. The regulators and supervisory body 
regulating CSMFI implies that more groups of stakeholders must be accounted to by the 
management of CSMFI. This broadens CSMFI’s accountability network.  
 
Currently CSMFI is still in the process of becoming a bank (Category 2 MFI), as certain 
documents are still pending while others are being reviewed by MINFIN. The implication here is 
that in a bid to respond to such external regulatory pressures as a result of its change in mission, 
CSMFI is currently restructuring its governance structure, with centralisation seeming to be the 
main change, where every activity of other parts of the organisational networks is controlled at 
the HO. Centralisation is required for CSMFI to operate well as a bank in the near future.  
 
 
Centralisation was thought of by CSMFI as making its activities appear more transparent, 
enhancing its accountability. Ebrahim (2003) adds that accountability can improve 
organisational transparency and performance, especially if it is well carried out. In a bid to 
remain more transparent and ease accountability, CSMFI has even gone as far as investing in a 
new banking software system. CSMFI changed its management information system to employ 
new accounting software that will be able to perform banking operations, thus affecting the 
manner in which reporting and other management accounting functions are carried out within the 
organisation. It can be argued here that CSMFI is employing an accounting and accountability 
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system shaped by regulatory norms in a bid to respond to the change in mission. The new 
General Manager of CSMFI commented,  
COBAC acting as a supervisory body for MINFIN visits CSMFI in order to make 
sure scripted lawful practices are being followed and any deviation from such 
practices usually receives heavy sanctions that could even mean shutting the doors of 
CSMFI. Thus, in order to continue operations CSMFI attempts to respect all 
regulatory laws are respected and all necessary changes made that will ensure 
compliance with regulatory norms hence, a need for restructuring within the 
organisation. 
 
Updated regulatory accounting guidelines, for example, are usually made accessible to all 
regulated financial institutions by COBAC (see Appendix). The change of text in the accounting 
plan, be it modification or addition, following Sulaiman and Mitchell’s (2005) typology of 
change, necessitates that all financial institutions concerned apply such changes supervised by 
COBAC. Also, if COBAC notices any changes within the organisations that they supervise, it is 
their responsibility to bring it to the attention of the organisation and expect management to take 
immediate action. The supervisory body tends to modify certain rules based on the practical 
audit reports which they receive on the various organisations under their supervision. Such 
reports reveal the practical situation of the company to COBAC, and as a result MINFIN expects 
COBAC to take action. The Director responsible for the supervision of MFIs from COBAC 
added, 
It was sometime discovered through our audit reports that CSMFI’s turnover was far 
more than what it was originally thought to be and COBAC did notify them of 
certain changes in line with CSMFI’s tax structure (modification on CSMFI 
accounting system), for example, an increase in the percentage of tax CSMFI is 
expected to declare to the government.  
 
Regarding the regulatory text on financial institutions that are moving from one type of financial 
organisation to another as a result of a change in mission, CSMFI is compelled to comply with 
such regulatory text, given its migration from a charity organisation to a Category 1 MFI 
(cooperative) and now to a Category 2 MFI (bank).  
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The external pressure for the change in operating systems software came mainly from the 
regulators (MINFIN) forcing financial institutions such as CSMFI to maintain laws of migration 
with the accounting regulations from OHADA and COBAC. Thus, CSMFI now follows the 
OHADA system for the layout of accounts and employs Banker’s Realm software which 
captures all regulatory requirements in the reports generated. The Deputy General Manager in 
charge of Operations again noted,  
In order to become a bank we need to have not just good software but one that 
respects the international regulatory standards especially applicable to our business 
line, if not CSMFI can be sanctioned by the MINFIN and COBAC which can lead to 
winding down of business. Hence, there is the need for the application of the right 
accreditation. 
 
 
Furthermore, because of the fact that CSMFI started operations after Cameroon gained 
independence in 1960 (Oyono, 2004), the country’s political history can be seen as another 
pressure level for change in CSMFI. The consolidated financial statements of CSMFI are 
bilingual (written in French and English) as one of the official requirements of the state, as 
pointed out by Oyono (2004). However, there is evidence of branches producing reports either 
solely in French or in English (before consolidation, thus making the consolidation of accounts 
complicated). The reason given for such activities is traced back to colonial history, where the 
region which produces reports solely in English is that part of the country colonised by the 
British and those who produce reports solely in French are from the French colony region of 
Cameroon. A number of scholars (Ardener, 1962; Oyono, 2004) have discussed the political 
history and partitioning of Cameroon where 1/5th of the territory was given to the British 
mandates who administered it as part of the Eastern Nigeria North West and South West regions 
of Cameroon. The remainder of the territory belonged to the French mandates administered as an 
independent entity. Konings and Nyamnjoh (1997) add that the British mandates formed the 
English part (Anglophones) and called the country Cameroon while the French mandate formed 
the francophone and called the country Cameroun. The General Manager commented, 
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Even though theoretically the country seems to be bilingual its people are not 
bilingual in practice. It was observed that branches situated in the Francophone 
regions of Cameroon (French colony) turn to use French as their official working 
(spoken and written) language and the same holds from the Anglophone regions of 
Cameroon (British colony) where English is solely used at work.27  
 
CSMFI’s change in mission has also impacted on the clients who initially saw the organisation 
as a poverty alleviation or socially focused institution. The change in mission to a more profit-
making organisation can be argued to be socially unjust to those clients who joined with the aim 
of satisfying their needs. This has further led to bad governance practices in CSMFI, where some 
reports are modified, for example by loan officers, as they are under pressure to meet financial 
targets. Such malpractices have given room for continuous poverty increase in the country, 
especially between 1986 and 1996 (Baye, 2006) even with the increasing number of MFIs 
thought to be aimed at poverty alleviation. Forje (2008) adds that Cameroon can be described as 
a country with a constitution but no constitutionalism and elections without democracy.  
 
Socially, there is clear evidence to suggest that CSMFI’s formation and operation are shaped by 
social objectives. One of the BOD members pointed out, 
The birth of CSMFI was mainly to reduce poverty especially at the time when there 
was devaluation in the country’s currency.  
 
This claim supports Baye’s (2006) argument that the poverty level of the Cameroonian economy 
measured by per capita income had risen significantly, especially after the January 1994 event 
which recorded a 50% CFA Franc devaluation in Cameroon: the devaluation affected close to 
50% of Cameroon’s population (Oyono, 2004). In a bid to eradicate or reduce such poverty 
levels and improve its economic growth rate, Cameroon embarked on promoting developmental 
projects. It is also claimed that Cameroon’s economy has been wrecked by a combination of 
other factors such as corruption, poor governance, nepotism, social injustice and 
underdevelopment (Oyono, 2004; Forje, 2008). Thus, CSMFI being a developmental 
                                                          
27 This statement was confirmed by the researcher by looking at CSMFI’s financial statements and reports. Some 
were in French and others in English. 
  
226 
 
organisation created in 2000 after such a devaluation event can be argued to be responding to the 
socio-economic needs of the poor. CSMFI today embarks on good governance mechanisms 
through its Corporate Social Responsibility department, where there seems to be evidence of 
social projects targeting the poor with increasing control, monitoring and reporting tools put in 
place. Furthermore, CSMFI has embarked upon replacing its accounting software with a more 
reliable and efficient system in a bid to monitor its progress or success level, respond to socio-
economic and developmental pressures and remain competitive. The Human Resource Manager 
commented, 
 
CSMFI cannot operate successfully without responding to the needs of society and 
its clients: the social sphere with clients’ habits remains vital in every business 
strategy. Thus, besides focusing on gaining more revenue, CSMFI also embarks on 
sharing some of its revenue to the less privileged in the society. This is usually in 
areas of education, health, sports and small and medium size businesses and 
agriculture. It is usually done when need arises or upon demand from NGOs, schools 
and other partners, and budgeted for yearly. 
 
 
The discussion above confirms Dillard et al.’s (2004) explanation of how the formation of 
institutions is shaped by the socio-political context. The analysis suggests that the norms and 
practices which form the most general and widely taken-for-granted organisational assumptions 
are usually made by the government, regulators and legislators.  
 
7.3.1.2 Organisational Field Dynamics of Institutional Change 
 
Oliver (1992) observes that,  
… economic considerations should be incorporated into institutional explanations of 
organisational activities in order to specify more precisely the particular situations or 
conditions within which institutionalized activities are most likely to persist or 
endure. (p. 21) 
In addition to the political field level pressures discussed earlier, studies have also identified that 
organisational fields can exert pressures to change practices (Tsamenyi et al., 2006; Leca et al., 
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2008). The organisational field-level pressures in the case of CSMFI come mainly from 
ANEMCAM, the association of all MFIs in Cameroon that has the primary responsibility for 
ensuring that these organisations are financially sustainable. With the current mission of CSMFI 
to become a Category 2 MFI, it is crucial for it to be seen as financially sustainable. Dillard et al. 
(2004) see the role or practices of professional bodies and consultants, amongst others, to be 
very important in shaping what goes on at the organisational field level.  
 
In a bid to respond to the external pressure from ANAMCAM and remain highly competitive 
and sustainable, CSMFI is undergoing major restructuring, which has impacted on its accounting 
and accountability practices. As a response to the change in mission, the style of reporting, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, has changed to more quantitative reporting, with reports now 
based mainly on data generated by the new software system.  Decision-making now follows a 
centralised pattern and is more formally done at the HO, unlike before when branch managers 
were allowed to make certain decisions. One of the branch clients commented, 
When I came to take a loan from CSMFI in 2003, my application was assessed and 
the loan given to me immediately if the branch manager approved the project I 
wanted to use the loan for. Today, so many things have changed in CSMFI when it 
comes to getting our loan applications approved. I was even told that all the loan 
applications now have to be sent to the HO and only the national credits officer from 
the HO can make a decision on whether to grant the loan or not. This has slowed 
down the loan processing times unlike before and we are not really happy. 
 
 
ANEMCAN’s pressure on CSMFI at the organisation field level is significant because of 
CSMFI’s desire to become a Category 2 MFI (bank). This requires more evaluation and checks 
by ANEMCAM. The change in CSMFI’s software, for example, was recommended by 
ANEMCAM after its review of CSMFI’s activities. ANEMCAM concluded that although 
CSMFI had started to include Category 2 products and activities in its operations, its software 
was not permitting the organisation to show a true reflection of all its activities, especially the 
newly introduced banking activities, hence, the change in the operating system to a more 
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sophisticated and transparent one that could accommodate and reflect CSMFI’s current 
operations, maintaining a true and fair view of the organisation’s accounts.  
 
There is also evidence of mimetic isomorphism as a result of the coercive pressures of 
ANEMCAM, suggesting that there is an interrelationship between the different types of 
isomorphism (Tsamenyi et al., 2006; Leca et al., 2008). ANEMCAM regularly evaluates all 
MFIs in Cameroon and ranks them based on the results. This process is actually forcing MFIs to 
mimic each other. For example, when a MFI is judged as the best, based on the ranking 
produced by ANEMCAM, other MFIs become interested in knowing what this MFI is doing 
differently to become more successful. This mimicking tendency is necessary for the MFIs to be 
competitive and seen as legitimate. CSMFI is considered as one of the leading MFIs in 
Cameroon, hence a number of other MFIs attempt to copy it.  
The Head of the Marketing Department at the HO noted,  
CSMFI is seen as a major competitor and leading MFI to many other MFIs in the 
country according to the reports received from ANEMCAM. CSMFI continuously 
updates itself about the market trends in order to make sure it remains the best in the 
market. CSMFI in order to remain the best MFI in Cameroon embarks on becoming 
a Category 2 MFI and compete more with banks who have MFI as a part of it. This 
has forced management to become more accountable to regulators and shareholders 
who are seen as the gateway to our success. This process has also led to other MFIs 
wanting to be like us. They want to copy a lot of the things we do. 
 
7.3.1.3 Organisational and Individual Dynamics of Institutional Change 
 
In line with Burns and Scapens (2000) and borrowing from OIE, internal level pressures also 
drive changes within an organisation in an attempt to achieve its mission. For example, the 
change in mission from an association to a cooperative Category 1 MFI was the result of certain 
internal organisational pressures from the management of CSMFI. To meet its missions and 
objectives, the AGM approved the centralisation proposal of CSMFI’s senior management. It 
can be argued here that the management team also saw the need to get people that could support 
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the idea and get it implemented and that is why the management team, with the aid of the 
General Manager and BOD, took the idea successfully to the AGM. This supports Hyvönen et 
al.’s (2012) argument that institutional entrepreneurs always engage themselves in looking for 
actors that will welcome their idea(s) or vision for change and get it implemented. 
 
 
The recent change in structure (from decentralisation to centralisation), following the change in 
mission and objectives further led to more changes, particularly the change in accountability 
system (type) from informal to formal and shift from grassroots to shareholder, regulator and 
senior management accountability. The change in the mission necessitates that internally 
management finds a way to streamline decision-making to make it easier to achieve the new 
objective of a commercially successful enterprise.  
 
The introduction of the new software, for example, was made easier because even before 
ANEMCAM raised the need for this change, the managers were experiencing challenges with 
the previous software they were using. The managers clearly realised that there was a need to 
have software that will perform banking transactions; hence there was a push internally by the 
managers for the change in software to Banker’s Realm. The change of software at CSMFI can 
thus be argued to be a practice-driven change (Smets et al., 2012). It is from attempting to 
operate as a bank (new mission) that the IT and accounting departments discovered 
incompatibility in the previous system they were using; therefore these departments were able to 
exert internal pressure for change. The Head Office Accountant explained, 
Initially before the new software was put in place my colleagues and I were finding it 
very difficult to incorporate certain banking transactions. For example, international 
money transfers were very difficult to reconcile using the old software but with the 
complaints that we raised, we now have software that can facilitate our jobs, 
especially when dealing with banking products recently introduced in the 
organisation. 
 
  
230 
 
It can be argued that CSMFI was subject to managerial pressures in order to improve its 
operations. The systems previously used were not effectively integrated into the management 
process. For example, before the change in mission to become a bank, CSMFI operated a 
decentralised system where monitoring and control were carried out physically at various 
different branches. There were no effective systems in place for checks and controls to be carried 
out remotely from the HO. As the organisation expanded and became more profit-orientated, 
there was internal pressure for monitoring from HO. The decision-making process, even though 
it is now more complex with different stakeholders up the decision-making ladder, is much more 
effective, with positive reports on loan outcomes, for example. The Credit Controller at the Head 
Office added,  
I can now effectively know which clients will be able to repay back loans if given 
following from the records of their activities accessible from the central system 
online and not necessarily to trust what the branch managers say. This process, even 
though more time consuming for the clients, has proven more effective for CSMFI as 
they have witnessed a drop in their bad debts since 2011.  
 
The movement of CSMFI from an association to a cooperative and now to become a bank 
implies a change in orientation, structures and processes. The organisation is now compelled to 
introduce a management style capable of producing information that will aid in the decision-
making process, control of financial and social information and being able to communicate the 
goals of CSMFI to all employees. The change in accounting and reporting is central in this 
change. As pointed out by Jones (1985), accounting is important in facilitating organisational 
integration and decision-making, which is essential for CSMFI. Jones (1985:197) points out, 
… accounting systems form an integral part of an organisation’s structure and 
processes to effect control. Their importance stems from the ability to facilitate 
organisational integration, to motivate, to assist decision making and to provide 
measurements of performance through enabling characteristics such as the delegation 
of authority, communication of objectives, participation and informational feedback.  
 
The change in software, for example, was initially initiated by the Deputy Manager in charge of 
Operations and Finance at the Head Office level in order to be able to correct certain errors that 
the old software could not rectify. This takes us to the intra-organisational level pressure 
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(individual). Given his experience and knowledge about using different banking software, he 
noticed that the change in mission would mean the modification or addition of several operations 
and that the existing software would be incompatible. In support of the change in software, the 
new General Manager argued, 
Banker’s Realm uses a big centralised system … and all CSMFI’s data can be 
consolidated into one big database and it can accommodate our international 
transactions as the old software only works locally. In the situation where real time 
data consolidation is needed, Banker’s Realm remains the best solution. 
 
Hyvönen et al. (2012) argue that institutional entrepreneurs often question the old institutional 
arrangements and strive to create new ones or come up with solutions that will replace such 
existing arrangements. The act of questioning the use of the old software in line with meeting the 
new organisational mission, as mentioned, was initially done by the Deputy Manager in charge 
of Operations. Given his position in the organisation, the BOD gave unequivocal support to his 
suggestions. This can be confirmed from his follow-up interview on system incompatibility 
where he pointed out, 
In line with the changing mission of CSMFI to become a fully-fledged bank, at the 
time I could not see how CSMFI could effectively accomplish it if the old software 
was continuously being used. The old software did not capture many banking 
operations as expected. In a bid to respond to the new mission, I kept on suggesting 
the need for new banking software that will avoid the present system’s errors such as 
errors of data, restriction and improper reporting and one that would produce more 
critical reports. I got the opinion of employee especially those concerned with 
producing such reports, and with the collective pressure the BOD reviewed the 
decision and Banker’s Realm was implemented. 
 
In line with the new mission to become a bank, continuous pressure was levied by the Deputy 
General Manager in charge of Operations to restructure the organisation by not only employing 
more employee who could perform banking operations but also to improve on the existing 
software. The Head of the Human Resource Department supported the idea of an increase in the 
number of employee, given how much work was needed, and increasing the tasks of current 
employee meant delays in other accounting and accountability functions, including slow 
reporting processes. The increase in number of employee also implies more accountability to a 
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different and wider group of stakeholders via a more centralised system. The implication here is 
more reports will be generated from and to different stakeholders, especially within the 
organisation. The Head Office Accountant, in support of the change in software, added, 
Given that the structure of operations at CSMFI is more centralised and the software 
does not realise this change, we need software that will recognise this new addition. 
Actually, when CSMFI’s mission gradually started shifting from being a cooperative 
MFI to a fully-fledged bank with microfinance services, the Operations department 
employee suggested that in order to manage and maintain the organisation’s mission 
there is a need to start thinking about software that will ease our job and produce 
effective results that will reflect a banking institution. 
 
 
In addition, the Head Office Accountant pointed out, 
… my line manager noticed the software incompatibility problem and that this will 
hinder the process of us becoming a bank by 2015 if nothing is done about it. This 
idea was then brought to the attention of the general manager by him during one of 
their monthly meetings and several other times. The general manager reported this 
problem during one of the BOD meetings. Initially there were many drawbacks and 
resistance to this idea at the level of the BOD meeting, as we learnt. Those who were 
against the idea argued that changing the software to a more sophisticated banking 
one will mean spending more costs (training employee and so on). I guess those who 
argued for posed our reasons of incompatibility in order to achieve the newly revised 
organisational missions and objectives. 
 
7.3.2 Actors  
 
In line with Seo and Creed’s (2002) argument, human praxis is a vital mediating force between 
institutional contradiction and institutional change. That is to say, institutional contradictions are 
the reasons for institutional or accounting change occurring, although this change result depends 
on the actors in the field. Actors can act to either bring about change or resist change. In line 
with Sarma (2011), the initiators (institutional entrepreneurs) and disseminating actors 
(supporters of the idea of change or stability or resistance) are discussed in this section. 
7.3.2.1 Institutional Entrepreneurs 
The institutional entrepreneurs28 in CSMFI range from external stakeholders to internal 
stakeholders, including shareholders, the new General Manager and the BOD (Schumpter 1991; 
                                                          
28 Innovators or rational actors that deviate from scripted ways of behaviour in order to (re)shape an institution. 
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Dorado, 2005; Lecca and Nccache, 2006; Hardy and Maguire, 2008). The institutional 
entrepreneurs behind the change in the recent mission are the new shareholders who seek to 
satisfy their profitability needs. The old mission of poverty alleviation was initiated by a member 
of the original association. However as the shareholding changed, the new shareholders saw the 
need to become more profit-orientated, hence the change in mission. The new General Manager 
then saw the need for a new structure to manage the new organisational form and can therefore 
be considered as the institutional entrepreneur for the centralisation in CSMFI, following 
pressure from ANEMCAM. The Deputy General Manager, who is also the Accountant and the 
IT Manager at the same time, pushed for the software change, so can be considered as 
institutional entrepreneurs. The changes initiated by institutional entrepreneurs, who can take 
various forms, mean that organisations will be forced to deviate from their original practices by 
modification, addition or replacement (Dorado 2005; Lecca and Nccache, 2006). This change 
can also be formal and progressive (Sulaiman and Mitchell, 2005; Burns and Scapens 2000). 
This would also suggest that one form of change can lead to another. In their follow-up 
interview, the DGM in charge of Operations added, 
The software change in CSMFI is not just a problem of change because we want to 
change, our intention was to have a tool that will help us with the services of a fully-
fledged bank when CSMFI finally migrates to a bank. So with Banker’s Realm we 
have the opportunity to have all the components of the services that we can use if we 
are a fully-fledged bank like ATMs, card services, interconnectivity and the 
possibility to have one server for the whole organisation which is the main reason for 
the change. 
 
The movement of CSMFI from a decentralised to a centralised accounting system was initially 
suggested by the new General Manager for better management and control. The BODs thought 
the idea was a good one after reviewing the advantages that centralisation could bring, including 
supporting CSMFI’s new mission of becoming a bank. Those who supported centralisation in 
CSMFI posed reasons such as: the ease of implementing common organisational rules and 
practices; an opportunity to get all the branches to actively participate in working towards a 
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common goal; easier control and co-ordination of the network by the head office (for example in 
dealing with budgets); greater use of specialisation; easier achievement of overhead savings and 
economies of scale; and above all to assure banking uniformity. One of the BOD members 
pointed out, 
Change management is not easy as people don’t want change - it gives challenges for 
everyone but we explain to employee that we are not changing for the sake of change. 
Thus, we cannot stop the process of trying to implement change because people don’t 
want to embrace the changes being made within the organisation. This means that the 
employee or people do not have a choice other than to accept the change. However, 
we also consider certain factors in saying people don’t have a choice. For example, 
who is resisting, the competence level of the person and so on. 
 
 
Furthermore, the Deputy General Manager in charge of Operations added,  
First of all, the vision to become a bank was the idea of the management and the 
board members. This plan was then proposed to the general assembly and accepted. 
This means that all the various organs of governance are concerned. We work on the 
strategy to migrate to become a fully-fledged bank and as part of the strategy, there is 
need to have good software. 
 
 
For CSMFI to become a bank, it needs to satisfy many requirements, including the appropriate 
accreditation or qualifications of the management team, the quality of investment and 
infrastructure, capital requirements and regulatory requirements. The change requires a Head 
Office that will control the activities of all other branches, hence the decision to centralise.  
 
7.3.2.2 Disseminating Actors 
Lawrence et al. (2002) and Burns and Nielsen (2006) argue that the vision of change can rarely 
succeed without the collaborative efforts of other embedded actors in support of the change 
action. The implication here is that there is the need for other actors (disseminating actors) to 
support the actions of the change initiators. The actors supporting the change in mission, 
structure and accounting and accountability practices in CSMFI vary, and include the 
management, shareholders, MINFIN (regulator), COBAC (supervisory body) and even the 
clients, based on their interests. The shareholders, management and regulators are the key 
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personnel that see to it that change is effectively implemented. This could be reflected in 
management reports, job descriptions of employee, organisational rules and responsibilities, and 
via audits and supervisory meetings. 
 
The idea to change the operating software was collectively supported by the management and 
employee, with the main reason being to successfully accomplish the mission of becoming a 
bank and a Category 2 MFI. The disseminating actors behind the structural changes such as the 
change to using software that could perform banking operations in preparation of becoming a 
bank was mainly supported by the Operations department, who saw the need for it as the main 
users, even though a few members of employee resisted. The Head Office Accountant 
commented, 
Most of the financial transactions that are being performed at the front and back 
office levels will require that CSMFI accepts using the new Banker’s Realm software 
unlike Global Bank that cannot handle international transactions and do 
consolidation properly, from experience when I was working in the bank and used it 
myself. The operations department will be the first people to struggle with producing 
timely reports and do their jobs effectively if CSMFI wants to operate like a bank 
and refuses to adopt the new software. We are aware of how costly Banker’s Realm 
is comparatively but we strongly believe it can be seen as an investment if CSMFI’s 
goals must be accomplished as planned.  
 
Thus, acting in a collaborative manner as suggested by Dorado (2013) is evident in CSMFI, and 
the trained employee also assist the untrained ones to get them acquainted with the use and 
application of Banker’s Realm in their daily work activities. The new General Manager who 
supported the software change also pointed out in the first semester report (2009:11), 
The quest for professionalism and the desire to meet up with exigencies of the 
present competitive market guided us in our choice of training employee. 
 
CSMFI wanting to operate in a more professional manner being reflected in its changing mission 
enforced by its structural change is consistent with the argument on institutional logic 
(Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006). The conclusion here is that professionals will want to operate 
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in a professional manner: the use of new professional software and practices makes the 
organisation look more professional, thereby working towards achieving its mission. 
 
7.3.3 Institutional Contradictions 
 
Following Hyvönen et al. (2012) and Sharma’s (2011) idea that institutional change opportunities 
can arise in an emerging field, it can be argued that such institutional entrepreneurship can occur 
in CSMFI, given that it is a microfinance which remains an emerging field. Since CSMFI 
operates in an emerging microfinance field, institutional contradictions are likely to occur (Seo 
and Creed, 2002).  
 
In line with the changing mission of CSMFI, it was noticed by management that there are certain 
organisational structural, accounting and governance hindrances as a result of inefficiencies, non-
adaptability, incompatibilities and conflicts within the organisation, which is consistent with the 
types of institutional contradiction suggested by Seo and Creed (2002) and Greenwood and 
Suddaby (2006). 
 
In terms of meeting the new mission of CSMFI, it was noticed that efficiency levels were 
dropping and not helping in moving towards the organisational goals. In line with technical 
efficiency, as pointed out by Seo and Creed (2002), employeeing remains inadequate despite its 
evolution over the years and is still a huge problem for CSMFI, given that more is expected from 
them in order to achieve the organisation’s mission. The first semester management report (2009) 
states that one of the main difficulties that CSMFI faces is “inadequate employeeing: quality of 
employee still mediocre” (p. 13). The continuous shortage of experienced employee leads to 
functional inefficiency (Seo and Creed, 2002). CSMFI even combines two or more positions and 
allocates them to one employee member. The Deputy General Manager of Operations 
commented, 
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Since CSMFI cannot afford the cost to employ another employee that will take over 
my old position as head of operations and finance control, I am forced by 
management to assume the post in addition to my new position as DGM even though 
I am only paid for the service I render as DGM.  
 
The organisation has recently addressed some of these problems by creating new departments 
together with employing new employee. For example, the CSR, SME and Client Care 
departments have all recently been added to the organisational structure of CSMFI. 
 
Furthermore, the old banking software not being capable of performing certain banking 
transactions, especially those to do with new products like international money transfer 
transactions shows incompatibility with CSMFI’s growth objective (Seo and Creed, 2002). 
CSMFI’s first semester management report (2009) comments on problems with the old software: 
The software’s incompatibility with the institution’s growth continues to be an issue. 
This is compounded with low mastery of the said software by employee, which 
further delays the detection of problems, and their solution. (p. 6) 
 
In addition, various institutional conflicts and inconsistency also occur at CSMFI that have acted 
as an impetus for change to occur. The decentralisation system initially practiced in CSMFI 
resulted in misaligned interests, conflicts and inconsistency and reduced the ability to control and 
coordinate activities. It was observed that different branches practiced certain accounting and 
accountability functions in different ways. The General Manager commented, 
The reports generated by various branches made consolidation difficult as the 
operations department has always complained. This is simply because such reports or 
statements were not uniform. This is the reason why CSMFI thought having a 
uniform centralised system would help resolve irregular practices and give the 
organisation a professional look, increase the collaborative efforts of employee and 
help towards becoming a better bank. 
 
With the decentralised system, employee from different branches reacted differently to similar 
situations from clients, which created problems within the organisation in regard to how clients 
were treated. The present structural arrangement with a centralised system makes the accounting 
and accountability functions clear and resolves conflicts where they are seen as a contradiction 
according to Seo and Creed (2002), even though centralisation has made the decision-making 
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and reporting process, for example, more complicated with more formal hierarchies and 
increased number of personnel on the decision-making and accountability ladders. 
 
7.3.4 Enabling Conditions 
The literature has argued that there are different types of enabling conditions that will make 
change in an institution to take place, broadly classified under field level conditions and actor’s 
position (Leca et al., 2008). The availability of resources and organisational power relations 
(Hardy and Maguire, 2008) has also been discussed. Jasyasinghe et al. (2007; 2009) also point 
out that issues around ‘emotions’ are vital in studying the conditions under which change can 
occur in a social organisational setting. How people feel about the change to be introduced 
cannot be ignored. In CSMFI, management appear to be given little room to express their 
feelings or emotions as to what they think about changing from one mission to another. One of 
the BOD explained that; 
It is not our place to decide on the change in the organisation but that of the 
shareholders, usually at the AGM. As we all know, shareholders usually think in line 
with their interest which to me is what is killing the organisation. The change in 
mission from client focus to a more profit focus one was mainly the idea of 
shareholders who see to it that management incorporates it in the daily running of 
CSMFI. 
 
The Head of Social Corporate Responsibility also added that; 
In my opinion I think by not giving employee and clients or even the general public 
the opportunity to express their feeling and opinions about changing the mission 
means imposing decisions on management and the targeted clients end up being 
those outside the microfinance scope: the non-poor. Unlike in the past when 
CSMFI’s mission was still solely social, today the needs of clients are different and 
clearly needs of the non-poor like having an international money transfer and online 
banking practice. 
 
In line with the review of the actor’s position in an organisation, it can be argued that the 
changes in CSMFI were largely successful because those who initiated them occupied influential 
positions in the organisational structure. Granlund (2001) argues that changes in structure put 
significant pressure on accounting and accountability to change, as is the case with CSMFI 
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where centralisation directly impacted on decision-making and control process and the presence 
of Banker’s Realm and new software also affected reporting.  
The current changes at CSMFI came mainly from senior management and regulators, with little 
attention paid to the grassroots. The Head of Consumer and Client Care said, 
Following the comments and suggestions we receive from clients especially those via 
suggestion boxes and given the changes that we notice within the organisation 
especially recently, I think most of the idea of the changes that have been put in place 
ignore clients’ suggestions. 
 
It can be argued here that the lower ranking position of clients does not impact positively on the 
changes, but rather senior managerial positions act as enabling change conditions in CSMFI. The 
above argument confirms Garud et al. (2002) and Maguire et al.’s (2004) views that for change 
to be initiated by actors they must occupy certain positions (Beckert, 1999) be it subject-related 
(Maguire et al., 2001) as the case above or social (Battilana, 2006). Precisely, the subject 
position comes from the Deputy and new General Managers, who can be argued to occupy 
influential positions that can impact on CSMFI’s decision-making process. Internally, the 
Deputy Manager collaborates with the General Manager and the General Manager networks with 
the BOD, which then networks with and convinces the General Assembly, which helps in 
accepting and implementing change such as the software. It can therefore be concluded here that 
without the General Manager accepting or seeing the reason for the change in software initiated 
by their deputy due to “the quest for professionalism” (First semester management report, 
2009:11), the replacement of the old software might have been impossible or resisted after 
initiation.  
 
In addition, the fact that the Deputy General Manager in charge of Operations had the necessary 
subject skills following the job description to include interpreting and analysing the situation of 
the company and preparing financial reports, statements and projections, ability to gain 
knowledge of state financial regulations, financial and accounting software applications, time 
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management, organisational and communication skills was enough for the idea about the change 
in software to be initiated. This can be related to the issue of power over decision-making, as 
suggested by Burns (2000). The ability to be able to make certain decisions within an 
organisation has to do with the subject position of the actor, particularly in an organisation such 
as CSMFI where decisions are centralised.  
 
Powell (1991) argues that the interest, preferences and choices or behaviour of people cannot be 
well understood if isolated from the cultural setting or historical period in which they operate or 
are embedded. Creed et al. (2002) and Hardy and Maguire (2008) add that cultural resources are 
also vital for institutional entrepreneurship to occur. Thus, studying the larger cultural setting in 
relation to the behaviour gives a better picture of the impetus for change in CSMFI. The idea of 
trust remains outstanding in CSMFI, which can arguably be used to explain why certain changes 
were able to be instituted. Clients believe that the microfinance’s sole mission is to help them 
succeed in their social and developmental activities, boosting their finances. It was observed that 
a significant number of clients from a particular branch come from either the same village or 
church or operate in the same business line. When these clients were interviewed, it was noticed 
that when one or two clients join a particular MFI, they convince their neighbours during village 
meetings or gatherings to become members of the same MFI, as the case with CSMFI suggested. 
Such clients trust each other and can easily be convinced to become members by their 
neighbours. CSMFI has over the years attempted to maintain such confidence from its clients and 
this has served as an enabling condition to implement change. The management was convinced 
that they could increase and expand their customer base. The Head of the Marketing Department 
in the 2012 Marketing and research report pointed out, 
 Stakeholders’ confidence and trust is an extremely valuable asset in CSMFI with 
clients becoming all the more discerning, informed and making prudent banking and 
financial decisions. We believe as we grow our clients will continue to support and 
transact business with us. 
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Furthermore, CSMFI is a financially viable organisation; hence it had the financial resources to 
support the change. Finance is therefore an enabling condition for change. Agents are able to 
mobilise these resources as a lever to negotiate the collaborative support and effort of the change 
vision (DiMaggio, 1988; Hardy and Maguire, 2008). 
  
It was easy to demonstrate the benefits of the changes in CSMFI, hence this enabled the change. 
For example, the introduction of the new software and centralisation of decision-making 
enhanced decision-making and speeded up processes in comparison to the previous software and 
decentralised systems. The time auditors spend moving from one branch to another was reduced 
with centralisation. The internal auditor at the Head Office can now control activities of branches 
from there. The available cost (use of finance, according to Greenwood and Suddaby (2006)) 
and time minimisation factor serve as enabling conditions for institutional entrepreneurship to 
take place in CSMFI. 
 
7.3.5 Implementation Process  
It has been argued that change initiators can rarely bring about institutional changes on their own 
without the collaborative efforts of other embedded actors (Lawrence et al., 2002) who are 
supportive of the idea of change. The mobilisation of allies, especially professionals and experts, 
remains vital for change to be successful (Greenwood et al., 2002; Fligstein, 1997; Leca et al., 
2008). In CSMFI, there has been a collaborative effort from employee to see to it that the 
changes such as software and centralisation changes become effectively applied in the day-to-
day running of the organisation. The heads of department supervise their departments, the branch 
managers control and supervise the implementation of changes by their employee and the 
internal auditor makes sure that management is doing what is expected of them, overseen by the 
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General Manager following reports. Dorado (2005) and Leca et al. (2008) add that 
implementation involves mainly strategy and skills. The General Manager pointed out, 
Even though it is true that it is not easy to implement change, we can say that CSMFI 
is kind of lucky that most of its employee were expecting certain changes to be made 
within the organisation when they learnt of the new organisation’s mission. 
 
CSMFI trains employee using in-house training workshops run by professionals external to the 
organisation, which compulsory for employee to attend and after which they are tested. The 
Management report 2009 states, 
The first training in line with new mission was in 2009 where loan and recovery 
officers of CSMFI were drilled on the new lending and recovery policies which 
lasted for over 8 hours. Other in-house trainings were carried out by heads of 
department and services given mainly to front office employee, credit officer (on new 
credit procedures) and internal controllers (reconciliation and internal control 
procedures). 
Sanctions are usually levied on those who fail to attend training workshops, especially those 
regarding changes made in the organisation. The sanctions range from warning letters to 
dismissals, depending on the circumstance surrounding the absence. Also the head of department 
and branch managers’ job descriptions require them to monitor the application of certain 
organisational changes made by the subordinate employee and produce a report which counts 
towards employee evaluation. A collaborative work environment is usually encouraged in 
CSMFI, which supports the argument by Wijen and Ansari (2007), Bruton et al. (2010) and 
Dorado (2013) that change can only be successfully implemented if there is a collaborative effort 
from social actors with divergent interests, as opposed to isolated actors.  
The Internal Auditor is also responsible for making sure employees do their job in line with the 
organisational rules and practices, thus making sure that employee implement all the changes 
that have been officially sanctioned in the correct manner. The Head of Marketing and Corporate 
Communications in the 2012 Marketing and research report pointed out,  
We have realized that a communication approach that bases its foundation on 
honesty, accuracy and simplicity, is the most effective and enduring. We also firmly 
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believe that both internal and external communications should be in consonance with 
the core principles of who we are and what we stand for as a banking institution. 
 
In line with Battilana et al.’s (2009) argument that implementing change that will build an 
already existing institution is very challenging, not to mention that which will break existing 
institutions, the implementation process of Banker’s Realm was very challenging from top to 
bottom. At the senior management level, this started with a delay in the General Manager 
conveying the idea to senior management when the individual pressure was levied by the 
Operations Manager until the management team exerted more pressure. At the AGM level, 
where some members resisted certain organisational changes due to tight budgets for training and 
purchases, such structural changes became more challenging. However, the AGM members in 
support of changes such as the change in software argued that hiring experienced employee 
would reduce the cost of training and these employees could be made to run in-house training 
(Management report, 2009), thus minimising cost. After giving management a trial session of 
employing experienced employee, CSMFI noticed positive implementation changes via in-house 
training from recently employed experts. The Internal Controller commented, 
The control department together with the departmental heads see to it that the new 
software is being used by employee in order to assure quality. Also employee are free 
to request training in certain domains of changes such as the case with the system 
software or where they think they are not competent enough in order to assure the 
application. 
 
Each departmental employee member also developed trust in their departmental head by them 
offering them training and via meetings which eased the implementation of certain 
organisational changes. Loan officers, for example, are usually given the same training and will 
feel comfortable asking another loan officer about what they do not understand or agree with, 
and can easily be convinced by their colleague, making the implementation process easier 
(normative pressure). This statement confirms Smets et al.’s (2012) argument that people in the 
same profession can easily cooperate, convince and trust each other, reducing the pains of 
resistance to the implementation of change.  
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In addition, MFIs, particularly commercially focused ones, have been argued to impose certain 
decisions on actors without giving them room for choice (Dorado, 2005; Battilana and Leca, 
2008; Battilana and Dorado, 2010). The employee of CSMFI has continuously been threatened 
with sanctions for failing to apply certain organisational changes in various daily operations, and 
others have even been dismissed following resistance to change, and CSMFI believes that such 
sanctions serve as a lesson to other employees (Management report, 2009). Burns (2000) adds 
that the reason why employees are forced to comply with organisational changes is because they 
have little or no power to influence organisational decisions.  
 
The implementation of centralisation was easily undertaken by making sure senior management 
worked together with lower management to achieve a common objective. For example, the heads 
of departments’ functions were revised to include the coordination of all departmental activities, 
liaising with lower management via reports and day-to-day activities. A communication online 
chat forum was also been created where employee can interact to resolve the distance problem in 
addition to maximising time and minimising cost. With the internal online chat forum, every 
department and service is able to communicate about the daily operations that take place t 
CSMFI while maintaining certain confidential client information. This means of communication 
in CSMFI has helped in the implementation of change, since employee can also use it as a 
learning forum without necessarily travelling to either undertake training workshops or attend 
meetings. In summary, training sessions did work and ease structural change implementation 
even though many challenges including non-compliance and decoupling were encountered 
during the process.  
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7.3.6 Impact on CSMFI   
The impact of initiating change on CSMFI has been discussed in line with its mission, structure 
and accountability practices. It can be argued that the attempt to initiate change in CSMFI 
resulted in change even though decoupling/ resistance were at times evident. 
7.3.6.1 Change 
Some of the changes that have been introduced at CSMFI have been successfully implemented 
over the years, for example the change in mission from a charity organisation to a cooperative 
(Category 1) MFI and the current hard work to become a Category 2 MFI under the canopy of a 
bank. Structural changes such as centralisation and the introduction of new software have also 
been successfully implemented and are currently used at CSMFI. The fact that all of the 
financial statements and reports are produced with the aid of Banker’s Realm is a sign that the 
software change has successfully been instituted. Also, it is current practice at CSMFI that most 
operations are controlled by the Head Office by various departments networking with the 
branches as shown in Figure 6.5 in Chapter 6. The increased number of functions and 
departments has also been successfully instituted at CSMFI, with evidence from reports 
generated and financial statements showing practical operations. The organisational chart also 
reflects such changes, including the addition of departments such as the Small and Medium Size 
Enterprises and Corporate Social Responsibility departments.  
 
The introduction of new policies at CSMFI has also eroded certain organisational practices, 
including accountability to the community, which existed when CSMFI was still a charity 
organisation. There has therefore been a weakening and disappearance of downwards 
accountability practices in CSMFI as a result of mission drift. 
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Table 7.3 shows a summary of the various changes that have taken place recently at CSMFI 
following the change process, including the major sources of pressure and the reasons behind 
their levels. 
7.3.6.2 Decoupling and Resistance 
In spite of the argument that the changes have been largely successful, there has still been some 
evidence of resistance and decoupling. For example, some of the older employee, particularly at 
the branch level, resisted the introduction of first the centralisation and second the software. 
Centralisation was perceived to be too bureaucratic and complex, with too many departments 
and functions in the hierarchy, demanding more accountability to a wider group of stakeholders 
and also being seen to reduce the power of lower level management and grassroots. The complex 
nature of the decision-making process as a result of centralisation gave room for resistance, 
especially by branch managers, who initially had higher decision-making powers vested in them. 
It is clear that after centralisation the approval and execution of certain accounting operations 
rested more with the departmental heads at the Head Office level, unlike before when branch 
managers were given such powers. The implication here is that decision-making has become 
more formal and complex and employee (mostly aged 50+ according to the interview scripts) 
who resisted were not willing to change their normal scripted ways of practice. One of the 
branch managers commented, 
My reason for not supporting the new idea of centralisation was because it is going to 
cease my power towards making certain banking decisions for my clients and make 
me feel unrecognised.  
 
The change in software was initially resisted at the board level, with budget constraints being the 
main reason. At the management level, employee members that were not willing to learn and 
deviate from their daily routines also resisted. Resisting employee did not have an interest in 
using the new system at all, and when forced by senior management to do so with various 
threats, some decided to resign and others abandoned the service; those who stayed and did not 
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comply with such organisational changes were even dismissed, as pointed out in the 
Management report (2009,) when the change was initiated (Table 7.2). This confirms Power 
(1991) and Seo and Creed’s (2002) argument that various institutionalised structures and 
practices become implemented naturally and legitimately without question, and efforts to try to 
change them will later be resisted as change will disrupt set routines and even be more costly. 
However, the further change of software at CSMFI still did not favour the older employee who 
had resisted previous software changes. 
 
TABLE 7.3: Recent Effects of Resistance to Change in CSMFI  
Names29 Observation Motive 
A Dismissal Gross unprofessional and unethical behaviour 
B Resignation Dissatisfied with working conditions 
C Resignation Not happy with changes in CSMFI, got another 
job somewhere else 
D Resignation Not happy with changes in CSMFI, got another 
job somewhere else 
E Resignation Personal reasons 
F Abandoned service  Not known 
G Abandoned service Not known 
H Resignation Travel to the USA with family 
 
Source: CSMFI’s first semester management report (2009: 13) 
 
In addition, CSMFI has invested a considerable amount of resources on a yearly basis especially 
since 2009 when its mission and objectives changed to include profitability. Seo and Creed 
(2002) in support of Powell (1991) argue that when a huge amount of economic resources have 
been invested in an organisation, it is difficult for actors to respond to changes easily. That is, 
there is bound to be resistance to change. Such a considerable amount of investment started in 
2009, as shown by the analysis of the investment committee, with more attention given to 
infrastructure, marketing and product development (75% of the budget allocated for the change 
                                                          
29 Names not revealed for reasons of confidentiality  
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in software), computers and accessories amongst other unforeseen needs necessary for the 
success of the MFI (CSMFI’s first semester management report, 2009).  
 
Some management employee, especially lower management reluctantly accepted such 
organisational changes because of the fear of losing their jobs given the history of how employee 
that resisted changes were penalised. Although some of the changes have been successful in 
theory, in practice some of these changes are not effective and new practices are not used (Audit 
report, 2010).30 It can be argued here that there is decoupling, which Oliver (1992) defines as a 
situation where actors accept certain institutionalised procedures but intentionally fail to put 
them into practice, also known as ‘window-dressing’. The decoupling action, according to the 
auditor’s report, came mainly from credit and recovery officers despite the number of training 
sessions they had attended. One of the credit officers added (expressing anger), 
Our reason for my colleagues to have accepted the software and centralisation 
change even though reluctantly was for the fear of losing their jobs. We did not want 
to accept the changes because we knew that our fraudulent activities with loans might 
be discovered by top management. We have always operated for the past years with 
the notion that ‘charity begins at home’. 
 
Some of the employee have were made to attend disciplinary meetings as a method of attempting 
to put more pressure on the implementation of changes, to no avail.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30 The audit report was given to the researcher to read for 1 hour, after which it was taken back for reasons of 
confidentiality 
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TABLE 7. 4: Summary of Institutional Entrepreneurship in CSMFI 
Changes  
(What?) 
Institutional 
entrepreneurs 
(Who?) 
Pressures  
(Where?) 
Why? Result 
Mission 
Level 1: From charity 
to cooperative 
One of the 
association 
members 
Association- internal 
(CSMFI) 
- Public 
- Felt responsible  
- Reach a wider 
community  
- Expansion 
(growth) and 
development 
Successful 
 
(mission 
drift) 
Level 2: From 
cooperative to bank 
Shareholders - COBAC,  
- MINFIN 
- ANEMCAM 
- Tax authorities 
- Shareholders 
- CSMFI 
(Management) 
- Individuals  
- Clients  
- To comply with 
regulatory rules 
- To remain 
competitive 
- To pay more taxes 
- Profitability  
- To operate in line 
with mission and 
objectives 
- To meet their 
needs  
In 
progress 
 
(mission 
drift in 
progress) 
Structure (impact from Level 2) 
- Centralisation  New General 
Manager  
Internally as a result 
of change in mission 
- In order to have 
uniformity  
- Ease control  
- Maximise time 
- Accessibility of data 
(flexibility) 
- Minimise cost 
Successful 
- Software  Deputy 
Manager 
(Operations) 
Internally as a result 
of change in mission 
- Faster/ Flexible 
- Consolidation  
- Better banking 
operations 
Resistance 
issues 
- Head office BOD Internally as a result 
of change in mission 
 Successful 
- Increase in 
employee and 
functions 
Human 
Resource 
Manager 
Internally as a result 
of change in mission 
- To guarantee 
effectiveness and 
efficiency 
- Timeliness of 
banking operations 
- To absorb increased 
tasks due to 
expansion and 
growth 
- To offer more 
employment to 
Cameroonian society 
Successful 
- Increase in BOD  Internally as a result - Expansion and Successful 
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number of 
branches 
(network) 
of change in mission growth 
- Depth and breadth of 
outreach  
Accounting and Accountability practices 
- Upwards from 
downwards 
 Internal and external 
pressures 
Addition of external 
stakeholders to whom 
accountability is 
demanded 
Successful  
- Reporting 
format 
 COBAC, MINFIN, 
Management 
To adapt to change in 
structure as a result of 
change on mission 
Resistance 
issues  
- Decision-
making (from 
informal to 
formal) 
  BOD  Successful 
- Control (now 
embraces 
external 
control) 
 Internal and external 
auditors 
Successful 
- Performance 
measurement 
(quantitatively 
done + BSC) 
 Management and 
ANEMCAM 
Successful 
- Project 
participation 
 Clients and 
Management 
Report to senior 
management 
Successful 
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7.3.6.3 Typology of Change 
 
The change discussed here can be arguably referred to as evolutionary, following Burns and 
Scapens’ (2000) typology of change. They suggest that any change that is of a practicable or 
random nature having some inertial forces usually resulting in new organisational rules and  
routines is said to be evolutionary in nature. However, according to Sulaiman and Mitchell’s 
(2005) typology of change, the decision to introduce centralisation in CSMFI can be argued to 
be a replacement. According to Sulaiman and Mitchell (2005), the software change can be said 
to be a replacement and according to Burns and Scapens (2000), evolutionary. The budgetary 
change, on the other hand can be argued to be a modification, simply because the budgeting 
process in CSMFI was only modified following the change in their mission (Chapter 6). Table 
7.4 is a summary of the types of changes that have occurred in CSMFI in line with the above 
classification. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
252 
 
 
TABLE 7.5: Typology of Change in CSMFI 
  
 
 
 
 
Typology of change 
Burns and Scapens (2000) Sulaiman and Mitchell (2005) 
Evolutionary 
or Progressive 
Revolutionary 
or Regressive  
Replacement  Modification  Addition  Reduction  
Mission and 
objectives 
 ✔   ✔  
Structure 
-Increase in 
employee 
-Introduction of new 
department 
✔  ✔  ✔  
   ✔ ✔  
Software (MIS) ✔  ✔    
Budgeting  ✔   ✔   
Decision-making 
- Centralis-
ation  
✔  ✔    
- New 
Branches/ 
departments/ 
functions 
✔   ✔ ✔  
Performance 
measurement/ 
management 
✔   ✔   
Control    ✔   
Accountability/ 
Reporting 
   ✔ ✔  
Regulations   ✔ ✔ ✔  
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7.4 Chapter Summary  
 
The discussion provided in the chapter has suggested that institutional change originates mainly 
from the interplay between existing pressures (macro or micro), power structures, culture and 
institutional contradictions groomed by the actions of actors (institutional entrepreneurs) in such 
settings. The key issues that emerged from the discussion are highlighted in Figure 7.4 below. 
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FIGURE 7.4: CSMFI’s Institutional Entrepreneurship Process 
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It has been observed that practical accountability in CSMFI stills lays much emphasis on 
‘upward’ and ‘external’ accountability, while the ‘downward’ and ‘internal’ accountability 
dimensions still remain comparatively missing. Furthermore, CSMFI has also paid more 
attention to ‘functional’ short-term accountability responses, with little attention to the ‘strategic’ 
processes vital for the assurance of long-term social and political change. The accountability and 
reporting system changed as a result of changes in the mission, which subsequently led to 
changes in the structure and internal processes. 
The above changes have been discussed drawing on the themes stemming out of the theoretical 
framework of the thesis, including the four institutional pressure levels, actors, institutional 
contradictions, change enabling conditions, the implementation of the change process and the 
results in terms of whether or not change finally took place. Issues surrounding resistance and 
decoupling have also been highlighted. The next chapter provides the conclusion to the thesis, 
where the major findings, contribution, limitations and future research direction are highlighted. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.0 Introduction 
The study explores the nature of accounting and accountability practices in MFIs with particular 
interest whether such practices have changed over time in line with the mission drift argument 
advanced in the literature. The study was particularly motivated by the increasing role of MFIs 
in socio-economic development and poverty alleviation in developing countries, especially in 
sub-Saharan Africa where these institutions are growing at a rapid rate. The missing role of 
actors in analysing change also added to the study’s motivation.  The challenges that MFIs face, 
particularly in a growing competitive and regulatory environment characterised largely by an 
informal, poor and illiterate client base have also been well documented.  
 
The study adopts an interpretive paradigm with the notion that accounting and accountability 
practices are socially constructed and need to be studied within their organisational context. 
Based on this, a case study approach was adopted where a microfinance organisation in 
Cameroon was studied. Data was collected from three main sources: semi-structured interviews, 
informal discussions and document analysis. The participants for the study were drawn from the 
Head Office and branches of the case organisation, as well as from customers of the firm. 
Further participants were drawn from external regulatory bodies. The data was transcribed, 
analysed and discussed in the preceding two chapters.  
 
This concluding chapter is divided into four sections. Following this introduction section, the 
next section presents a summary of the major findings, followed by the main contributions of the 
research. Fourth, the limitations of the study are presented together with suggestions for future 
research.  
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8.1 Summary of the Major Findings of the Study 
(1) The nature of CSMFI’s accounting and accountability practices  
It is clear from the study that the nature of accountability in CSMFI is largely formal, 
hierarchical and rules-based. In such a practice, upwards accountability relationships as opposed 
to downwards accountability relationships are clearly evident (figure 7.1). It can be concluded 
that downwards accountability, as suggested by Dixon et al. (2006), although existing in some 
forms, has become subservient to the need to demonstrate upwards accountability. Recently, the 
organisation has started to demonstrate rethinking about downwards accountability. New in 
CSMFI is the CSR department with a CSR Officer who has been making attempts to bring back 
customers into the accountability structure of CSMFI, based on the argument that CSMFI still 
includes its social mission in its structure. However, CSMFI’s relationship with its customers 
still operates on an informal basis. 
 
Upwards accountability is observed from management to shareholders and regulators and from 
the community or customers to management. Downwards accountability is evident through 
social projects employing the participative actions of clients or the community. However, such 
participative actions only assure functional accountability, as they remain limited to consultation 
(contacting village heads or farmers’ group leaders, management of social projects and clients) 
and implementation (funds from funders and management to the community or farmers). The 
community or farmers are not given the opportunity to control these projects or bring in their 
own initiatives as to how they want the farming project to run. Internal accountability occurs 
amongst shareholders or management themselves through self-evaluations following internal 
rules and regulations, even though unintended and informal. The implication here is that the 
accountability mechanisms evident in CSMFI are broad, including social projects and activities, 
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reports and disclosure statements, job descriptions and communications mechanisms, loans, 
performance evaluations, behaviours (ethics), self-regulation and compliance assessment and 
social audits. 
 
(2) Change(s) in CSMFI’s accounting and accountability practices 
In line with the main research aim, it was observed that the mission of the case organisation, 
CSMFI, has changed over the years, from a purely social one to one that includes profitability. 
This change has impacted on the governance structure of the firm to include centralisation, 
increase in employment and new positions and function. The mission and structural change has 
further impacted on the accounting and accountability practices as will be discussed below. 
Findings from the data collected show that the changes that have occurred in the governance 
structure of CSMFI were mainly in response to the changes in its mission and objectives.  
 
When CSMFI started as an association of individuals with the sole mission of poverty 
alleviation, downward accountability was evident. These individuals saw the need to provide 
agricultural products and small loans to farmers in their village and neighbouring villages. 
Farmers took upon themselves the responsibility (taking responsibility) to report to this group of 
individuals how well their crops were doing and so on. These groups of individuals established 
close informal relationships with farmers and actively participated in attended farmers meetings 
giving them their idea of what they thought could be done to improve on their harvest. This 
group of individuals later on noticed that the microcredit idea was welcomed and embraced by 
many farmers including those from other villages where they had not extended their charitable 
hand. In order to meet up with the growing demand from farmers, the group of individuals 
decided to include funders and management in the governance structure.  
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By the mid-2000s, the nature of CSMFI’s accountability practices changed to welcome upwards, 
formal accountability. CSMFI became a cooperative organisation with more stakeholders to 
include shareholders (funders) and management. This implied a more complex nature of 
accountability. Upwards (formal) accountability was emphasized as management and other 
group of stakeholders were held responsible to report back to shareholder or their fund providers. 
Clients also had to report back to management giving an account for example how loans were 
used and the process of their situation or business. Downward accountability gradually faded 
out. 
 
By 2010, CSMFI mission of becoming a bank clearly includes profitability in its objectives in 
addition to the neglected poverty alleviation one. The dual objective nature of CSMFI implies 
more accountability to different stakeholders making the structure more complex. More 
emphasis is still on upwards accountability to their regulators, supervisory body and 
management. However, CSMFI has recently (since 2013) started working hard on the nature of 
their grassroots accountability embracing clients’ needs. There has been an addition of the CSR 
section under the human resource department in CSMFI in a bid to assure downwards 
accountability to clients.  
 
(3) The institutional actors, roles and relative power in the change process 
One objective of the study was to understand the role of agency in the institutional or 
organisational change process. In the study, the actors involved in the process of change 
included two main groups: institutional entrepreneurs (change initiators) and participating actors 
(those who coordinated to effect the implementation or rejection of the change). The institutional 
entrepreneurs at CSMFI included the regulator (MINFIN), supervisory body (COBAC), new 
General Manager, Deputy General Manager in charge of Operations and Finance, shareholders 
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and even customers. The participating actors included management employee, the BOD, loan 
officers, customers, regulators and ANEMCAM.  
 
The roles played by these groups of actors have been well explain within the study (see chapter 6 
and 7) in either support or rejection of the organisation’s missions and objectives or even 
structural changes. Those who rejected some of the changes included mainly the lower 
management (older employee) of CSMFI. The power level used to implement decision-making 
on changes in CSMFI includes the government (regulators, tax authorities, and supervisors), 
BODs and even management as discussed in Chapter 6 and analysed in Chapter 7. 
 
(4) Challenges encountered in the accountability environment 
The study has found a number of challenges which impact on the accountability process in 
the case organisation. First, regulators operating in an embryonic evolving sector such as 
microfinance, where regulations often overlap and are very confusing. This has led to gaps 
in the regulatory mechanisms, posing questions on regulatory text, the reason for the 
continuous update of such regulatory text. In addition, the lack of sufficient resources 
(human, financial and logistics) to embark on such duties also hinders effective regulatory 
work. The evidence collected suggests that there are not less than 480 authorised MFIs in 
Cameroon. At the supervisory body in charge of MFIs, there are no more than 14 employee 
and 10 personnel from COBAC. Not all of the employees are trained to undertake 
supervision, control and evaluation, despite the emphasis laid by MINFIN on capacity 
building and manpower monitoring of MFIs.  
 
Second, in 2010 the management of CSMFI was still faced with three managerial challenges: 
organisational, timing and accountability. The preparation and reporting of timely and accurate 
accounting information is still a major challenge for CSMFI, especially with the change in 
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mission. However, efforts are being made to restructure the Operations and Control department 
and work on improved procedures in order to conform to the general accounting and regulatory 
norms.  
 
Third, the microfinance environment in Cameroon remains a competitive one with which a 
rapidly growing MFI like CSMFI must continuously strive to keep up. In order to keep up with 
the market competition, CSMFI has gradually moved towards operating as a Category 2 MFI, 
being more commercially orientated with the intention of also becoming a bank in the near 
future to speed up its growth. This will also help to address CSMFI’s long-term financial 
sustainability problem. CSMFI is also embarking on reviewing its customer service by engaging 
in continuous training of employee, especially those who act as customers’ first point of contact. 
This has led to an increased customer base, retention and satisfaction.  
Fourth, CSMFI also faces the internal problems of resistance and decoupling. Some employees, 
especially management employee, has been there since the beginning but are not willing to 
embrace the new institutional changes, and these people who have served as the pioneers of the 
organisation are difficult to uproot. Evidence gathered from the study suggests that some of the 
older employee seem not to be very literate, but they have historical and cultural influence in the 
organisation and the organisation claims that it cannot just do away with them simply because 
they need educated people. Besides other reasons, these individuals function as the archives or 
memory of the organisation. They are the source of reference for information about the 
organisation’s evolution, especially at the beginning, as there is no written documentation to 
refer to. There is also indiscipline and employee misconduct, especially through non-
collaborative efforts in accepting and learning the new managerial procedures and changes 
within CSMFI in order for the organisation to move forward. Such employees are usually 
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threatened with disciplinary sanctions which include dismissal, so resisting employee turn to 
accept the procedures against their will and comfortable organisational culture.  
 
Furthermore, there is a strong regional/ cultural influence within and outside the organisation. 
Most MFIs turn out to have huge number of customers from a particular village but now CSMFI 
is moving towards embracing all other citizens and hoping to see its dream come true of being 
the first 100% bilingual commercial bank/MFI 100% in the country. 
 
8.2 Thesis’ Contributions to Knowledge  
The study contributions to knowledge have been explained under three sub headings; empirical 
knowledge, theoretical knowledge and policy making / practice. The study is in response to 
Scapens (2006:28) – a call for a change in interpretive accounting research to include that which 
can impact on practice. Also, Scapens (2004) suggests that it is necessary to modify existing 
theories if they fail to provide satisfactory explanations. Thus the research starts by providing a 
theoretical framework that provides an insight relevant to practitioners. The thesis framework 
builds on Battilana et al (2009)’s framework following recent reviews. 
 
 
8.2.1 Empirical knowledge 
In responds to Unerman and O’Dwyer (2006) quest for a suitable accountability framework/ 
mechanisms, a proposed accountability framework has been developed in the study which the 
management of CSMFI has already agreed to use to improve on their accountability practices 
especially in relation to the ‘grassroots’ where eyebrows were raised. Several accountability 
mechanisms also emerged in the study which other MFIs (management) might want to adopt. 
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The knowledge of accounting and accountability change studied as a ‘process’ with subjective 
reasoning will help management in understanding organisational change process and make 
decisions that will enhance socio-economic development. For example understanding such 
process of change might help management minimise resistance challenges within their 
organisations. It was noticed that communication (Collaboration in implementing change as 
argued by Dorado, 2005; 2013) was essential for change to be successfully implemented at all 
levels within CSMFI- the reason for continuous centralisation and online chat forums. This can 
also help the management of other MFIs in implementing change. Similar organisations can use 
findings and proposed theoretical framework to act as a guide for them in attempting to 
understand MFIs accounting and accountability practices. 
 
The study raises awareness of the challenges that MFIs are likely to encounter in attempting to 
deliver proper accountability to stakeholders. This finding will serve as a guide to MFIs interest 
parties and will help them think of how to prevent such challenges in order to meet their 
objectives. 
 
Also research on how to conduct case study research mainly focuses on developed countries. 
The application of such published work in the study was not valid. Instead, social networks (pre-
established) were used to negotiate access. Thus, the implication here is social networking with 
case organisations is a very important strategy to adopt in conducting case study research in 
developing countries. It was also noticed that researchers from developed countries and nationals 
of the case country served as an added advantage. 
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8.2.2 Theoretical knowledge   
Sholars/ researchers can be able to use the thesis theoretical framework which extends the 
understanding of institutional entrepreneurship theory to better and further understand the role of 
actors (individuals as change agents) in accounting and accountability change. The proposed 
theoretical framework will aid different stakeholders to better the organisational context of 
accounting and accountability change process. 
 
The study contributes to the application of institutional entrepreneurship theory in accounting 
research. The study based on recent suggestions and limitations from other study, builds up on 
previous theoretical frameworks and arrives at a new theoretical framework (Figure 4.4) which 
has been adopted and used in the study. This current framework aids the researcher to 
understand on the change process in in CSMFI. The thesis theoretical framework can also be 
used by different stakeholders to include accounting research in studying, analysing and better 
understanding institutional or organisational change processes (the role and relative powers 
actors in the change process highlighted). 
 
The study contributes to the theoretical gap by embracing a discussion that includes grassroots 
accountability based on the argument that; even though recent attempts have been made to study 
microfinance accountability (O’Dwyer et al., 2005), grassroots accountability (Dixon et al., 
2006; Hopper et al., 2009) still remains underdeveloped. The inclusion of grassroots 
accountability in the study serves as an addition to the accountability literature specifically in 
Cameroon where such accountability study is missing.   
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The study adopts a case study approach. Traditionally management accounting research has been 
conducted mainly using large scale surveys and in positivistic studies. More emphasis on 
accounting has shifted towards understanding its organisational context (social life of 
organisations inclusive) which the study addresses. The study gives a deep understanding of the 
nature of accounting and accountability practices (as a process not outcome) highlighting 
individuals as agents of change.  
 
8.2.3 Policy making / Practice  
The study reveals that downwards accountability remains subservient (subdued) in favour of 
upwards accountability. This finding will assist policy makers like the government in 
formulating and implementing policies that are meant to enhance organisational accountability 
systems and improve on socio-economic development. (e.g ask socially focused organisations to 
submit reports detailing how they engaged clients and the community in their accountability 
practices).policy makers following the proposed accountability framework might see the need to 
design specific policies suitable for each type of organisation and not general rules. 
 
The specific policies will help to enhance organisational transparency which can assure better 
accountability. Such policies could make provisions for MFIs to submit reports detailing how 
they have engaged with the community. Furthermore, donors or funders of these MFIs can also 
insist on seeing evidence of accountability to the grassroots. The lesson learned from the study 
seems to be contrary to the theoretical concept of microfinance. Even though microfinance is 
theoretically thought to assist mainly the poor (Parikh, 2006), the practicality of MFIs usually 
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embraces a wider class of people, including even the rich. This is evident for CSMFI, where its 
daily operations are seen to be contrary to what is stated in its mission statement.  
 
Today, MFIs are more commercially focused, welcoming other client groups outside the 
poverty-stricken groups, and this is known in the literature as mission drift (Woller, 2002; 
Christen, 2001). However, the reason for CSMFI’s mission drift is in line with Zeller’s (2001) 
and others’ suggestion on microfinance commercialisation being aimed at ensuring the long-term 
financial sustainability of MFIs, which permits them to further pursue their social objectives.  
 
It was observed from the study that the management of CSMFI does not seem to have built 
enough trustworthy relationships with employee like loan officers and daily collectors following 
their activities, who make untrue reports, and this makes it difficult for it to understand and 
respond to customers’ needs. Thus, for the relationship between Types 2 and 3 or 2 and 4 
accountabilities to work (see Figure 8.1), there is a need for management to exert more control 
and audit such employee in order to strengthen these relationships and enhance (grassroots) 
accountability. That is, downwards accountability is necessary for aid and developmental 
organisations such as CSMFI in order to assure good performance and transparency. 
Incorporating customers’ views in the decision-making triangle is good but not enough. The 
following accountability framework has been suggested for further implementation. 
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FIGURE 8.1: Proposed Accountability Structure for CSMFI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Modified from Dixon et al. (2006) 
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Also, CSMFI like any other similar MFIs especially in Cameroon, there is need to give equal or 
more attention to its social mission if it is to remain a socially focused MFI, as stated in some the 
documents collected from CSMFI (Marketing brochures/ leaflets). It is recommended that it 
includes in its banking strategy, a department providing advice and guidance services to 
customers. The advice and guidance services should include tools such as budgeting and savings 
tools which customers are given some help with (budgeting help, managing debt, planning 
ahead). This will minimise bad debts and assure customers’ better finance management, thus 
reducing poverty rates.  
 
Having knowledge of institutional pressures driving change in the MFI environment will be 
useful for regulators (policy makers) and donors. Thus, this knowledge of institutional pressures 
(internal and external) can deepen and enrich their understanding as to what areas to be more 
mindful about when changing or developing accountability practices. 
 
8.3 Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Future Research 
First, as initially pointed out in the research methodology, case studies have been criticised for 
their failure to achieve external validity. This limitation has been recognised in this study. 
However it must be stated that other forms of validity, namely internal, content and construct 
validity have been achieved. In terms of external validity, the use of a single case study brings 
the problem of generalisation. The argument here is that the changes that occur at CSMFI may 
not be same in another case study inside Cameroon or in other developing countries (De Vaus, 
2001). The idea that research is valuable when the same results can be reproduced in another 
similar study/context is true in a quantitative study with a positivistic approach where there is an 
objective reality. However, in a qualitative study with an interpretive approach like this case 
with CSMFI, reality is seen as being constructed and can be reconstructed given changes 
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inherent in the environment. Meanings are seen in this case to change with time, hence it is not 
the aim of the research to “statistically” generalise the case study results but it rather intends to 
“analytically” generalise its findings. 
Second, the literature reviewed is mostly from developed countries and the few from developing 
countries did not include Cameroon, which can result in ignoring some pertinent developing 
country (particularly Cameroon) issues. This might affect the results of the study. However, this 
drawback was somehow overcome in the sense that some well-informed participants were 
interviewed, which supports Yin’s (2003) argument that such well-informed participants can 
provide vital insights to the study. 
Third, the study had very few participants from the government sector. Several appointments 
were organised which took almost two months but kept on being cancelled by the government 
officials due to their busy schedule. However, the limitation was overcome by relying on 
documents published and received directly from the few officials interviewed. The next 
paragraph talks about the recommendations for future study. 
In line with the theoretical framework of the thesis, the application of the framework in other 
organisations is recommended in order to further improve on analysing organisational change 
process. Another recommendation is that of conducting a study across different organisations 
and different developing countries in order to make generalisations and gain an in-depth 
understanding of microfinance accountability issues including their change processes. Last, in 
order to enrich the understanding of the regulatory pressure level that result in organisational 
changes, future studies should collect more primary data from regulators and other government 
officials and add to the data collected from other stakeholders. 
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